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iAbstract
Equipment	maintenance	is	one	of	the	most	important	areas	in	the	life-cycle	management	of	High	Energy	Physics	(HEP)	facilities.	In	HEP	facilities	(such	as	CERN,	ISOLDE,	GSI/FAIR,	GANIL,	FRIB	and	ESS),	beam	 intensities	are	 increasing.	 Ionizing	radiation	 is	a	significant	hazard.	 The	 ionizing	 radiation	 directly	 affects	 the	 health	 of	 radiation	 workers	 and	therefore	 it	 is	 desirable	 to	 reduce	 human	 intervention	 through	 robotic	 operations.	The	Facility	 of	 Antiproton	 and	 Ion	 Research	 (FAIR),	 a	 HEP	 facility	 under	 construction	 in	Darmstadt,	 Germany,	 will	 house	 the	 world’s	 most	 powerful	 Super	 Fragment	 Separator	(Super-FRS)	facility,	which	will	require	remote	maintenance.	One	section	of	the	Super-FRS	is	 termed	 the	main	 tunnel.	This	 is	160m	 long	 and	has	 four	 focal	planes.	The	Super-FRS	beamline	 inserts	will	 require	 remote	maintenance	 and	 remote	 inspection.	To	 carry	 out	these	Remote	Handling	(RH)	tasks,	a	RH	system	for	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel	is	essential.	RH	 equipment	 for	 HEP	 facilities	 are	 complex	 systems.	 They	 must	 operate	 within	 an	intricate	environment	with	multiple	 interfaces.	However,	 there	 is	very	 limited	 literature	on	how	to	approach	the	development	and	evaluation	of	RH	concepts	at	HEP	facilities	even	though	 various	 facilities	 have	 developed	 RH	 systems	 tailored	 to	 their	 individual	environments.		This	 thesis	 proposes	 new	 systematic	 approach	 for	 developing	 and	 evaluation	 of	 RH	concept	designs	targeted	to	help	maintenance	procedures	at	HEP	facilities.	The	systematic	approach	is	composed	of	Systems	Engineering	(SE)	State	of	the	Art	practices	molded	to	fit	HEP	 facilities	 needs	 and	 requirements.	 The	 SE	 approach	 for	 HEP	 facilities	 focuses	 on	finding	 optimum	 RH	 solution	 by	 exploiting	 HEP	 facilities	 limited	 resources	 available	compared	 to	 nuclear	 power	 production	 industry.	The	 systematic	 approach	 is	 tested	 to	develop	the	RH	maintenance	solution	for	Super-FRS	main	tunnel	scenario	for	FAIR	facility.	The	 practice	 carried	 out	 during	 this	 research	 work	 resulted	 in	 the	 best	 possible	 RH	solution	for	Super-FRS	and	is	currently	under	development	for	the	Super-FRS	facility.		The	 research	work	 to	develop	 systematic	 approach	 for	development	of	RH	 system	was	based	on	a	very	critical	State	of	the	Art	study	that	has	not	been	carried	for	HEP	facilities	till	now.	 The	 State	 of	 the	 Art	 studies	 explores	 the	 HEP	 facilities	 in	 detail	 and	 results	 in:	classification	of	HEP	facilities	RH	environments,	classification	of	RH	equipment	currently	used	at	HEP	facilities	and	present	status	of	SE	knowledge	integration	within	HEP	facilities.		The	systematic	approach	 to	develop	RH	system	and	knowledge	attained	during	State	of	the	Art	 studies	 are	 utilized	 to	 develop	 three	RH	 system	 concept	designs	 that	 fulfill	 the	Super-FRS	RH	 requirements.	 This	 research	 work	 focuses	 on	 collaborating	 between	 RH	experts	 to	 conduct	 reliable	 and	 creditable	 trade-off	 analysis	 for	 RH	 system	 concepts	evaluation.	The	aim	of	collaboration	with	RH	experts	is	to	develop	diversify	the	systematic	approach	for	RH	system	concept	development.	The	collaboration	and	the	State	of	the	Art	studies	enable	 the	model	 to	 formalize	 the	procedures	 that	will	ensure	 the	 integration	of	RH	needs	into	facility’s	development	by	classifying	(Commercial	Off-the–Shelf	(COTS))	RH	equipment	and	by	identifying	key	steps	in	the	development	of	RH	concepts.		The	 developed	RH	 concepts	 for	 Super-FRS	 are	 evaluated	 for	 requirements	 traceability,	functional	 analysis,	 radiation	dose	 analysis,	 possible	 system	 failure	 scenarios,	 including	cost	estimates,	and	task	sequence	optimization	analysis.	The	result	of	trade-off	analysis	is	delivered	 in	 the	 form	of	optimal	RH	system	design	 that	 fulfills	 the	RH	requirements	and	will	be	developed	to	carry	out	RH	tasks	at	Super-FRS	facility.		This	thesis	provides	details	concerning	each	concept	design’s	merits	and	demerits,	along	with	 suggestions	 for	 design	 changes	 needed	 to	 improve	 RH	 system’s	 flexibility	 and	performance.	 The	 systematic	 approach	 used	 to	 develop	 the	 RH	 concepts	 was	 used	 to	
ii
identify	 and	 address	 the	 critical	 issues	 with	 Super-FRS	 tunnel	 layout,	 beamline	 insert	designs,	 storage	 /	 transport	 of	 activated	 parts,	 and	 remote	 maintenance	 integration	 at	very	early	stage	of	HEP	facility	design.	The	 research	 work	 in	 this	 thesis	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 the	 future	 systematic	 RH	 systems	concepts	design,	and	development	practices;	by	moving	beyond	the	classical	approaches	to	 develop	 concept	 designs	 at	 the	 HEP	 facilities.	 The	 conclusion	 will	 also	 present	 a	summary	 design	 comparison,	 relevant	 technologies,	 advantages,	 limitations	 and	 future	research	work	opportunities.	
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Preface
The	main	focus	of	this	thesis	is	to	develop	RH	system	concept	using	SE	knowledge	to	carry	out	remote	maintenance	at	HEP	facilities.	The	work	has	been	carried	out	within	the	Pre-venting	hUman	inteRvention	for	increased	SAfety	in	inFra-structurEs	(PURESAFE)	project,	which	 is	an	 Initial	Training	Network	(ITN)	 for	the	 training	of	young	researchers,	 funded	under	 the	European	Commission’s	Seventh	Framework	Programme	Marie	Curie	Actions.	ITNs	have	two	fold	goals.	On	one	hand,	the	purpose	of	ITN	is	to	develop	the	career	of	Early	Stage	Researchers	(ESRs)	by	 improving	 their	research	skills	and	 integrating	 the	min	 the	research	teams.	On	the	other	hand,	the	research	which	results	from	these	networks	is	ex-pected	to	be	of	great	scientific	value	and	have	high	impact.		The	aim	of	the	PURESAFE	ITN	 is	to	provide	solutions	for	cost-efficient	 life-cycle	manage-ment	of	facilities	that	generate	 ionizing	radiation.	To	achieve	this,	new	engineering	tech-niques	 have	 been	 studied,	 both	 in	 hardware	 and	 software.	 Implementation	 of	 a	 SE	 ap-proach	to	develop	RH	solutions	has	 large	benefits	for	maintaining	these	facilities.	There-fore,	one	of	the	research	packages	within	PURESAFE	has	been	focused	on	developing	RH	solutions	 for	 the	Super-FRS	 facility.	The	main	results	of	 the	work	carried	out	 in	said	re-search	package	are	presented	in	this	thesis.	The	research	work	presented	in	this	thesis	has	been	carried	out	at	GSI,	Darmstadt.	I	would	like	to	express	my	sincere	gratitude	to	my	project	supervisor	Dr.	Helmut	Weick,	who	gave	me	 the	chance	 to	participate	 in	this	experience	and	 for	his	support	and	guidance	during	the	whole	project.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	him	for	his	support,	not	only	in	the	actual	de-velopment	work,	but	also	 in	research	work	and	 in	the	doctoral	studies.	Without	his	sup-port,	this	thesis	would	have	never	been	possible.	
I	would	like	also	to	express	my	sincere	gratitude	towards	Professor	Jouni	Mattila,	my	doc-toral	thesis	supervisor	at	TUT	and	coordinator	of	PURESAFE	project	for	his	unfailing	guid-ance	and	encouragement	throughout	the	preparation	of	this	thesis.	
I	would	also	like	to	give	special	thanks	to	all	PURESAFE	consortium	members	for	provid-ing	the	 inputs	that	they	have	provided	to	make	this	research	work	possible.	 I	would	also	like	to	specially	thank	my	fellow	Early	Stage	Researchers	at	PURESAFE	project	for	such	a	diverse	and	rich	research	working	experience.	This	thesis	would	have	not	been	what	it	is	with	help,	input	and	enthusiasm	of	PURESAFE	personnel.	Finally,	 I	would	 like	 to	 thank	my	whole	 family	especially	my	wife	Nousheen	Bibi,	 father	Amjad	Ali,	and	mother	Shahnaz	Parveen	for	providing	the	time,	encouragement	and	sup-port	in	order	to	complete	my	thesis	when	I	need	them	most.	Darmstadt	02.08.2016	Faraz	Amjad
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11 Introduction
1.1 Research context
1.1.1 The importance and challenges of fundamental experimental physics re-
searchHigh-energy	and	nuclear	physics	research	communities	are	pushing	the	boundaries	of	knowledge	con-cerning	known	nuclides	in	order	to	understand	nature	at	its	most	basic	level.	Modern	fragment	sepa-rator	facilities	have	made	it	possible	to	study	of	the	fundamental	questions	of	the	universe	in	the	fields	of	nuclear	structure	and	astrophysics.	Fragment	separator	facilities	are	designed	to	deliver	beams	of	rare	nuclei	via	 fragmentation	and	 fission	reactions	caused	by	high-energy	beams	hitting	targets.	Ad-vances	 in	 technology	have	 enabled	 scientists	 to	build	powerful	 facilities	 for	producing	high-energy	beams	of	short-lived	radioactive	nuclei.	Rare	isotopes	are	radioactively	unstable,	and	they	decay	into	stable	nuclei	by	emitting	radiation.	Figure	1	shows	a	nuclide	chart	as	a	function	of	proton	and	neutron	numbers.	The	nuclei	shown	in	black	are	the	more	stable	nuclei;	these	have	very	long	half-lives	and	can	be	found	naturally	in	the	universe.	The	more	unstable	and	discovered	nuclei	are	shown	in	orange.	The	green	region	of	the	chart	shows	nuclei	that	have	been	theoretically	predicted,	but	that	are	thus	far	un-known	to	mankind[1].	In	 the	 current	 scientific	 environment,	 radioactive	beams	 represent	 the	primary	way	 to	 explore	 the	uncharted	regions	of	the	nuclei	chart	(Figure	1)	and	to	find	answers	concerning	the	evolution	of	the	universe	 [2][3][4].	The	main	aim	of	Rare	 Isotope	Beam	(RIB)	 facilities	 is	to	study	nuclear	physics	 in	order	to	understand	the	properties	of	nuclear	matter	and	atomic	nuclei	in	order	to	answer	such	fun-damental	questions	such	as:	
· What	is	the	significance	of	unstable	nuclei	in	the	nuclear	processes	that	shape	the	visible	uni-verse	[5]?		
· To	discover	new	forms	of	matter	and	to	study	the	structure	and	behavior	of	matter	at	extreme	conditions,	(namely)	when	a	transition	from	nuclear	to	quark	gluon	matter	occurs	[1]?	
2Figure	 1.	Chart	 of	nuclide:	 stable,	discovered	 and	predicted	nuclei.	Presented	 as	 function	 of	
their	Proton	(Z)	and	Neutron	(N)	numbers[1].	The	Organization	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD)	Global	Science	Forum’s	report	[6]	shows	that	RIB	facilities	are	producing	the	latest	and	most	important	research	in	the	field	of	nucle-ar	physics.	The	research	performed	 in	these	facilities	has	a	direct	 impact	on	medical	 imaging,	cancer	treatment,	environmental	research,	 food	processing,	material	sciences,	accelerator	 technology,	space	technology,	space	sciences,	microchip	 fabrication,	biology	and	clean	energy	 technologies	 [6].	Within	the	 last	decade,	 the	Nuclear	Physics	European	Collaboration	Committee	 (NuPECC)[7]	have	 reported	major	progress	and	discoveries	in	the	field	of	nuclear	physics	that	have	direct	applications	to	society.	
1.1.2 Importance of particle acceleratorsIn	2000,	an	estimated	15,000	particle	accelerators		[8]	were	operational	across	the	globe.	This	number	is	increasing	as	research	in	various	relevant	fields	is	expanding.	Existing	accelerators	are	diversifying	with	the	construction	of	new	facilities.		According	to	Amaldi	[8],	primary	and	secondary	particle	beams	have	undergone	an	evolution	(Figure	2).	Currently,	they	are	u-sed	for	the	following	three	types	of	ac-tivities:
· Beam	particles	are	used	in	the	analysis	of	physical,	chemical	and	biological	samples.
· Beam	particles	are	used	for	the	modification	of	the	physical	chemical	and	biological	properties	of	matter.
· Energetic	beam	particles	are	used	for	the	research	in	study	of	basic	subatomic	particles.	
3Figure 2: The Time Tree gives a pictorial view of the development of the applications of acceler-
ators in both modification processes and sample analyses [8].Current	 research	shows	accelerator	 applications	 in	 the	arts,	other	sciences,	medicine	and	high-tech	industries.	Scientific	applications	include:	national	security	(e.g.	cargo	inspection),	stockpile	steward-ship	 and	 materials	 characterization.	 Medical	 applications	 include:	 accelerator-based	 diagnoses	 and	radiation	therapy	in	hospitals	and	clinics	around	the	world.	High-tech	industrial	applications	include:	the	modification	of	material	properties,	such	as	 the	alteration	of	plastics,	 for	surface	 treatments	and	pathogen	destruction	 in	medical	sterilization	and	food	 irradiation;	the	extensive	use	of	 ion-beam	ac-celerators	in	the	semiconductor	industry,	where	they	are	used	for	chip	manufacturing	and	for	harden-ing	the	surfaces	of	materials,	such	as	those	used	in	artificial	joints.	Particle	accelerators	are	also	crucial	for	understanding	the	origin	of	our	universe	and	for	forming	heavy	nuclei		[7][8][9].	
1.1.3 PURESAFEThis	project	work	 is	 connected	with	Preventing	hUman	 inteRvention	 for	 increased	 SAfety	 in	 inFra-structurEs		(PURESAFE)	research	project	[10].	PURESAFE	is	an	acronym	for	“Preventing	hUman	inter-vention	for	increased	SAfety	in	inFrastructures	Emitting	ionizing	radiation”.	The	project’s	main	scien-tific	objective	is	to	develop	models,	methods	and	tools	to	improve	the	radiation	protection	in	scientific	facilities	emitting	 ionizing	radiation,	as	well	as	 to	practically	 implement	 these	 techniques	using	case	studies	within	PURESAFE	project	work	packages	(WPs).	PURESAFE	focuses	particularly	on	high	ener-gy	physics	accelerator	facilities	that	can	generate	radioactive	nuclei	parts	and	thus	require	innovative	maintenance	techniques.	PURESAFE	 is	a	multi-disciplinary	project	that	 is	divided	 into	five	WPs,	of	which	three	are	further	di-vided	 into	research	packages	(RPs).	WP1	addresses	processes	and	modeling.	WP2	 is	concerned	with	the	hardware	platforms	and	applications	of	WP1	and	WP3	in	actual	RH	projects.	WP3	addresses	soft-ware	platforms	 for	RH.	 It	 is	worth	noting	 that	 input	 from	various	research	projects	 from	WP1,	WP2	
4and	WP3	are	applied	in	this	research	work	and	contribute	to	the	research	work’s	results.	These	con-cern	radiation	protection,	intervention	planning,	teleoperation,	mobile	robotic	communication	and	the	integration	of	RAMS	(Reliability,	Availability,	Maintainability	and	Safety)	into	systems	design.	
1.1.4 General contextThe	main	application	of	the	PURESAFE	project	concerns	High	Energy	Particle	accelerator	(HEP)	facili-ties.	Such	HEP	facilities	are	focused	on	high	energy	physics	in	order	to	study	the	smallest	known	com-ponents	of	matter	[11].	These	facilities	use	high-tech	equipment	(including	particle	accelerators,	vacu-um	chambers,	 targets,	detectors	and	magnets)	 to	accelerate,	steer,	 focus	and	stop	particle	beams	 in	order	to	perform	experiments	[11][12][13].	In	order	to	push	the	boundaries	of	physics	research	,	ex-perimental	physics	is	progressing	towards	the	use	of	higher-energy	particle	beams	to	perform	exper-iments	[2][6][7].	This	has,	in	turn,	caused	physicists	and	engineers	to	develop	more	complex	machines	[13][14][17].	Particle	accelerator	 facilities	 that	consist	of	multiple	complex	machines	can	be	 termed	“super-systems.”	The	complex	machines	 themselves	can	be	 termed	as	“subsystems”,	which	are	com-posed	 of	 “equipment”.	 During	 beam	 circulations	 in	 experiments,	 these	 subsystems	 and	 pieces	 of	equipment	interact	directly	with	high-energy	beams,	causing	beam	collisions	within	accelerators	and	detectors.	These	interactions	cause	the	undesirable	radiological	activation	of	accelerator	facilities	and	equipments	[18].	Due	 to	 the	 ionizing	radiation	at	HEP	 facilities,	 the	radioactive	equipment	at	such	 facilities	cannot	be	directly	handled	or	maintained	by	personnel.	Thus,	at	this	stage,	there	is	a	significant	need	to	reduce	the	level	of	radiation	dosage	experienced	by	personnel	during	the	inspection,	maintenance,	installation,	replacement,	removal	and	storage	of	radioactive	elements.	Strategies	to	reduce	the	radiation	dosages	experienced	by	personnel	include:	improving	the	design	and	development	of	HEP	facilities,	using	tel-erobotics	or	RH	to	conduct	maintenance	activities,	and	 implementing	State	Of	the	Art	tools	for	 inter-vention	prediction	and	planning.The	studies	conducted	in	this	research	are	connected	with	the	Facility	of	Anti-proton	and	Ion	Research	(FAIR),	which	is	currently	under	construction	and	development	in	Darmstadt,	Germany.	The	develop-ment	of	this	thesis	is	focused	solely	on	the	FAIR	project	and	it	addresses	the	design	needs	of	the	FAIR	facility.	However,	the	same	approaches,	tools	and	techniques	can	be	implemented	in	other	high-energy	particle	accelerator	facilities.	Examples	of	such	facilites	are:	Conseil	Européen	pour	 la	Recherche	Nu-cléaire	(CERN)	[19][20]	,	Grand	Accélérateur	National	d'Ions	Lourds	(GANIL)	SPIRAL2[21],	and	Facili-ty	for	Rare	Isotope	Beams	(FRIB)[22]).	Since	particle	accelerator	inception,	there	are	two	basic	types	of	modern	 accelerators	 for	HEP	 facilities:	 linear	 and	 circular with	various	 components	 that	 can	be-come	activated	due	 to	operation	 [23][24].The	developments	can	also	be	useful	 to	other	 facilities	 in-volving	ionizing	radiation	which	are	not	accelerator	facilities,	for	example:	Joint	European	Torus	(JET)	[96][97],	International	Thermonuclear	Experimental	Reactor	(ITER)	[98],		and	DEMOnstration	Power	Plant	(DEMO)	[98].		
1.1.5 Facility for Antiproton and Ion Research (FAIR)The	FAIR	facility,	 in	Darmstadt,	Germany,	was	proposed	 in	2001	by	the	GSI	 in	collaboration	with	the	wider	 international	science	community.	The	government	gave	conditional	approval	for	the	construc-tion	of	FAIR	in	February	2003.	The	approval	was	based	upon	the	following	conditions	[2]:	“(i)	a	scien-tific-technical	plan	 for	a	staged	construction,	and	(ii)	participation	of	 international	partners	contrib-uting	at	least	25%	to	the	construction	cost”.	Thus	far,	14	countries	(China,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	
5Greece,	India,	Italy,	Poland,	Romania,	Russia,	Slovenia,	Spain,	Sweden,	and	the	United	Kingdom)	have	signed	 the	Memorandum	of	Understanding	 for	FAIR,	 indicating	 their	wish	 to	participate	 in	 the	FAIR	facility	[2][5].		The	current	FAIR	 facility	 layout	consists	of	 a	superconducting	double-Synchrotron,	 the	SIS100/300,	with	a	circumference	of	1,100	meters.	This	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	FAIR	accelerator	facility,	as	shown	in	Figure	3.	Following	an	upgrade	for	high	intensities,	the	existing	GSI	accelerators	Universal	Linear	Ac-celerator	 (UNILAC)	 and	 Schwerionen-Synchrotron	18	 (SIS18)	will	 serve	 as	 an	 injector.	Following	 a	high-intensity	upgrade,	the	existing	GSI	accelerators,	the	UNILAC	and	the	SIS18,	will	serve	as	injectors.	In	the	resulting	double-ringed	facility,	continuous	beams	with	high	average	intensities	of	up	to	3x1011	ions	per	second	will	be	provided	at	energies	of	1	GeV/u	for	heavy	ions,	using	primary	beam	parame-ters	from	the	SIS100/300	facility	for	the	different	research	fields,	as	shown	in	Figure	4	[5].	
	
Figure	 3:	 Layout	 of	 the	 existing	 GSI	 facility	 (UNILAC,	 SIS18,	 and	 Experimental	 Storage	 Ring	
(ESR))	are	shown	in	blue	on	the	left	and	the	planned	FAIR	facility	is	shown	on	the	right	in	red.	
This	includes:	the	superconducting	synchrotrons	SIS100	and	SIS300,	the	collector	ring	(CR),	the	
accumulator	ring	(Recycled-Experimental-Storage-Ring	(RESR)),	the	new	experimental	storage	
ring	(Neue-Experimentier-Speicherring		(NESR)),	the	rare	isotope	production	target,	the	super-
conducting	fragment	separator	(Super-FRS),	the	proton	LINAC,	the	antiproton	production	tar-
get,	and	the	high	energy	antiproton	storage	ring	(der	Hochenergie-Speicherring	(HESR)).	Also	
shown	are	 the	experimental	stations	 for	plasma	physics,	relativistic	nuclear	collisions	 (Com-
pressed	Baryonic	Matter	(CBM)),	radioactive	ion	beams	(Super-FRS),	atomic	physics,	and	low-
energy	antiproton	and	ion	physics		[2].	
6Figure	4:	Primary	beam	parameters	 (table)	 from	 the	SIS100/300	 facility	 for	 the	different	re-
search	fields[2].	The	accelerator	complex	at	FAIR	will	host	a	large	number	of	experiments,	of	which	the	four	largest	will	reside	on	the	Super	Fragment	Separator	(Super-FRS).	The	Super-FRS	is	the	main	application	area	for	FAIR	facility.	Radiation	doses	will	be	present	at	the	Super-FRS	facility	due	to	the	activation	of	beamline	inserts,	which	will	require	remote	maintenance.	It	 is	 in	this	context	of	remote	maintenance	that	this	thesis	focuses	on	developing	a	conceptual	solution	with	a	systematic	framework	to	fulfill	the	RH	needs	of	the	Super-FRS	and	FAIR	facility	in	an	effective	and	optimized	manner.	
1.2 Remote Handling (RH)
Teleoperation	and	mobile	robotics	are	now	frequently	used	to	carry	out	maintenance	tasks	in	hostile	and	hazardous	environments,	where	humans	cannot	perform	certain	tasks	due	 to	safety	 issues	(e.g.,	high	radiation	levels	or	environmental	challenges)	[25][26][27][28].	Performing	tasks	with	teleopera-tion	equipment,	mobile	robotics	and	automated	robotic	systems	enables	humans	 to	conduct	remote	manipulations	safely	 and	 reliably,	without	engaging	 in	personal	contact	with	dangerous	 items	 [29].		The	term	“RH”	is	used	in	this	thesis	to	refer	to	remote	maintenance	tasks	performed	by	robots,	wheth-er	these	tasks	are	teleoperated,	completed	under	supervisory	control	or	carried	out	by	automatic	sys-tems.	The	use	of	RH	systems	is	very	common	in	nuclear	[30][31][32][33],	space	[34][26][28],	and	sub-sea	[29][30][40]	industries;	however,	the	term	“RH”	is	most	commonly	used	in	relation	to	the	nuclear	power	 industry,	where	 the	 term	refers	 to	the	maintenance	of	power-generating	equipment,	 the	pro-cessing	of	fuel	assemblies,	the	inspection	of	surroundings	and	the	manipulation	of	activated	parts	(e.g.	through	repairs	to	damaged	equipment,	exchanges	of	parts,	disposals	of	activated	material	and	stor-age).	In	the	nuclear	power	industry,	all	tasks	are	conducted	inside	hot	cell.	RH	tasks	in	radiation	envi-ronments	are	typically	carried	out	using	dedicated,	modified	equipment	that	is	controlled	and	operat-ed	from	a	central	control	room,	as	shown	in	Figure	5.	RH	is	also	used	in	hospitals	and	educational	la-boratories	to	conduct	surgeries	and	research	activities	using	high-precision	telerobotic	equipment.	From	the	1960s	until	the	present	day,	the	RH	philosophy	has	followed	the	“human	in	the	loop”	concept,	in	which	 a	human	 operator	 controls	machine	output	by	 entering	 commands	via	 a	Human-Machine	Interface	(HMI)[29].	However,	progress	in	the	use	of	industrial	robots	over	the	past	three	decades	has	
7enabled	RH	 engineers	 to	 use	 low-cost,	 high-performance	 industrial	 robots	 for	more	 automated	RH	applications[41].		
Figure	5.	RH	at	JET	facility	representing	control	room	(right)	and	RH	equipment	(left)	
1.3 The need for RH in HEP facilities
1.3.1 Radiation environmentHEP	facilities	are	highly	radioactive	due	to	activated	material	in	the	beamline	equipment.	In	order	to	produce	a	high	rate	of	secondary	particles,	such	as	antiprotons,	neutrons,	neutrinos	and	rare	isotopes,	beams	are	 required	 to	be	very	high-intensity	 [2][9][47].	When	 these	beams	 interact	with	 targets,	 it	radioactively	activates	the	material	which	ultimately	degrades	the	material	properties	and	 limits	the	lifetime	of	beamline	equipment.	Degraded	targets,	collimators	and	beam	dumps	also	become	activated	as	 a	 result	of	 this	beam	 interaction	and,	hence,	must	be	shielded	 to	protect	humans.	This	beamline	equipment	requires	constant	remote	maintenance.	Prior	to	any	remote	maintenance	or	upgrade	pro-ject,	HEP	facility	accelerators	are	shut	down	gradually	in	order	to	seize	the	production	of	neutrons	and	to	prevent	the	possibility	of	damaging	radioactive	effects	during	the	interventions.			The	activated	products	exhibit	one	or	more	of	a	range	of	radionuclides	(atoms	with	nuclei	character-ized	by	excess	energy)	which	is	eventually	dissipated	through	the	ejection	of	a	particle	or	electron.	The	energy	state	of	the	activated	material	undergoes	nuclear	decay,	emitting	harmful	ionizing	radiation	in	the	process	[18][42].	A	radioactive	“source"	is	said	to	have	an	activity	of	1	Becquerel1	when	such	trans-
1 In this document, we will use  Sievert (Sv) as the basic unit for a radiation dosage. Sv is a derived unit for ionizing
radiation dosage in the International System of Units (SI).
8formations	are	occurring	at	the	rate	of	one	per	second.	The	precise	relationship	of	activity	radiation	intensity	depends	on	the	decay	scheme	of	the	radionuclide	involved.	Radiation	protection	is	concerned	with	the	intensity	of	the	radiation	emitted	by	a	source,	and	its	main	aim	is	to	reduce	human	exposure	to	ionizing	radiation.	Thus,	the	following	measures	are	typically	taken	to	ensure	worker	safety:		
· Wait:	Radioactivity	decays	with	time,	and	this	decay	is	normally	exponential.	Thus,	activation	is	typically	reduced	by	many	orders	of	magnitude	in	the	first	days	of	shut-down.	
· Shielding:	Gamma	 radiation	can	exist	 for	 long	periods	of	 time;	hence,	shielding	 is	needed	 to	protect	workers	from	harmful	effects.	Shields	should	be	developed	from	appropriate	materials,	such	as	concrete	or	lead.	
· Increased	distances	between	workers	and	sources:	Workers	should	be	placed	as	far	from	sources	as	possible	in	order	to	carry	out	maintenance.	This	increased	distance	is	the	prime	motivator	for	using	RH	for	activated	beamline	inserts.	New	research	facilities	[10][12][14][36][40]	which	are	capable	of	delivering	powerful	beams	will	also	generate	more	activated	parts.	The	handling	and	maintenance	of	these	activated	parts	must	be	done	remotely,	and	the	design	of	new	facilities	should	incorporate	provisions	for	RH.	Figure	6	shows	a	typi-cal	radioactive	environment	at	a	particle	accelerator	target	facility—in	this	case,	the	ISOLDE	facility	at	CERN.		
Figure 6. Radiation visualization of radiation levels at ISOLDE facility CERN[45]
1.3.2 Radiation effects on RH equipmentRH	equipment	typically	enables	workers	to	perform	maintenance	remotely,	thus	reducing	the	radia-tion	dosages	experienced	by	workers.	However,	this	approach	directly	exposes	the	RH	equipment	to	ionizing	radiation.	Modern	robotic	systems	include	various	electronic	sub-systems	which	require	pro-tection	during	RH	tasks.	Modern	robotic	systems	are	composed	of	various	components	which	are	af-fected	by	radiation	(see	Figure 7),	including:		
9· Electronic	 components,	 such	 as	microprocessors,	RAM/ROM	memory,	ADC/DAC	 converters,	operational	amplifiers,	controllers,	sensors,	diodes,	capacitors,	motors,	etc.	
· Mechanical	components,	such	as	metal,	insulators,	glass,	camera	lenses,	fiber	optic	cables,	lead	cells,	plastics,	etc.		The	exposure	of	robotic	systems	to	ionizing	radiation	causes	embrittlement,	a	 loss	of	ductility,	creep,	and	aging.	Hence,	equipment	selected	for	use	in	radioactive	facilities	must	be	radiation-hardened,	and	sensitive	systems	should	be	placed	far	away	from	radiation.	Critical	robotic	systems	also	require	ex-tensive	testing	before	commissioning	 in	order	to	estimate	their	 life	expectancy	and	performance	pa-rameters.	Modifications	 are	 also	 commonly	made	 to	 commercial	 off-the-shelf	 (COTS)	 equipment	 in	order	 to	 reduce	 external	 development	 costs	 and	 enhance	 in-house	 development	 capabilities.	 Such	modifications	 include	 the	removal	of	on-board	electronics	and	addition	of	shielding.	The	 target	area	robots	used	in	the	ISOLDE	facility	are	an	example	of	this.	
Figure 7. Cumulated permissible dose level for electronic components [42]
1.3.3 Radiation protectionRadiation	protection,	sometimes	termed	radiological	protection,	refers	to	the	science	of	radiation	ef-fects	and	the	practices	used	to	protect	people	and	the	surrounding	environment	from	the	harmful	ef-fects	of	 ionizing	 radiation[11][18][49][50].	Radiation	protection	 involves	measuring	 radiation	doses	
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and	ensuring	that	people	are	not	exposed	to	 levels	which	are	capable	of	causing	damaging	biological	effects.		
1.3.3.1 International legal efforts in radiation protectionOccupational	 radiation	protection	 is	critically	 important	among	 the	 international	community	due	 to	the	harmful	effects	of	radiation	on	workers’	health.	Legal	 limits	are	defined	by	national	and	 interna-tional	authorities.	Some	notable	organizations	 involved	 in	providing	 recommendations	on	 radiation	dose	limits	are	listed	below.		
· International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	(IAEA)
· International	Labour	Organization	(ILO)
· European	Commission	(EC)
· World	Health	Organization	(WHO)
· Organization	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development’s	 Nuclear	 Energy	 Agency	(OECD/NEA)
· United	Nations	Scientific	Committee	on	the	Effects	of	Atomic	Radiation	(UNSCEAR)
· International	Commission	on	Radiological	Protection	(ICRP)
· International	Commission	on	Radiation	Units	and	Measurements	(ICRU)In	2002,	 the	 IAEA	and	ILO	organized	an	 International	Conference	on	Occupational	Radiation	Protec-tion.	The	event	was	co-sponsored	by	the	other	 listed	organizations	and	was	held	 in	Geneva,	Switzer-land.	The	conference	specified	recommendations	 for	occupational	radiation	protection	based	on	 the	global	progress	made	over	the	past	few	decades	in	radiation	protection.	ICRP	[51]	recommendations	regarding	radiation	limits	serve	as	the	basis	for	all	standards	put	forward	by	all	of	the	other	organizations	 listed.	The	radiation	dose	 limits	recommended	by	the	ICRP	[50][52]	are	based	on	 radiation	biology,	which	 consider	 the	damaging	 interactions	of	 ionizing	particles	with	living	tissues.	The	European	Union	(EU)	has	adopted	the	European	Atomic	Energy	Community	(EUR-ATOM)	directive	(Directive	96/29	[53]),	which	is	the	basis	for	radiation	protection	regulations	for	EU	member	states.	EURATOM	includes	the	Recommendations	of	the	International	Commission	on	Radio-logical	Protection	(ICRP60)[54][55]2.		The	work	in	this	thesis	follows	the	occupational	radiation	doses	recommended	by	the	German	Federal	Office	for	Radiation	Protection,	which	are	in	line	with	those	of	the	EURATOM	directive	[53]	and	those	of	the	ICRP103	[55].	Thus,	the	dose	limits	used	are	in	line	with	the	basic	safety	standards	outlined	by	the	EU	[56]	at	the	time	of	writing.	Dose	limits	are	frequently	altered	by	national	and	international	reg-ulators,	as	shown	in	Figure	8[57]	This	is	due	to	the	continued	evolution	of	the	field	of	radiation	protec-tion	and	the	persistent	lack	of	a	full	understanding	of	the	effects	of	radiation	[58].	In	Germany,	accord-ing	 to	European	 guidelines,	 the	permissible	 effective	dose	of	occupational	 radiation	 exposure	 is	20	millisievert	(mSv)	per	calendar	year	[56].	The	German	Commission	on	Radiological	Protection	(SSK)	(in	German:	 	 Strahlenschutzkommission)	 advises	 the	Federal	Ministry	 for	 the	Environment,	Nature	Conservation,	Building	and	Nuclear	Safety	(BMUB)	on	 issues	concerning	protection	from	the	risks	of	ionizing	and	non-ionizing	radiation.			
2 The ICRP updated the recommendation in 2007 that are known as “ICRP103”[55]
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Figure 8: This logarithmic plot of the recommended limits on annual exposures to radiation
shows a continual decrease from the beginning of the century to the present [57].The	GSI	Helmholtz	 Center	 for	Heavy	 Ion	Research	 is	 a	German	 research	 organization	 and,	 thus,	 is	obliged	to	abide	by	German	dose	 limit	standards.	However,	the	GSI	also	 imposes	stricter	regulations	on	itself	to	reduce	workers’	radiation	doses	to	no	more	than	2mSv/year,	[24].		
1.3.3.2 Radiation protection principles and philosophyHEP	facilities	are	complex	machines,	comprised	of	various	types	of	scientific	equipment,	such	as	parti-cle	accelerators	and	beamline	inserts	(e.g.,	detectors/slits,	etc.).	All	of	these	require	maintenance	over	time.	 It	 is	during	 this	maintenance	 that	human	 intervention	 is	needed.	To	protect	human	beings	 in	radiation	environments,	the	most	common	technique	is	called	ALARP	or	ALARA	(As	Low	As	Reasona-bly	Practicable	or	Achievable)	[50][59][66].	This	approach	is	used	to	limit	the	radiation	doses	received	by	humans.	The	ALARA	approach	 is	based	on	the	philosophic	principle	of	“justifying,	optimizing	and	limiting”	the	doses	received	by	all	who	need	to	work	on	or	near	activated	parts	of	the	facility.		ICRP60	 and	 ICRP103	 recommend	 that	 all	 radiation	 protection	 be	 based	 on	 this	 same	 philoso-phy[54][55].	The	justification	principle	requires	that	an	“intervention	procedure	will	benefit	the	indi-vidual	and	society	 to	balance	 the	radiation	dose	effects;	while	 there	 is	no	alternative	solution	exists	which	would	not	involve	radiation	exposure”.	The	optimization	principle	states	that	any	“(1)	interven-tion	scenario/s	has	been	assessed	 in	regards	 to	radiation	protection,	(2)	decision	making	process	 is	traceable	to	selected	intervention	scenario/s,	(3)	possible	accidents	and	disposal	of	radiation	sources	are	taken	into	consideration	for	intervention	scenario/s”.	The	limitation	principle	requires	that	expo-
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sure	 “comply	 with	 the	 annual	 dose	 limit/dose	 constraint	 based	 on	 recommendations	 of	 the	 ICRP”	[61][62].	Based	on	this	philosophy	of	 	“justification,	optimization	and	 limitation”,	the	ALARA	principle	has	be-come	 the	most	predominant	methodology	 for	estimating	received	doses	 [59].	 In	 the	case	of	occupa-tional	exposure,	which	is	the	relevant	case	for	the	context	of	this	thesis,	the	dose	received	by	individu-ally	 monitored	 personnel	 during	 any	 consecutive	 12-month	 period	 must	 not	 exceed	 20	 mSv.	 The	ALARA	approach	 is	 implemented	 to	prevent	any	exposures	beyond	 	 the	 limit	value	since	“in	case	of	continuing	exposure,	this	exposure	is	associated	with	a	radiological	risk	for	the	individual	which	can-not	be	accepted	any	more	under	‘normal’	circumstances”	[59][61][62]).	The	 ALARA	 principle	 has	 been	 globally	 adopted	 by	 all	 radiation	 protection	 agencies	 based	 on	 the	IAEA’s	Occupational	Radiation	Protection	recommendations:	Protecting	Workers	against	Exposure	to	Ionizing	Radiation[61].	
1.3.3.3 Radiation dosesHEP	facilities	and	nuclear	power	plants	are	some	of	the	major	sources	of	non-naturally	occurring	ion-izing	radiation.	The	 ionization	process	occurs	when	an	atom	becomes	excited	due	to	the	high	energy	carried	by	the	radiation	and	therefore	gains	(or	loses)	an	electron.	In	HEP	facilities,	ionizing	radiation	includes	alpha	particles	(protons	and	neutrons),	beta	particles	(electrons	and	positrons)	and	photons	(gamma	rays	and	X-rays).	 Ionizing	radiation	can	affect	humans	both	deterministically	(through	high	levels	of	radiation	exposure)	and	stochastically	(through	low	levels	of	exposure).	The	ICRU	has	laid	the	scientific-mathematical	basis	for	radiation	protection	[62][66].	The	fundamental	protection	quantities	adopted	by	the	ICRP	are	based	on	measures	of	the	energy	de-posited	in	the	organs	and	tissues	of	the	human	body.	The	total	amount	of	ionizing	radiation	absorbed	by	material	or	 tissues	 is	 termed	an	 “absorbed	dose”.	This	absorbed	dose	 (aka	 “energy	dose”)	 is	 the	fundamental	physical	quantity	that	serves	as	the	basis	for	all	subsequent	quantities	used	in	radiation	protection	[50].	The	ICRP	states	the	following:	“The	absorbed	dose	abbreviated	as	D,	is	the	amount	of	energy	 locally	deposited	at	a	given	 location	 in	matter.	It	 is	defined	as	the	deposited	energy	(ΔE)	per	unit	of	mass	of	material	(Δm)”[62][66]:	
ܦ = Δܧ
Δ݉
																								[Gy = J. kgିଵ]								 Eq 1
The	unit	of	an	absorbed	dose	is	the	gray	(Gy)3.	The	absorbed	dose	depends	on	both	the	incident	radia-tion	and	the	absorbing	material.	
Equivalent	dose	Since	 different	 types	 of	 ionizing	 radiation	 cause	 different	 amounts	 of	 damage	 to	 living	 tissue,	 the	“equivalent	 dose”	 (H)	was	 developed	 as	 the	 product	 of	 the	 absorbed	 dose	 for	 ICRU-tissue	 and	 the	weighting	factor	WR	(where	R	stands	for	the	radiation	type).	This	dose	is	used	to	determine	the	dam-
3 Old units, which are still used in parts of the world are the rad and the rep.
1 rad = 0.01 Gy (2.3)
1 rep = 8.3 or 9.3mGy
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age	to	human	tissue	for	different	types	of	radiation.	These	weighting	factors	(shown	 in	Figure	9)	are	defined	by	ICRP103	[55].	The	“equivalent	dose”	is	defined	as:	
ܪ = ෍ ோܹܦோ
ோ
Eq 2
Figure 9. Radiation weighting factors WR  table as defined in ICRP103 [55]
	The	“equivalent	dose”	to	a	specific	organ	or	tissue	T	is	defined	as:	
ܪ் = ෍ ோܹܦ்,ோ
ோ
Eq 3
The	unit	of	equivalent	dose	is	J	kg−1,	which	is	also	known	as	the	Sievert	(Sv).	
Effective	Dose	All	human	organs	 are	 sensitive	 to	 ionizing	 radiation;	however,	 the	 equivalent	dose	 can	harm	 some	organs	more	than	others.	To	quantify	the	effects	of	the	equivalent	dose	on	different	organs,	the	“effec-tive	dose”	(E)	was	developed.	To	calculate	the	effective	dose,	the	equivalent	dose	 is	weighted	by	the	tissue	weighting	 factor	WT,	which	depends	on	the	tissue	or	organ	that	the	radiation	 is	affecting.	 	WT	values	are	also	defined	by	ICRP103	(see	Figure	10).	The	effective	dose	is	defined	as:	
ܧ = ෍ ்ܹܪ்
்= ෍ ்ܹ
்
෍ ோܹܦ்,ோ
ோ
					[ܵݒ]
Eq 4
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In	Eq	4		WT	is	the	tissue	weighting	factor	for	tissue	T	and	∑ ்்ܹ = 1.The	unit	of	equivalent	dose	is	also	the	Sievert.	The	effective	dose	is	the	main	quantity	that	is	used	in	radiation	protection,	and	it	is	also	the	main	quantity	that	we	will	use	in	this	research	work.	
Figure 10. Tissue weighting factor WT table as defined by ICRP103 [55].
1.3.3.4 Radiation protection in particle accelerator facilitiesHEP	facilities	have	a	legal	obligation	to	protect	the	public	and	any	persons	working	on	their	sites	from	exposure	to	ionizing	radiation.	The	results	of	these	measurements	facilitate	the	preventive	assessment	of	radiological	risks	and	 the	reduction/elimination	of	 individual	and	collective	doses.	Figure 11	pro-vides	an	example	of	a	GSI	beam	operation	 lifecycle	and	shows	the	position	of	an	ALARA	approach	 in	radiation	protection.	The	following	criteria	may	apply,	depending	on	whether	the	particle	accelerator	machines	(and,	thus,	the	particle	beams)	are	running:	
Beam	ON:	No	access	for	personnel	is	possible	when	particle	beams	are	circulating	in	the	accelerator.	This	 is	because	of	 the	high	 levels	of	radiation	will	affect	both	humans	and	electronics.	For	 the	same	reason,	electronic	devices	(e.g.,	RH	equipment)	cannot	be	permanently	fixed	or	placed	inside	the	beam	facilities.		
Beam	OFF:	Once	the	beam	is	turned	off	and	the	cool-down	period	has	passed,	human	intervention	is	usually	possible.	The	cool-down	period	is	over	when	the	residual	activity	is	below	a	certain	legal	and	admissible	threshold.	However,	some	areas	are	not	accessible	to	humans	even	after	the	beam	has	been	turned	off,	due	to	residual	radioactivity	from	activated	components.	Such	areas	can	only	be	inspected	and	maintained	with	remote	maintenance	equipment.	Radiation	tolerances	 in	robot	components	are	generally	greater	 than	 four	orders	of	magnitude	higher	 than	 those	 in	humans	 [20]	 [51][54][69].	For	this	reason,	RH	can	be	used	inside	beam	facilities	during	and	after	the	cool-down	period	when	human	access	is	restricted.	
15
Figure 11. HEP facilities operational cycle with ALARA application.
1.3.3.5 The need for robotic systems for RHThere	is	a	clear	need	for	robotic	RH	systems	in	HEP	facilities,	due	to	the	radioactive	environment	and	effects	of	radiation	as	explained	above.	Electronics	can	handle	a	 total	dosage	of	100	Sv,	which	 is	 far	more	than	2mSv	dose	limit	for	personnel	at	GSI.	In	the	FAIR	facility,	the	beamline	insert	will	be	highly	radioactive.	Remote	maintenance	will	be	obligatory	as	human	workers	will	be	unable	to	directly	han-dle	the	beamline	inserts.	The	major	benefits	of	using	RH	equipment	in	the	FAIR	facility	are:	
· Reducing	 the	 exposure	 of	 workers	 to	 ionizing	 radiation	within	 FAIR	 through	 planning.	 RH	could	help	in	the	planning	of	human	maintenance	interventions	by	providing	detailed	radiation	measurements	and	visual	checks	of	faulty	equipment.	Moreover,	mobile	robots	may	facilitate	more	accurate	measurements	and	visual	inspections,	since	they	eliminate	the	need	for	the	time	limits	imposed	on	humans	in	places	with	high-radiation.	
· Handling	radioactive	parts	(i.e.,	removing	and	installing	the	beamline	insert,	transporting	radi-oactive	parts	to	hot	cells	for	storage	and	maintenance,	etc.).	
· Optimizing	 HEP	 facility	 maintenance	 overall	 (i.e.,	 increasing	 beam	 availability	 by	 reducing	downtime).	The	cool-down	period	can	be	quite	long	(several	days/weeks)	before	an	access	is	granted	for	a	human	to	visually	check	of	the	equipment,	especially	in	cases	of	machine	failures	during	beam	operation.	 	The	use	of	RH	would	 remove	 this	 restriction	 and	so	 allow	mainte-nance	to	be	carried	out	more	quickly.	
1.3.4 Existing RH in HEP facilitiesRH	is	not	a	new	concept	within	HEP	facilities.	However,	although	it	has	been	used	frequently	in	some	facilities,	the	use	is	limited	and	very	specific.	Majority	of	the	RH	systems	with	in	HEP	facilities	were	not	originally	planned	 for	 the	HEP	 facilities	overtime	 and	one	examples	of	particle	 accelerator	 facilities	that	have	gradually	added	RH	capabilities	over	time	are:	The	Paul	Scherrer	Institute	(PSI)	in	Switzer-land	 [33][34],	 the	 Oak	 Ridge	 National	 Laboratory	 (ORNL)	 in	 USA	 [35][36],	 	 CERN	 in	 Switzerland	[19][66],	and	the	GSI	Helmholtz	Centre	for	Heavy	Ion	Research	(GSI)	in	Germany	[3][24]	For	all	these	facilities,	RH	was	not	originally	planned	for.	It	was	only	integrated	later,	as	the	radioactivity	hampered	the	sequence	of	maintenance	tasks.			
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There	are	four	main	cases	in	which	HEP	facilities	require	maintenance:	
· System	failure	prevents	the	facility’s	normal	operations	(e.g.,	damage	to	a	beamline	insert,	in-cluding	target	or	instrumentation,	leads	to	a	need	for	replacement).	
· Normal	 degradation	 of	 system	 components	 (aging)	 leads	 to	 a	 need	 for	 periodic	 preventive	maintenance	of	the	system	(e.g.,	beamline	inserts,	vacuum	pumps,	cryogenics,	etc.).	
· The	experimental	system	requires	changes.	The	Super-FRS	setup	will	require	modifications	or	changes	as	a	routine	part	of	the	experiments.	For	example,	the	Nuclear	Structure,	Astrophysics	and	Reactions	(NuSTAR)	collaboration	at	FRS	may	want	 to	 test	new	 ideas	 to	verify	 theories,	which	will	require	the	installation	of	new	instruments	into	the	setup.	
· Regular	inspections	during	regular	annual	checks.	These	are	carried	out	to	maintain	the	opera-tional	license	for	HEP	facilities	(e.g.,	cryogenic	systems	require	annual	checks	of	their	values).	
	As	a	general	rule,	FAIR	components	with	failure	probabilities	of	greater	than	1	in	20	years	of	facility	operation	 require	 scheduled	 preventive	 maintenance	 or	 replacement.	 For	 example,	 the	 Super-FRS	target	will	interact	directly	with	a	beam	and,	thus,	be	subjected	to	a	high	 level	of	wear	and	tear.	As	a	result,	 it	 will	 need	 scheduled	 replacement	 after	 two	 years.	 FAIR’s	 lifecycle	 is	 40	 years;	 hence,	 the	equipment	that	is	bound	to	fail	during	the	FAIR	facility’s	operation	duration	will	require	maintenance	if	its	parts	are	ionized	due	to	beam	interactions.	Components	with	 low	 failure	 probabilities	 do	 not	 require	 scheduled	maintenance;	 however,	 in	 the	case	of	unexpected	 failures,	 they	may	 require	unscheduled	maintenance.	For	 example,	magnets	 are	designed	to	last	throughout	a	facility’s	lifecycle.	However,	a	magnet	failure	would	require	unscheduled	shutdown	and	maintenance.	
	In	September	2008,	 a	 “large	helium	 leak	 into	sector	3-4	of	 the	LHC	 tunnel	 [was	confirmed	 to	have	been	caused	by]	a	faulty	electrical	connection	between	two	of	the	accelerator’s	magnets”.	This	was	an	unexpected	event	that	was	unforeseen,	and	CERN	had	to	conduct	necessary	repairs	to	make	the	facility	operational	again[67]	.		If	certain	failures	occur	at	HEP	facilities	due	to	unforeseen	incidents,	unsched-uled	repairs	must	be	considered.	Any	unplanned	event	will	require	remote	 inspection	prior	to	a	sys-tematic	analysis	of	the	event.	Maintenance	operations	 in	HEP	facilities	are	performed	by	qualified	workers	 in	full	accordance	with	the	principle	of	ALARA	(see	section	1.3.3.4).	For	example,	at	GSI,	the	environmental	dose	limit	for	radi-ation	workers	 is	10µSv/h	for	hands-on	maintenance.	As	discussed	 in	section	1.3.3.3,	the	annual	total	dose	 limit	 is	2mSv.	 	Some	of	the	equipment	at	GSI	(as	well	as	 in	CERN,	PSI	and	other	facilities)	have	higher	activation	levels	than	these	limits	allow	and,	hence,	emit	very	dangerous	levels	of	radiation.	In	such	cases,	RH	is	the	only	solution.	The	need	for	RH	is	explained	in	section	1.3	in	more	detail.		RH	utilizes	State	of	the	Art	technologies	and	engineering	management	techniques	to	enable	operators	to	handle	 radioactive	 components	 from	 a	 safe	distance	without	 endangering	maintenance	workers.	Experiences	of	RH	at	facilities,	like	JET,	show	that	remote	maintenance	operations	take	more	time	and	effort	than	normal	maintenance[41].	Effective	remote	maintenance	is	only	possible	when	[41]:	
· RH	equipment	is	carefully	designed	from	an	early	stage	according	to	system	needs.	
· RH	tasks	are	planned	in	advance	and	in	detail.	
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· The	components	requiring	remote	maintenance	are	compatible	with	RH.	
· Extensive	 testing	 is	 required	on	mockups	before	RH	 tasks	 are	 actually	performed	 in	 a	 real-world	environment.	The	role	of	RH	in	the	maintenance	of	HEP	facilities	has	increased	recently	and	it	is	now	considered	a	basic	requirement.	Provisions	 for	the	RH	of	activated	materials	 is	now	a	major	part	of	proposals	 for	new	HEP	 facilities,	such	as	GANIL	SPIRAL2	 [21],	 the	 Japan	Proton	Accelerator	Research	Complex	(J-PARC)	[43],	the	FAIR	[2]	and	the	FRIB[22].		The	 details	 regarding	 existing	RH	 equipment	 and	 capabilities	 at	 selected	 HEP	 facilities	 will	 be	 ex-plained	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	2.	
1.3.5 Project engineering and Systems Engineering (SE) for HEP facilities RHThe	complexity	of	HEP	facilities	 is	 increasing	and,	as	a	result	there	 is	an	 increasing	need	for	Systems	Engineering	(SE).	Previous	studies	[68][69]	have	shown	that		a	standard	SE	approach	to	project	man-agement	can	increase	chances	to	success	to	develop	HEP	complex	systems.	However,	SE	[70][71][72]	literature	suggest	that	 the	“complex	 technical	project	success	 is	dependent	on	 the	management	pro-cess	and	procedure	supporting	the	technical	requirements	and	concept	designs	that	are	carefully	de-signed	that	vividly	explains	the	interfaces	within	the	system”.	Hence,	project	management	or	the	tech-nical	development	of	RH	at	later	project	stages	is	a	suitable	option	for	HEP	project	success.	RH	systems	need	to	be	integrated	from	the	start	of	any	HEP	project.	The	technical	aspects	of	the	project	need	to	be	defined	very	early	on	in	order	to	ensure	project	success	and	compatibility[73].			Every	HEP	 facility	 is	a	complex	project	composed	of	complex	systems	and	machines.	Normally,	HEP	facilities	 are	developed	by	physicists,	whose	knowledge	 regarding	project	management	 and	 SE	 are	limited.	Early	HEP	 facilities	were	not	as	 large	as	 they	are	now,	and	 the	resources	needed	 to	execute	them	were	 locally	available.	In	contrast,	modern	HEP	facilities,	 like	the	LHC,	the	FRIB,	SPIRAL	2	and	FAIR,	are	enormous	projects.	They	 require	 funding	and	resources	 from	both	 local	and	 international	bodies.	Effective	project	management	and	SE	approaches	must	be	introduced	if	the	projects	are	to	be	successful.	 	The	PURESAFE	 ITN	 is	one	such	approach,	 launched	by	 the	EU	 to	 introduce	SE	practices	into	the	development	of	HEP	facilities.	PURESAFE	brings	together	engineering	students	from	different	fields	to	train	them	in	the	maintenance	needs	of	HEP	facilities.	
1.4 Research motivation and objectives
1.4.1 MotivationAs	outlined	above,	RH	has	become	an	integral	part	of	the	design	of	HEP	facilities.	It	is	imperative	that	designers	 adopt	 a	 systematic	 approach	 to	develop	 and	 evaluate	 integrated	RH	 concepts	during	 the	early	stages	of	the	project.	However,	there	 is	very	 little	 literature	on	how	to	approach	such	develop-ment	in	a	systematic	way.		Up	until	now,	every	HEP	facility	 in	the	world	has	adopted	its	own	practices	to	develop	their	RH	sys-tems.	Thus,	each	facility	has	unique	RH	equipment	and,	hence,	the	information	regarding	their	RH	sys-tems	is	scattered	and	not	available	in	a	unified	format.	Individual	HEP	facilities	also	have	RH	experts,	who	 are	 major	 contributors	 and	 pioneers	 of	 the	 equipment	 and	 practices	 used	within	 the	 facility.	
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These	experts	don’t	often	publish	their	experiences,	which	limits	our	understanding	of	the	existing	RH	practices	 in	such	 facilities.	All	 these	 factors	combined	mean	 that	RH	systems	are	developed	without	any	systematic	approach.		Due	to	the	reasons	stated	above,	RH	systems	are	always	based	on	expert	opinions	and	personal	expe-riences.	It	is	undeniable	that	expert	opinions	and	experiences	are	critical	to	RH	development;	however	expert	opinion	is	not	enough	on	its	own.	It	is	also	critical	to	understand	the	RH	systems	and	approach-es	 that	are	used	 in	various	HEP	 facilities	and	to	utilize	knowledge	 from	SE	to	design	RH	concepts	at	earlier	stages	to	avoid	issues	with	equipment	reliability,	cost,	maintenance	and	logistics	at	later	stages	of	 the	product	 life	cycle.	Since	HEP	 facilities	are	research-oriented	and	have	 limited	budgets	 for	RH.	The	budget	allocated	to	the	development	of	HEP	RH	is	fraction	of	total	facility	costs,	it	is	important	to	develop	systems	 that	are	cost	effective	and	reliable.	To	develop	such	systems,	 it	 is	 important	 to	use	COTS	equipment	to	reduce	the	costs	of	concept	development.	It	is	also	important	to	evaluate	the	con-cepts	developed	for	RH,	including	costs,	without	compromising	system	functionality.		The	Super	Fragment	Separator	(Super-FRS)	facility	is	a	new	facility	at	FAIR,	with	higher	beam	intensi-ties	compared	to	beam	intensities	at	FRS	in	GSI.	It	is	of	the	utmost	importance	that	the	RH	concepts	are	developed	in	such	a	way	that	they	can	be	tested	and	further	developed	before	the	RH	is	implemented	in	the	new	facility.		Thus,	 the	motivation	 for	carrying	out	 this	research	 is	to	develop	a	concept	design	 for	the	Super-FRS	facility	by:	
· Reviewing	the	RH	systems	of	HEP	facilities	across	the	globe.	
· Classifying	RH	equipment	to	develop	a	guideline	for	future	RH	equipment	selection	in	HEP	fa-cilities.	
· Reviewing	the	various	SE	approaches	which	already	exist	for	developing	complex	equipment.	
· Defining	a	systematic	approach	for	developing	and	evaluating	RH	concept	designs	based	on	the	findings	of	this	SE	review.	
· Developing	an	optimal	RH	concept	for	the	main	Super-FRS	tunnel	using	a	SE	approach.	
1.4.2 Objectives		Complex	machines		like	the	Super-FRS	are	not	only	expensive	to	build,	but	are	also	costly	to	maintain	due	to	the	fact	that	they	produce	activated	beamline	inserts	(e.g.,	targets,	instruments,	slits,	degrader	wedges,	etc.).	Consequently,	due	to	high	levels	of	radiation,	the	Super-FRS	requires	comprehensive	RH	logistics	to	address	 logistical	 issues	 in	 the	handling	of	activated	beamline	 inserts.	These	RH	 logistics	need	to	be	developed	at	a	conceptual	level	to	make	them	more	reliable.	This	approach	will	identify	the	possible	failures	of	RH	systems	and	negate	any	causes	for	possible	failures.	It	will	also	make	 it	safer,	and	 more	 cost-effective,	 to	 conduct	 detailed	 radiation	 and	 intervention	 analysis	 and	 maintenance.	However,	 for	 routine	 inspections	and	maintenance	 tasks,	 the	number	and	duration	of	 interventions	should	be	minimized	and	shifted	to	the	use	of	RH	equipment.		The	main	focus	of	this	thesis	is	to	develop	RH	system	concept	using	SE	knowledge	to	carry	out	remote	maintenance	at	HEP	facilities.	The	key	objective	of	this	thesis	is	to	propose	new	systematic	approach	for	developing	and	evaluation	of	RH	concept	designs	for	HEP	facilities.	This	thesis	also	focuses	on	de-veloping	a	RH	logistics	concept	and	select	RH	equipment	for	the	activated	beamline	inserts	produced	in	the	Super-FRS	facility	a	systematic	approach.	The	work	presented	in	this	thesis	can	then	be	used	as	
a	guideline	for	the	development	of	RH	system	and	logistic	concept	studies	at	other	HEP	facilities	across	the	globe.	The	key	features	of	this	RH	logistics	concept	and	systematic	approach	will	be	based	on	the	following:	
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· Selecting	a	concept	 that	 is	safe	 to	operate	with	minimum	 failures	(due	 to	known	causes	and	consequences)	and	that	will	reduce	human	 interventions	and	accumulated	doses	for	humans	and	equipment.	
· Optimizing	and	improving	the	RH	logistics	in	order	to	optimize	individual	intervention	scenar-io.	
· Optimizing	the	HEP	facilities	limited	resources	to	find	suitable	RH	system	according	to	HEP	fa-cility’s	requirements.	
1.5 Research questions
Based	on	the	thesis	section	motivation	(Section	1.3.3.5	and	Section	1.3.4)	and	objectives,	this	research	will	address	the	following	research	questions:	
· How	the	latest	RH	technologies	can	be	used	to	reduce	the	exposure	of	worker	to	ionization	ra-diation	at	HEP	facilities?	
· How	to	optimize	the	HEP	facility	RH	maintenance	by	increasing	beam	availability	and	reducing	downtime?	
· What	are	the	State	of	the	Art	techniques	and	equipment	used	in	existing	HEP	facilities	to	con-duct	RH	and	maintenance	of	radioactive	parts?	
· How	can	we	develop,	classify	and	categorize	 the	RH	equipment	used	 in	HEP	 facilities,	 to	 im-prove	HEP	facilities	and	equipment	categorization	in	order	optimize	technology	integration?	
· How	can	we	study	and	understand	the	approaches	and	processes	related	to	the	development	of	RH	concepts	in	HEP	facilities	and	in	the	nuclear	industry?	
· What	do	we	know	 about	 the	 expert	 approach	 to	 concept	development	 in	 the	 earlier	design	stages	of	HEP	facilities?	
· What	do	experts	consider	to	be	the	key	factors	in	the	development	of	RH	concepts	for	HEP	fa-cilities?	
· How	can	we	use	current	practices	to	develop	a	SE	approach	which	improves	the	development,	integration	and	evaluation	of	RH	concepts	in	the	stages	of	a	project?	
· What	tools	and	approaches	can	be	adopted	that	will	contribute	to	the	concept	development	for	RH	logistics?	
· How	can	we	develop	a	concept	for	RH	logistics	in	a	cost-effective	manner?	
1.6 Research approach
This	research	project	is	focused	on	finding	a	solution	to	Super-FRS	RH	problems	in	a	systematic	man-ner.	It	aims	to	find	an	approach	to	professional	design	development	that	can	be	reused	in	the	future.	The	research	uses	a	multimethodological	approach	[74]	for	systems	building	within	design	engineer-ing.	The	research	only	focuses	on	concept	development	and	does	not	involve	prototype	development,	which	is	outside	the	scope	of	the	thesis.		RH	system	concepts	are	typically	developed	at	a	very	early	stage	of	a	facility’s	lifecycle.	A	system’s	be-havior	may	subsequently	change	once	 it	has	been	deployed,	due	 to	changing	environmental	 factors	during	facility	development.	This	makes	the	objective	evaluation	of	specific	RH	concept	very	difficult,	since	every	situation	and	case	 is	different.	By	using	a	multimethodological	approach,	 the	 focus	 is	on	
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the	construction	and	extraction	of	valuable	artifacts	(e.g.,	models,	knowledge,	methods	and	tools)	from	existing	solutions	to	other	problems	in	the	field.	In	this	way,	the	research	aims	to	obtain	solutions	for	future	problems	 in	 an	 innovative	way	 and	 to	deliver	 the	 required	 results.	Multimethodological	 ap-proaches	 for	 systems	 development	 uses	 a	 constructive	 approach	 [132]	 that	 fills	 in	 conceptual	 and	knowledge	gaps	by	using	existing	practices	and	knowledge,	which	are	 tailored	 to	support	each	 indi-vidual	case	or	situation.		The	 specific	 multimethodological	 approach	 used	 in	 this	 research	 is	 based	 on	 that	 presented	 by	Nunamker	et	al.	[74],	which	is	shown	in	Figure	12.	
	
Figure	12.	Research	approach	for	development	of	RH	logistic	concept	[74].	In	order	to	utilize	this	multimethodological	approach,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	background	of	the	problem	domain	 in	order	 to	establish	 the	environment	of	 the	RH	system.	 It	 is	also	 important	 to	understand	the	roles	of	system	engineering	and	system	development	 lifecycles	 in	order	to	develop	a	lean,	systematic	approach	for	the	development	of	RH	system	concepts.	Based	on	this	analysis,	concept	designs	can	then	be	developed.	The	various	concepts	are	then	evaluated	in	order	to	select	the	best	one,	which	is	then	refined	for	architectural	and	detailed	design	processes.	
1.7 Contribution of the research
The	main	contributions	of	this	research	are	as	follows:	
· Development	of	systematic	approach	for	designing	RH	systems	concepts	for	HEP	facilities.		
· Detailed	classification	and	categorization	of	HEP	 facilities	hazardous	environments,	RH	prac-tices,	RH	planning	methodologies,	RH	equipment,	and	RH	technologies	to	develop	RH	solutions	for	development	of	HEP	facilities	and	research	facilities	from	across	the	globe.	
· 	Development	of	RH	system	and	logistics	concept	for	Super/FRS	facility	utilizing	SE	approach.	
· Planning	an	effective	RH	remote	maintenance	schedule	to	maximize	system	flexibility	and	per-formance	by	optimization	the	RH	task	sequences.	
· Development	and	selection	of	RH	designs	based	on	SE	approach,	which	can	then	be	generalized	for	developing	RH	logistic	concepts	for	scientific	facilities.	
· Development	of	criteria	 for	 integrating	COTS	equipment	 into	RH	 logistics	concepts	based	on	the	opinions	and	evaluations	of	RH	experts.	
· Detailed	 information	 concerning	RH	 systems	 in	 scientific	 facilities	 (e.g.,	PSI,	CERN,	GSI	 etc.)	that	have	not	yet	been	reported,	 including	 logistics	practices,	methods,	equipment	and	prob-lems	faced	.	
· Use	of	and	contribution	to	the	development	of	tools	to	improve	and	optimize	RH	logistics,	task	sequences	and	intervention	scenarios.	
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· Integrating	RH	system	requirements	and	needs	to	HEP	facility	development	process	at	an	early	stage	of	product	 lifecycle,	to	 influence	the	facilities	equipment	and	 infrastructure	design	pro-cess.		
1.8 Thesis structure
This	thesis	is	divided	into	four	chapters.	The	contents	of	each	chapter	are	summarized	below:	This	thesis	is	divided	into	four	chapters.	The	contents	of	each	chapter	are	summarized	below:	
Chapter	1:	Chapter	1	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	research	objectives,	contributions	and	goals.	It	elaborates	on	the	research	context,	the	 importance	of	particle	accelerators,	the	need	for	RH	 in	radia-tion,	radiation	protection	requirements,	and	the	research	methodology	used	to	achieve	the	target	goals.	
Chapter	2:	Chapter	2	examines	the	current	state	of	the	systems	and	practices	in	the	field	of	RH	engi-neering,	 including	RH	systems	and	SE	practices	 for	 them.	The	chapter	 is	split	 into	 two	sections.	The	first	section	 includes	 a	detailed	survey	of	 the	RH	systems	currently	used	 in	different	HEP	 facilities.	Based	on	 the	 results	of	 this	survey,	 the	State	of	 the	Art	equipment	used	 to	conduct	 remote	mainte-nance	are	categorized	and	classified.	The	second	section	of	this	chapter	focuses	on	SE	standards	and	practices	in	the	development	of	complex	equipment.		Current	SE	standards	and	practices	are	reviewed	by	conducting	interviews	with	RH	experts	from	different	HEP	facilities.		
Chapter	3:		This	chapter	presents	a	SE	approach	for	developing	RH	logistics	concepts	at	HEP	facilities,	using	the	Super-FRS	as	a	test	bed.	It	is	split	into	five	sections.	The	first	section	presents	the	SE	approach	for	developing	RH	logistics	concepts	at	HEP	facilities,	which	is	then	refined	through	discussions	and	interviews	with	SE	and	RH	experts	at	various	HEP	facilities.		The	second	section	presents	how	an	SE	approach	can	assist	in	the	development	of	RH	logistic	concepts	using	Super-FRS	as	a	test	bed.	The	third	section	compares	the	concepts	developed	for	the	RH	of	the	Super-FRS	tunnel	before	the	ap-plication	of	SE	practices	with	those	 following	 the	application	of	SE.	This	section	presents	 the	Super-FRS	RH	logistic	concepts	for	the	facility	developed	during	the	period	from	2012	to	2015.				The	fourth	section	presents	the	tools	and	techniques	which	were	needed	to	realize	the	RH	logistic	con-cept	 for	the	Super-FRS.	The	concepts	are	 then	evaluated	against	 the	developed	criteria,	 following	an	extensive	discussion	on	the	best	way	to	select	commercial,	off-the-shelf	equipment.	In	the	final	section	of	this	chapter,	a	tradeoff	analysis	is	conducted	to	select	the	best	conceptual	solu-tion	for	the	Super-FRS	facility.	
Chapter	4:	This	chapter	presents	conclusions	and	future	research	work.	
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2 Review of the State of the Art: RH technologies, logistics
and concept design practices in HEP facilities
This	provides	a	detailed	overview	of	the	State	of	the	Art	within	HEP	facilities	with	regards	to	RH	re-quirements	and	practices,	RH	equipment	and	technologies,	and	system	engineering	involvement	in	the	development	of	RH	concepts.	Section	2.1	discusses	State	of	the	Art	in	RH	setups	and	techniques,	which	are	used	to	handle	the	activated	parts	for	remote	maintenance	in	existing	HEP	facilities.	Through	this,	the	key	strategic	RH	scenarios	and	techniques	are	identified.	Section	2.2	elaborates	on	the	key	State	of	the	Art	equipment	that	is	currently	utilized	for	remote	maintenance	and	disposal	activities	both	within	HEP	facilities	and	the	nuclear	industry.	Section	2.3	attempts	to	classify	RH	for	the	purpose	of	assisting	engineers	in	their	quest	to	develop	concepts	for	RH	requirements.	Section	2.4	provides	a	compact	and	composite	overview	of	system	engineering	practices	within	HEP	facilities	alongside	the	State	of	the	Art	within	the	field	of	SE.		
2.1 State of the Art in RH in HEP facilities
This	section	will	discuss	existing	HEP	facilities	with	activated	targets	and	the	State	of	the	Art	RH	tech-niques	which	are	used	to	handle	the	activated	parts.
2.1.1 HEP facilities with proton beams
Table	1	shows	a	list	of	large	accelerators	with	high-powered	radioactive	targets.	These	HEP	facilities	accelerate	proton	beams	that	are	used	for	the	production	of	secondary	particles,	such	as	antiprotons,	neutrinos,	and	muons.	Many	of	these	HEP	facilities	use	close	shielding	around	beamlines	to	avoid	the	spread	of	radiation	close	to	the	source,	thus	reducing	the	overall	volume	required.	To	exchange	con-sumable	targets	into	the	beam,	the	vertical	plug	concept	is	often	used.	Following	a	standard	method	of	radiation	shielding	against	fast	neutrons,	the	inner	part	consists	of	iron,	which	is	a	high-density	mate-rial.	 In	contrast,	 the	outer	part,	which	has	 a	 large	volume,	 is	made	of	cheaper	concrete	 for	neutron	moderation	and	absorption.	Significant	shielding	can	be	saved	by	placing	the	target	in	a	tunnel	below	ground	level,	so	that	the	soil	can	contribute	to	the	shielding.	In	such	an	underground	tunnel,	space	is	usually	 limited	 for	extended	maintenance	setups	and	additional	close	shielding	with	plugs.	 In	 these	facilities,	activated	parts	must	at	least	be	transported	from	the	beamline	to	a	maintenance	region	built	as	 either	 a	hotcell	or	 a	workcell	detached	 from	 the	beamline.	 In	 a	 scenario	with	 enough	space	 and	cranes	for	heavy	equipment,	the	maintenance	area	can	be	completely	separated	from	the	in-beam	po-sition	through	either	a	shielded	transport	tunnel	or	a	mobile	shielding	flask.	
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Table	1:	List	of	selected	HEP	facilities	with	radioactive	targets.	
S.No.	 Facility	Name	 Target	Type	
1.	 Antiproton	target	CERN,	Switzerland	 Antiproton	
2.	 Fermilab,	USA	
3.	 p-bar	at	FAIR	(planned),	Germany		
4.	 Fermilab	NuMI	,	USA	 Neutrino	Production		
5.	 CERN	CNGS,	Switzerland	
6.	 J-PARC	T2K	,	Japan	
7.	 Target	E	at	PSI	,	Switzerland	 Muon	Production	
8.	 J-PARC	MUSE	,	Japan	
9.	 SNS	Oak	Ridge,	USA	 Spallation	 Neutron	 Sources	(SNS)	10.	 JSNS	at	J-PARC,	Japan	
12.	 ISIS,	STFC	Rutherford	Appleton	Laboratory,	UK		
13.	 SINQ	at	PSI,	Switzerland		
14	 ESS	(planned),	Sweden		
15.	 LHC,	Switzerland		 Hadron	Collider	
Figure	13	shows	the	basic	parts	of	a	close	shielding	with	plug	inserts.	The	main	purpose	of	the	plug	is	to	 limit	activation	on	the	side	opposite	the	beam	to	a	 level	at	which	hands-on	maintenance	becomes	possible.	At	the	same	time,	radiation-sensitive	materials,	such	as	vacuum	seals,	are	protected.	In	prin-ciple,	 this	 solution	 offers	 well-protected	 access,	 since	 there	 is	 always	 shielding	 between	 the	 main	
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source	 of	 radiation	 and	 the	 operator.	 Moreover,	 this	 approach	 limits	 the	 motions	 necessary	 for	maintenance	 to	 simple,	vertical	movements.	However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 it	drastically	 increases	 the	weight	of	the	components,	since	they	become	directly	connected	to	the	heavy	shielding	blocks.	Despite	this	limitation,	it	is	the	method	of	choice	at	numerous	particle	accelerator	facilities	as	explained	in	the	following	sub-sections.	
Figure	13.	Sample	drawing	of	a	closed	tunnel	with	vertical	plugs.	
2.1.1.1 Remote maintenance systems at PSIThe	 PSI	 in	 Switzerland	 (Figure	14)	 operates	 a	 proton	 accelerator	 and	 a	 spallation	 neutron	 source	which	supply	particles	for	experimental	scientific	and	 industrial	programs.	It	also	has	a	 large	facility	for	 canner	 treatment	 using	 protons.	The	 PSI	 cyclotron	 delivers	 a	 proton	 beam	 of	 2mA	 at	 590MeV	[64][75][76].	Targets	and	beam	dumps	are	in	direct	contact	with	the	beam	and,	hence,	doses	can	range	
4	mSv/h	or	more	at	a	distance	of	one	meter	 from	 the	 target.	Thus,	hands-on	maintenance	 is	not	an	option.	The	PSI	beamline	 (Figure	15)	 is	shielded	 through	 the	use	of	concrete	blocks	which	provide	adequate	 radiation	 shielding	 for	 hands-on	 operations	 on	 the	 working	 platform	 when	 the	 beam	 is	turned	off.	
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Figure	14:	PSI	in	Switzerland,	birds-eye	view		[77].	
Figure	15.	beamline	section,	showing	a	multiple	beamline	inserts	(i.e.,	targets	and	collimators)	
that	require	remote	maintenance	under	concrete	shielding	[77].	
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Target	M,	target	E	and	the	SINQ	target	shown	 in	Figure	15	are	three	of	the	most	activated	beamline	inserts	in	the	PSI	beamline.	The	SINQ	and	E	targets	are	exchanged	using	the	following	sequence	[77]:	1. Concrete	blocks	are	removed	to	clear	access	to	working	platform	(Figure	16).	2. Media	cables	and	other	connections	(e.g.,	water,	electricity,	control	signals,	vacuum)	are	dis-connected.	This	 is	performed	by	an	operator	and	 the	dose	rates	are	monitored	on	top	of	the	beamline.	3. A	parking	bridge	structure	is	installed	and	positioned.	The	bridge	is	used	to	position	the	shield-ing	flask.		4. The	shielding	flask	is	moved	across	the	hall	using	an	overhead	crane.	An	operator	is	involved	in	monitoring	the	installation	of	the	bridge.	5. The	transfer	cask	 is	moved	and	docked	onto	the	bridge.	The	operator	checks	to	confirm	that	the	docking	of	the	flask	is	complete	and	secure.	The	operators	then	depart	from	the	area	before	the	target	extraction	is	carried	out	using	the	shielding	flask	(Figure	16).	6. The	shielding	flask	engages	the	target	and	extracts	it	using	an	internal	lifting	mechanism.	The	doses	at	the	target	are	extremely	high.	The	shielding	flask	is	designed	in	such	a	manner	that	it	protects	the	environment	from	radiation	doses.	7. The	shielding	flask	 is	closed	down	and	the	beamline	 insert	 is	transported	(Figure	17)	to	the	hotcell	for	dismantling	operations	(Figure	18).	
Figure	16.	SINQ	target	concrete	shielding	(left)	and	shielding	flask	installed	on	top	of	the	stor-
age	pit	(right)	[77].	
28
	
Figure	17.	PSI	SINQ	target	is	transported	(left)	and	docked	with	the	hotcell	(right)	[77].	
Figure	18.	PSI	SINQ	target	is	extracted	within	the	hotcell	and	dismantled	using	a	Master	Slave	
Manipulator	and	power	manipulators	[77].	The	PSI	facility	uses	different	shielding	flasks	for	maintenance	of	its	targets.	The	RH	was	built	gradual-ly	 into	 the	 facility;	hence,	 the	shielding	 flasks	were	also	built	gradually	according	 to	changing	needs	and	requirements.	
2.1.1.2 Remote maintenance systems at J-PARCJ-PARC	is	a	high-intensity	proton	accelerator	facility.	J-PARC	includes	three	main	sections	(Figure	19):	
a	400	MeV	linear	proton	accelerator,	a	3	GeV	Rapid	Cycling	Synchrotron,	and	a	50	GeV	Main	Ring	syn-chrotron.	The	Materials	and	Life	Science	Experimental	Facility	at	 J-PARC	(Figure	20)	uses	 the	beam	from	the	Rapid	Cycling	Synchrotron	on	muon	and	neutron	targets	[43].	These	targets	are	both	highly	radioactive	and	therefore	require	remote	maintenance.	Heavy	concrete	shielding	is	used	on	top	of	the	beamline	during	 facility	operation.	The	 targets	 	are	 located	 inside	the	 target	hall,	which	has	an	 inte-grated	hotcell	and	storage	facility,	but	are	individually	transported	into	the	hotcell	facility	for	remote	disassembly	using	separate	shielding	flasks.		The	facility	currently	operates	at	0.4	MW,	but	by	2018,	it	
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will	be	operating	at	1	MW—thus	generating	targets	with	an	even	greater	 level	of	activation	that	will	also	require	remote	maintenance		[43].	The	shielding	flask	for	muon	targets	 is	composed	of	a	shielding	case	and	a	sliding	door.	Two	chains,	driven	by	a	motor,	are	used	to	move	the	door.	There	is	also	a	gripper,	which	is	driven	by	an	individual	motor.	The	transport	task	sequence	for	the	J-PARC	target	is	identical	to	that	of	the	PSI	target,	as	shown	in	Figure	21.	The	 shielding	 flask	 is	moved	by	 an	overhead	 crane	 installed	on	 top	of	 the	bridge	 ar-rangement,	which	keeps	the	shielding	flask	aligned	with	the	beamline	insert	[78].		
Figure	19.	J-PARC	facility	in	Tokai,	Japan.	
Figure	20.	 J-PARC	Materials	and	Life	Science	Experimental	Facility	with	muon	and	neutron	 t	
argets	requiring	remote	maintenance.	
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Figure	21.	Schematic	illustration	of	the	J-PARC	muon	target	and	shielding	flask,	showing	critical	
positions	for	remote	maintenance	[78].	The	shielding	flask	uses	its	internal	crane	to	lower	the	target	plug	onto	the	plug	stand,	which	is	situat-ed	inside	the	hotcell	(Figure	22).	The	plug	stand	has	the	capability	to	rotate	by	360	degrees	and	is	also	compatible	with	other	beamline	plugs.	The	exchange	device	is	used	to	remove	the	target	rod	from	its	shielding	after	 it	is	unscrewed	from	the	shielding	by	a	power	manipulator	using	a	specially	designed	tool.	The	target	rod	is	then	transported,	via	an	exchange	device,	to	a	cutting	device,	where	it	is	cut	into	small	pieces	and	 later	packed	 into	a	disposal	barrel.	A	new	 target	rod	 is	 then	attached	 to	 the	 target	plug	 shielding	 using:	 an	 exchange	 device,	 a	 power	 manipulator	 and	 a	 Master	 Slave	 Manipulator	(Figure	22).	During	the	design	stage	of	this	equipment,	a	misalignment	was	detected	between	the	tar-get	rod	and	the	target	plug	shielding.	This	misalignment	was	caused	by	the	tolerances	of	the	devices	between	several	parts:	the	plug	stand	and	plug	stand	attachment;	the	plug	stand	attachment	and	Tar-get	assembly;	the	Target	rod	and	rod	attachment;	and	the	rod	attachment	and	exchange	device[78].	To	tackle	this	misalignment,	during	assembly	a	careful	sequence	 is	followed,	and	the	Center	of	Mass	for	each	element	is	carefully	considered.4
Figure	22 shows	 the	current	RH	setup	for	 the	muon	 target	 in	the	 J-PARC	Materials	and	Life	Science	Experimental	Facility.	The	 facility	 includes	 a	 target	hall,	 a	 shielding	 flask,	 a	bridge	 for	 the	shielding	flask,	and	a	hotcell	(which	itself	includes	a	power	manipulator,	an	exchange	device,	a	Master	Slave	Ma-nipulator,	an	overhead	crane	and	a	plug	stand).	The	muon	target	has	been	replaced	several	times,	with	six	replacements	occurring	since	2014.	The	timeline	of	these	replacements	is	given	below:	
· 2008:	Commissioning	 for	 replacements	of	 the	 cold	 fixed	 target,	 the	profile	monitor	 and	 the	current	transformer.	
· 2009:	Commissioning	for	replacements	of	the	hot	fixed	target.	The	fixed	target	was	used	again	(50	mSv/h	at	surface).	
· 2011:	Tests	of	hot	fixed	target	(500	mSv/h	at	surface).	
4 “In	particular,	the	rod	attachment	must	have	two	hanging	positions,	because	it	has	two	weight	centers,	one	with	a	Target	rod	and	another	without.	The	balance	of	the	rod	attachment	is	adjusted	by	the	po-sition	of	the	hanging	points	and	some	counter	weights”	[78].
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· 2012:	Commissioning	for	replacements	of	the	cold	rotating	target.	
· 2013:	Commissioning	for	replacements	of	the	cold	rotating	target	and	volume	reduction	of	the	cold	target	rod.	
· 2014:	Commissioning	for	volume	reduction	of	the	cold	fixed	and	rotating	mock	target	rods.	
Figure	22.	J-PARC	remote	maintenance	setup:	Materials	and	Life	Science	Experimental	Facility	
target	hall	with	muon	target	shielding	flask;	hotcell	setup;	power	manipulator	on	the	roof	of	the	
hotcell;	muon	target	handled	in	the	hotcell;	hotcell	from	the	inside.	The	neutron	spallation	 target	at	the	 J-PARC	Materials	and	Life	Science	Experimental	Facility	also	re-quires	 remote	maintenance.	More	 details	 concerning	 the	 handling	 of	 the	 Japan	 Spallation	Neutron	Source	(JSNS)	are	provided	 in	Section	2.1.1.5	 in	the	context	of	the	Oak	Ridge,	USA,	setup	for	remote	handing	of	spallation	source	targets.	
2.1.1.3 Targets with vertical plug maintenanceThe	“Neutrinos	at	the	Main	Injector”	(NuMI)	 is	a	120	GeV	proton	beam	facility	at	the	Fermilab	facility,	USA.	The	neutrino	target	 is	mounted	on	a	vertical	plug	 in	a	closed	tunnel	that	 is	heavily	shielded	with	iron	and	concrete[79].	Analysis	of	 the	 target	 indicates	high	 levels	of	 radiation;	however,	 the	space	 is	confined	due	to	the	shielding	making	 it	challenging	for	maintenance	by	RH.	With	regard	to	the	 layout,	the	facility	design	report	states:	“Most	of	the	components	of	the	primary	beam	system	reside	in	the	Main	
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Injector	enclosure	or	the	NuMI	stub.	Both	regions	are	covered	by	an	extensive	earth	shield	and	built	as	part	of	 the	civil	construction.”	 [79]	 In	 the	 facility	 there	are	 two	beamline	devices,	 termed	 “horns,”	 to	focus	the	beam.	They	are	mounted	on	top	of	the	vertical	plug	for	retrieval.	An	overhead	crane	is	used	to	remotely	transfer	the	target	from	the	beamline	to	the	workcell	area,	where	basic	maintenance	is	carried	out	[79].		
Figure	23.	Fermi	lab	NuMI	target	area	cross-section.	The	second	horn	is	shown	hanging	from	its	
alignment	module,	which	rests	on	alignment	rails	at	the	top	of	the	channel	[79].	Like	 the	NuMI	 target,	 the	Tokai-to-Kamioka	 (T2K)	 target	 and	 horns	 at	 J-PARC	 are	 also	mounted	 on	vertical	plugs	and	are	retrieved	vertically	using	an	RH	crane	that	can	lift	up	to	40	tons.	The	T2K	target	station	is	covered	with	a	2.2	m	thick	iron	shielding	and	concrete	blocks.	The	target	station	is	comprised	of:	 the	 target,	horn	1,	horn	 2	and	horn	3,	which	are	constructed	underground	to	protect	 the	environ-ment	from	radiation	[80][81].		The	target	is	attached	to	horn	1	on	the	T2K	beamline.	Horn	1	is	then	lifted	up	using	a	specially	designed,	remotely	handled	crane	from	the	beamline	and	installed	on	the	remote	maintenance	area	(the	hotcell).	The	spend	target	is	removed	from	Horn	1,	and	a	new	one	 is	 installed	onto	 it	before	 it	 is	 installed	onto	the	beamline	for	further	operations.	The	used	target	is	stored	after	remote	maintenance.	The	target	has	
a	 specially	 designed	 target	 exchanger,	with	which	 the	 target	 can	 be	 replaced	 using	 an	master	 slave	manipulators	[80].	The	target	exchanger	 is	equipped	with	twin	 jack	systems	which	can	be	adjusted	to	the	 required	 angle.	The	 exchanger	 is	 also	 equipped	with	 a	 load	 cell,	 gimbals	 and	 a	 spring	 system	 to	preventing	overloading.	
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Figure	24.	T2K	target	station	setup	at	J-PARC.	
Figure	25.	T2K	target	remote	maintenance	in	the	hotcell	using	a	Master	Slave	Manipulator	pro-
vided	by	Canada's	national	laboratory	for	particle	and	nuclear	physics	(TRIUMF)	[80][81].	
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2.1.1.4 Remote maintenance systems at CERN (excluding ISOLDE)For	High	Intensity	Beam	(HIB)	machines	with	very	high	beam	energies	(of	hundreds	of	GeV	or	TeV)	close	shielding	becomes	 impractical	 and	can	even	 lead	 to	 increased	dose	 rates	during	maintenance	operations.	The	reason	for	this	is	the	much	higher	attenuation	distance	required	for	secondary	radia-tion,	as	well	as	the	potential	build-up	of	radiation,	due	to	the	effect	whereby	from	one	particle,	many	more	particles	are	created,	 leading	 to	an	avalanche	of	 radiation.	 In	 this	case,	adding	more	material	close	to	the	beam	may	make	activation	even	worse.	The	very	 long	attenuation	distance	required	can	only	be	achieved	by	placing	machinery	over	 a	 large	area	and	 locating	 it	 far	underground.	The	most	extreme	example	of	this	 is	the	Large	Hadron	Collider	(LHC)	at	CERN.	The	LHC	collides	two	opposing	proton	 beams	 at	 energies	 of	 up	 to	 7TeV.	 Over	 the	 whole	 circumference	 of	 27km,	 dedicated	 beam	dumps	and	collimators	are	installed,	which	all	require	maintenance	[82].	The	CERN	accelerator	beam	lies	approximately	50	to	175	meters	(164	to	574	ft)	underground	(Figure	26).The	earth	above	it	and	the	radiation	shielding	on	the	sides	of	the	tunnel	provide	the	shielding	necessary	to	protect	the	outside	environment.	However,	over	time,	the	equipment	in	the	tunnel	becomes	radioactive	to	varying	degrees.		
Figure	26.	CERN	accelerator	network	[83].	To	conduct	maintenance	within	the	CERN	facility,	the	maintenance	team	uses	various	pieces	of	remote	maintenance	and	inspection	equipment.	These	are	discussed	in	the	following	sub-sections.
Collimator exchange using a remotely operated craneMore	than	100	collimators	of	various	types	are	currently	installed	in	the	LHC,	mainly	at	Points	3	and	7	(Figure	27).	The	collimators	exist	at	certain	points	around	the	LHC	ring	in	order	to	stop	particles	from	straying	 from	 their	desired	beam	orbits.	The	collimators	become	radioactive	as	a	result	of	collisions	with	stray	particles;	thus,	repair	scenarios	need	to	be	developed	to	minimize	personnel	access.	These	regions	are	among	the	most	radioactive	in	the	LHC,	with	dose	rates	in	the	order	of	several	mSv/h.	In	the	case	of	a	collimator	failure,	it	is	necessary	to	remotely	exchange	the	collimator	whilst	minimizing	direct	intervention	by	people.	The	various	CERN	services	affected	in	such	a	case	are:	transport,	vacu-um,	water	cooling,	radiation	protection,	surveying	and	the	design	office	[83].	The	initial	installations	of	
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collimators	are	designed	to	facilitate	remote	replacement,	as	follows:	“Vacuum	connections	are	made	using	special	beam	pipe	vacuum	clamps	and	the	collimator	sits	on	supports	fitted	with	guiding	pins	to	ease	their	 installation.	Electrical	and	cooling	water	connections	are	established	by	automatic	plug-in	devices	when	the	collimator	is	lowered	onto	its	supports”	[83].	Initial	installation	of	the	LHC	collima-tors	was	done	using	a	custom-designed	mobile	crane	(Figure	27),	which	required	hands-on	guidance	from	operators	to	move	the	collimators	into	position	(Figure	27).		
Figure	27.	LHC	underground	tunnels	and	caverns,	with	points	3	and	7	marked	(left);	the	initial	
installation	of	an	outer	collimator	passing	over	an	adjacent	beam	pipe,	showing	a	limited	avail-
ability	of	space	in	the	LHC	tunnel	(right).		
A	third-generation	remotely	operated	crane	(Figure	28)	 is	currently	being	tested	to	perform	full	re-mote	removal	and	 installation	of	the	LHC	collimators,	based	on	the	same	concept	as	the	original	mo-bile	crane.	The	new,	remotely	operated	crane	will	have	 a	one-ton	 lifting	capacity,	a	visual	system	 to	monitor	 the	extraction	and	 installation	of	 the	collimator,	a	mobile	platform	capable	of	accessing	 the	LHC	tunnel,	a	shielding	container	for	the	activated	collimator,	and	a	control	system	for	remote	opera-tion.	The	remotely	operated	crane	will	obtain	power	from	existing	installations	within	the	LHC	tunnel	and	from	a	backup	battery,	which	will	drive	the	system	in	the	event	of	power	failure.			
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Figure	28.	Remotely	operated	crane	for	collimator	exchange.	
Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV)According	to	a	review	of	 the	RH	needs	of	 the	CERN	accelerator,	a	RH	 team	 identified	the	need	 for	a	general-purpose,	Remotely	Operated	Vehicle	(ROV)	to	carry	out:	
· Remote	visual	inspections	
· Remote	radiation	dose	measurements	
· Remote	manipulations	of	small	loads.	Currently,	CERN	 is	using	 a	Telemax	ROV	 (Figure	29)	 equipped	with	 tracks	 that	 enable	 it	 to	 climb	stairs.	The	ROV	 is	 also	 fitted	with	 a	 six-axis	manipulator	 arm	 (5kg	payload).	The	 control	 station	 is	portable	and	communication	between	the	control	station	and	the	ROV	occurs	through	either	an	optical	fiber	or	a	radio	link.	The	Telemax	ROV	has	programmable	movement	sequences.	It	was	recently	used	for	the	following	tasks	[84]:	
· Disposal	of	the	Antiproton	Decelerator	target.		
· Disconnection	of	the	Super	Proton	Synchrotron	Long	Straight	Section	1	(LSS1)	collimators,	in-cluding	water	vacuum,	cabling,	etc.	
· Visual	inspection	of	the	Antiproton	Decelerator.	
· Providing	vision	assistance	for	the	Proton	Synchrotron	Booster	dump	removal.	
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Figure	29.	Telemax	ROV	for	RH	at	CERN.	
Remote overhead crane at CERNThe	CERN	Neutrinos	to	Gran	Sasso	(CNGS)	target	also	receives	high-energy	protons	(400GeV)	from	the	CERN	Super	Proton	Synchrotron.	These	interact	with	an	assembly	of	five	graphite	rods	mounted	on	a	revolving	assembly	which	is	encompassed	by	iron	shielding	[85].	Operational	problems	have	made	it	evident	that	adequate	shielding	measures	are	required	to	protect	the	electronics	and	personnel	during	operation.	The	facility	tunnel	is	underground	and	uses	no	shielding.	The	target	station	can	be	remotely	inspected,	but	there	is	only	space	for	a	remotely	controlled	overhead	crane	and	its	cameras	[85].	The	CNGS	 target	 is	not	coupled	directly	 to	a	maintenance	hotcell.	Currently,	 the	CERN	engineering	 team	has	installed	a	specially-built	crane	in	the	CNGS	region.	This	overhead	crane	can	handle	up	to	7.5	tons,	has	width	of	3.4m	and	motion	range	of	123m	(Figure	30).	The	crane	also	has	no	onboard	electronics;	instead,	remote	control	panels	and	remote	cameras	are	used	 to	assist	 in	the	handling	of	radioactive	parts.	The	 remote	maintenance	at	CNGS	 target	has	 faced	various	 issues	and	unplanned	disruptions.	The	maintenance	of	these	disruptions	revealed	some	important	lessons[85]:	
· In	the	design	of	the	target,	brazing	must	be	avoided	 in	compression	regions.	Ceramics	can	be	used	 in	compression-only	regions.	Identical	bolts/screws	must	be	used	with	proper	position-ing.	RH	procedures	must	be	well	documented	with	a	video	and	photo	diary.	
· Intervention	optimization	must	be	carried	out	by	planning	the	 intervention	 in	detail	to	mini-mize	the	dose	received.	
· For	“consumables	 items,”	optimization	of	the	radioactive	waste	should	be	 included	 in	the	de-sign	and	designs	must	be	RH	compatible.	The	designs	must	be	home	grown	 to	 increase	 the	availability	of	 the	 system,	 as	 this	will	 allow	 optimized	 replacement	 and	maintenance	of	 the	consumable.	
· Radiation	effect	 to	COTS	electronics	 is	 important	 factor	 for	electronics.	The	CNGS	electronics	were	installed	at	location	with	higher	radiation	doses,	which	that	caused	the	electronic	ventila-tion	system	to	fail.	This	was	resolved	with	more	shielding.			
· It	is	important	to	use	radiation	simulations	to	understand	and	evaluate	the	radiation	environ-ment	in	a	facility	beforehand.		
· Anticipate	tooling	and	procedures	to	observe	the	components	that	fail,	before	exchanging	them	with	spares.	
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Figure	30.	CNGS	region	with	a	specially	built,	remotely	controlled	crane.	During	the	2013-2015	shutdown	at	CERN,	the	Target	Absorber	Neutral	(TAN)	detector	and	shielding	elements	needed	to	be	exchanged	in	the	LHC	tunnel	on	either	side	of	the	ATLAS	experiment.	Remote	TAN	mini	cranes	were	commissioned	to	carry	out	 the	exchange.	The	cranes	were	equipped	with	on-board	 cameras	 and	 controlled	 from	 a	 remote	 control	 station.	 Separate,	 free-standing,	pan-tilt	zoom	cameras	were	also	deployed	to	provide	an	overview	of	the	operations.	The	TAN	mini-crane	setup	can	be	seen	in	Figure	31.	The	crane	has	a	very	restricted	operational	space,	and	it	is	permanently	located	inside	the	tunnel.	Due	the	nature	of	the	tunnel,	and	the	delayed	realization	of	the	RH	needs,	the	remote	TAN	mini	crane	was	custom-designed		[86].	
Figure	31.	Remote	TAN	mini-crane	setup	at	CERN	a)	Minicrane	handling	copper	bar,	b)	Min-
crance	from	below,	c)	Off-boad	PTZ	camera,	and	d)	Control	console	[86].	
RH train for LHC radiation protection surveys and visual inspectionIn	the	event	of	 limited	or	no	personal	access	to	the	LHC	tunnel,	a	Train	Inspection	Monorail	(TIM)	 is	used	to	conduct	the	inspection	and	measurements	remotely.	The	TIM	is	an	overhead	train	mounted	on	
a	monorail	in	the	ceiling	of	the	LHC	tunnel.	The	TIM	includes	cameras	to	conduct	visual	inspections,	as	well	as	instruments	to	measure	the	radiation	and	oxygen	levels	within	the	LHC	tunnel.	The	TIM	struc-
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ture	 is	10.2m	 long	and	 it	 is	divided	 into	a	motor	wagon,	a	reconnaissance	wagon,	a	radiation	protec-tion	wagon,	a	battery	wagon	and	a	control	wagon.			
Figure	32.	TIM	structure	(left);	TIM	remote	control	setup	from	the	LHC	control	room	(right)	Currently,	the	TIM	infrastructure	covers	the	space	between	Point	5	and	Point	8	in	the	LHC	tunnel.	Fu-ture	plans	for	the	TIM	project	include	developing	three	more	TIM	trains	that	can	cover	the	entire	LHC	tunnel.	The	TIM	has	 a	maximum	speed	of	8Km/h.	As	well	as	being	autonomous,	 it	can	also	be	con-trolled	 remotely	 from	 the	LHC	main	control	 room	via	 the	General	Packet	Radio	Service	 (GPRS)	net-work	that	is	available	within	the	LHC	tunnel.		
2.1.1.5 Remote maintenance system for neutron spallation targets and facilitiesLarger	and	heavier	target	 installations,	such	as	 large	 liquid/solid	target	assemblies,	cannot	be	trans-ported	 in	overhead	shielding	containers	or	mounted	on	 larger	shielding	plugs	 that	can	be	extracted	vertically,	due	to	the	high	 loads	and	 liquid	containment;	 instead,	they	have	to	be	maintained	on-site.	The	hotcell	in	these	facilities	are	built	on	top	of	the	target	regions	in	order	to	conduct	on-site	remote	maintenance.	 The	 large	 targets	 are	 mounted	 on	 horizontal	 assemblies	 that	 use	 rail	 mechanism	 to	transport	the	target	in	between	target	station	and	hotcell	Figure	33	shows	the	general	components	of	
a	spallation	neutron	source	(SNS)	target	for	RH.			
SNS at Oak Ridge National LaboratoryThe	SNS	at	Oak	Ridge	National	Laboratory	(ORNL)	facility	 is	powered	by	a	2MW,	1GeV	proton	 linear	accelerator	that	is	335m	long.	Beam	pulses	are	bunched	in	a	ring	and	then	directed	towards	a	flowing	liquid	mercury	target	that	converts	the	protons	to	a	pulse	of	approximately	5x1015	neutrons	[65].	The	horizontal	RH	setup	(Figure	34)	was	established	to	allow	maintenance	of	the	target,	since	the	target	is	mounted	on	a	moveable	platform	that	retrieves	it	into	the	hotcell.			
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Figure	33.	SNS	target	setup:	general	overview	and	components	[65].	The	SNS	ORNL	hotcell	(Figure	35)	 is	equipped	with Telerob	EMSM-2B	dual	servo	manipulator	arms.	Each	manipulator	has	six	positioning	Degrees	Of	Freedom	(DOF),	a	gripper	axis,	a	1.8m	reach,	a	25Kg	continuous	capacity	and	a	45.5Kg	peak	capacity	(Figure	35).	The	servo	manipulator	package	includes	
a	227kg	auxiliary	hoist	for	assisting	 in	component	handling	and	tool	support.	The	servo	manipulator	bridge	is	supplemented	by	a	robotic,	7.5	ton	bridge	crane,	which	is	mounted	on	an	independent	set	of	rails	in	the	hotcell.	With	regard	to	positioning	the	arms	and	hoist	hook,	it	has	been	reported	that:	“Pre-
cise	robotic	position	control	of	the	bridges	allows	the	arms	or	hoist	hook	to	be	positioned	automatically	to	
within	less	than	3.1mm	”	[65].	 	The	hotcell	RH	equipment	is	controlled	from	a	safe	area	using	Internet	communication.	The	cell	viewing	systems	can	have	total	absorbed	doses	of	up	to	106	Gy	[65].		
	
Figure	34.	RH	system	setup	at	SNS	at	ORNL	[65].	
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Figure	35.	SNS	ORNL	hotcell	setup	(left);	Telerob	EMSM-2B	dual	servo	manipulator	arms	(right)	
[65].	The	 high	 bay	 area	 on	 top	 of	 the	 target	 chamber	 uses	 a	 pedestal-mounted	 hydraulic	 boom	 system	(Figure	36),	which	can	be	equipped	either	with	a	450kg	hoist	or	dual	servo	manipulator	arms	to	con-duct	RH	on	the	radioactive	waste	parts.	The	 	boom	has	a	payload	capacity	of	2948Kg	and	can	reach	9.2m	horizontally,	9.7m	above	the	level,	and	3.7m	below	level,	giving	it	access	to	the	pipe	fittings	and	other	components	 located	at	the	top	of	the	shielding	plugs.	Operations	in	the	high	bay	area	focus	on	the	removal	of	spent,	 failed,	or	obsolete	components,	such	as	proton	beam	windows,	rather	 than	on	remote	maintenance.	Thus,	 the	remote	equipment	 in	 the	high	bay	 is	“designed	to	be	disconnected	for	
removal	into	shielded	transfer	casks.	Removed	components	may	go	into	long-term	storage,	be	shipped	off	
site,	or	moved	into	the	hotcell	through	a	top-loading	hatch	for	inspection,	breakdown,	or	packaging”	[65].	In	order	to	carry	out	RH	tasks	in	the	SNS	facility,	a	mobile	manipulator	vehicle	(Figure	36)	is	used.	It	is	equipped	with	a	Telemate	servo	manipulator	arm	which	has		a	101.6	cm	reach,	a	continuous	load	ca-pacity	of	11.3	kg,	and	a	peak	capacity	of	15	kg.	The	mobile	platform	 is	based	on	a	commercial	mini-excavator	that	was	converted	from	a	diesel	engine	to	electric.	The	system	 is	mounted	on	tracks	that	provide	versatile	positioning	capabilities,	such	as	zero-radius	turning	and	an	ability	to	drive	through	99cm	doorways.	The	mobile	device	is	controlled	from	a	remote	station	that	includes	a	vehicle	control	panel,	a	servo	manipulator	master	control	arm,	and	a	man-machine	interface	[65].	
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Figure	36.	SNS	ORNL	RH	system:	pedestal-mounted	hydraulic	boom	system	(left);	mobile	ma-
nipulator	vehicle		system	(right)	[65].	
SNS at J-PARCThe	SNS	source	at	J-PARC	is	also	a	liquid	mercury	target,	making	it	similar	to	that	at	SNS	ORNL.	How-ever,	 it	has	an	 intense,	high-energy	proton	beam	(3GeV,	1MW),	compared	 to	 the	1GeV	at	ORNL	The	lifetime	of	the	JSNS	mercury	target	was	estimated	based	on	a	fatigue	endurance	curve,	taking	into	ac-count	the	degradation	due	to	pitting	and	irradiation	damage	[87][88].		The	target	is	mounted	on	a	hor-izontal	 trolley	 that	 is	retracted	 into	the	hotcell	 for	 remote	maintenance.	Figure	37	shows	 the	 target	assembly	setup.	The	hotcell	at	J-PARC	is	shared	by	muon	and	neutron	targets.	It	is	equipped	with	RH	equipment	to	carry	out	maintenance	and	disposal	task	sequences	on	the	facility’s	radioactive	compo-nents.	A	separate	shielding	 flask	 is	used	 to	 transport	 the	neutron	 target	components	 to	a	 long-term	storage	facility	below	the	hotcell	area	(see	Figure	38)	[89].		Detailed	description	of	this	RH	task	is	giv-en	in[89].	
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Figure	37.	Target	assembly	setup	of	the	SNS	source	at	J-PARC	[89].	
Figure	38.	RH	task	sequence	for	a	target	assembly	setup	of	the	SNS	source	at	J-PARC	[89].	
Science and Technology Facilities Council SNS target at Rutherford Appleton La-
boratory
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The	 Science	 and	Technology	Facilities	Council	 (ISIS)	 facility	 at	 the	Rutherford	Appleton	Laboratory	uses	proton	beams	on	a	solid,	tantalum-clad	tungsten	target	(Figure	39).	This	target	is	maintained	by	two	Master	 Slave	Manipulators,	which	 are	 positioned	 opposite	 one	 another,	 each	with	 a	 dedicated	window	for	viewing.	The	cell	also	has	a	crane	and	cameras	to	provide	assistance	in	remote	manipula-tion.	 The	 spent	 target	 is	 stored	 close	 by	 and	 removed	 via	 an	 underground	 mechanism	 using	 a	transport	flask.	RH	at	the	ISIS	facility	includes	the	horizontal	removal	of	target,	reflector	and	modera-tor	systems	(as	well	as	all	cooling	plants).	The	target	replacement	normally	takes	10	days	from	beam	off	to	beam	on.	Certain	RH	operation	can	take	up	to	14	days,	with	no	beam	operation	possible	during	this	time[133].		
Figure	39.	Science	and	Technology	Facilities	Council	(ISIS)	SNS	target	and	hotcell	setup	for	RH.	
2.1.2 HEP facilities with Rare Isotope Beams (RIB) targetsRare	 Isotope	Beams	 (RIB)	are	produced	using	 two	 techniques	 (Figure	40):	 in-flight	separation	and	isotope	separations	online	(ISOL)	[90][91].		In-flight	separations	 involve	 the	nuclei	 in	heavy	 ion	beams	being	converted	 to	other	nuclides	when	impinged	on	the	 target.	Many	different	 fragments	are	produced,	which	are	 then	separated	 in	a	 frag-ment	separator	with	the	application	electromagnetic	fields.	The	nuclides	can	even	be	separated	inde-pendently	by	mass	and	charge,	by	using	degraders.	This	method	of	operation	means	 that	 there	are	high	levels	of	radiation	due	to	the	beam’s	interaction	with	the	target	and	other	parts.	Parts	hit	by	the	intense	beam,	such	as	 the	dedicated	beam	catchers,	become	strongly	activated.	Most	of	 the	beam	 is	dumped	during	the	separation	process,	and	the	radiation	level	drops	towards	the	end	of	the	separator.		In	 ISOL	 facilities,	 the	nuclei	 in	 the	 target	are	converted	 through	bombardment	with	a	high-intensity	beam	consisting	mostly	of	protons.	The	nuclei	produced	are	 then	extracted	 from	 the	 target	and	col-lected	in	a	low-energy	beam.	Afterwards,	a	low-energy	but	high-resolution	mass	separator	 is	used	to	select	the	nuclides	of	interest.	Due	to	the	lower	energy	of	this	process	(except	in	the	case	of	the	target)	little	activation	is	caused;	however,	due	to	the	extraction	from	the	target,	contamination	poses	a	severe	problem.		
Figure	40	illustrates	the	different	production	schemes.	Table	2	shows	some	of	the	major	RIB	in-flight	and	ISOL	facilities.	
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Figure	40:	RIB-producing	processes.	
Table	2.	Selected	RIB	in-flight	and	ISOL	facilities.	
S.No.	 Facility	Name	 Target	Type	
1	 RIKEN	RIBF	Target	at	BigRIPS,	Japan	 In-Flight	
2	 FRIB	at	MSU	(new),	USA	
3	 FRS	at	GSI,	Germany	
4	 Super-FRS	at	FAIR	(new),	Germany	
5	 SISSI	at	GANIL,	France	
6	 SPIRAL	2	at	GANIL,	France	 ISOL	
7	 ISOLDE	at	CERN,	Switzerland	
8	 ISAC	at	TRIUMF,	Canada	
9	 SPIRAL	1	at	GANIL,	France	
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ion beam
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As	shown	in	Table	2,	the	FRIB,	Super-FRS	and	SPIRAL2	are	new	facilities	with	higher	beam	energies	and	intensities.	This	means	that,	in	these	facilities,	more	parts	will	be	activated	and,	ultimately,	require	maintenance.	It	is	imperative	to	study	the	practices	of	other	RIB	facilities	to	effectively	design	the	RH	for	such	new	facilities.	The	FRS	facility	in	GSI	and	ISOLDE	in	CERN	currently	deploy	State	of	the	Art	RH	equipment	 to	maintain	 the	 targets	and	beamlines.	 In	 later	sections,	we	will	discuss	 the	RH	 in	 these	facilities	in	more	detail.		
2.1.2.1 FRS target remote maintenance systems at GSIThe	GSI	Helmholtz	Centre	for	Heavy	Ion	Research	(German:	GSI	Helmholtzzentrum	für	Schwerionen-forschung	GmbH)	is	a	federally	and	state	co-funded	heavy	ion	research	center.	It	was	founded	in	1969	as	the	Society	for	Heavy	Ion	Research	(German:	Gesellschaft	für	Schwerionenforschung),	abbreviated	GSI,	to	conduct	research	on	and	with	heavy-ion	accelerators.	The	facility	can	be	divided	 into	the	fol-lowing	research	sub-facilities	[92]:		
· A	heavy	ion	LINAC	for	energies	up	to	14	MeV/u	
· A	heavy	ion	synchrotron	for	energies	up	to	1	GeV/u	in	the	case	of	Uranium	beams.	
· A	fragment	separator	(FRS),	which	was	built	in	1990	and	which	produces	and	separates	differ-ent	beams	of	(usually)	radioactive	ions.	The	process	involves	a	stable	beam	that	is	accelerated	through	“Schwer	Ionen	Synchrotron”	(SIS)	and	that	impinges	on	a	production	target.	From	this	event,	many	fragments	are	produced.	The	secondary	beam	is	then	purified	in	the	FRS.	The	ex-periment	storage	ring	(ESR)	and	additional	experiment	caves	exist	for	the	conducting	of	exper-iments.	
· Two	 high-energy	 lasers:	 the	 Nhelix	 (Nanosecond	 High-Energy	 Laser	 for	 Heavy	 Ion	 Experi-ments)	and	the	Phelix	(Petawatt	High-Energy	Laser	for	Heavy	Ion	Experiments).	Currently,	in	the	GSI	FRS,	the	target	area	and	the	first	dipole	stage	are	activated	areas	that	have	been	operational	since	1990.	The	FRS	 target	area	 is	 located	at	 the	 first	 focal	plane,	where	primary	beam	interactions	with	the	target	cause	radiation	to	the	order	of	mSv/h	[3][92].	Radiation	at	the	target	area	exists	even	after	a	month	of	cool-down;	hence,	it	is	not	possible	for	humans	to	conduct	maintenance.	The	second	focal	plane	also	accumulates	a	substantial	amount	of	beam	loss.	As	a	result,	RH	needs	to	be	performed	for	both	focal	planes.	The	vacuum	chambers	of	the	focal	planes	consist	of	complex	equip-ment,	including	beam	diagnostic	devices,	targets,	mechanical	drives,	and	vacuum	pumps.	Each	of	these	need	 to	be	 remotely	 replaced	 (Figure	41).	The	chamber	 in	 target	area	 and	 first	dipole	stage,	along	with	its	components	requires	remote	maintenance.	
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Figure	41.	FRS	target	area.	The	two	focal	FRS	planes	are	remotely	handled	using	two	individual	KUKA	KR350	robots	(Figure	42).	Each	robot	can	handle	loads	up	to	350	kg	and	has	a	working	envelope	of	25	m2.	The	positioning	accu-racy	and	repeatability	is	better	than	0.3	mm.	The	robot	which	operates	in	the	target	area	is	mounted	on	a	5	m	long	rail	system	to	facilitate	access	to	all	necessary	components.	The	robot	at	the	first	focal	plane	is	mounted	on	a	fixed	concrete	base.	The	levels	of	radiation	at	the	target	area	are	much	greater	than	those	at	the	focal	plane;	and	hence,	the	robot	at	the	target	area	needs	protection	while	the	beam	is	on	and	until	the	cool-down	time	 is	completed.	When	the	FRS	 is	using	a	beam	for	experiments,	the	robot	at	the	target	area	 is	parked	behind	a	 lead	wall	to	prevent	 it	from	being	ionized.	Lead	shielding	containers	 are	provided	near	 the	 robots	 to	 safely	 store	 activated	beamline	parts	once	 they	 are	 re-moved	 from	 the	vacuum	chamber.	The	 lead-shielding	containers	are	 later	 transported	 to	 long-term	storage	facilities.	This	is	done	through	human	intervention,	since	there	is	no	automated	mechanism	to	transport	the	activated	beamline	 inserts.	The	ALARA	principle	 is	used	to	conduct	 interventions,	with	time,	distance	and	shielding	used	as	bases	for	the	intervention	[3].	
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	(a)	 	(b)	
Figure	42:	FRS	remote	maintenance	work	using	KUKA	KR	350	robots:	(a)	target	area	robot	in-
stalled	on	a	5	m	long	rail	to	conduct	remote	maintenance	across	the	target	chamber;	(b)	robot	
at	the	first	focal	plane,	installed	on	a	fixed	concrete	base	with	a	tool	rack	beside	the	chamber	on	
the	wall	[3].	
FRS	 robots	 carry	 customized	 tools	 (or	 end	 effectors),	which	 are	 required	 to	 handle	 the	 individual	components.	FRS	robots	use	two	tools—a	hook	and	a	grippe	(Figure	43)—to	conduct	RH	tasks.	The	hook	is	used	to	lift	heavy	loads	and	transport	them	from	the	chamber	to	a	lead-shielding	container,	or	vice	versa[3].	
Figure	43:	Hook	and	gripper	tools	 for	the	Super-FRS	(left);	KUKA	KR350	removing	and	trans-
porting	a	vacuum	window	from	a	vacuum	chamber	using	a	hook	tool	(right)	[3].	The	gripper	tool,	which	is	operated	by	a	pneumatic	actuator,	is	used	to	catch	and	handle	smaller	parts,	such	 as	media	 supply	 panels	 (Figure	44).	Media	 supply	 panels	 are	 specially	 designed	 for	 the	 FRS	beamline	 inserts.	They	supply	compressed	air,	electricity	(including	high-	and	 low-voltage	supplies),	electronics	(detector	and	control	signals,	etc.),	cooling	water,	and	exhaust	air	and	gases	for	the	detec-tors.	They	are	also	used	to	vent	the	vacuum	system.	The	media	supply	panels	are	connected	via	a	20	by	
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20	cm2	media	panel.	A	pneumatically	driven	lock/unlock	mechanism	ensures	a	tight	mechanical	con-nection	after	the	robot	arm	has	moved	away.	All	media	feeds	go	through	standard	commercial	pieces.	The	 water	 and	 gas	 feeds	 are	 self-locking	 and	 open	 automatically	 upon	 disconnection	 and	 connec-tion[3].		
Figure	44.	FRS	beamline	insert	media	supply	panels	(left);	KUKA	robot	arm	using	a	gripper	to	
remove	the	beamline	insert	media	panel	from	the	detector	in	the	target	chamber	(right)	[3].	Viton	O-rings	are	used	to	ensure	a	solid	vacuum	 in	the	chamber.	Due	the	weight	of	the	beamline	 in-serts	the	gravitational	force	to	secure	the	vacuum	sealing.	Viton	O-rings	suffer	from	radiation	damage	and	can	withstand	integral	doses	of	up	to	106	Gy	[3].	All	RH	tasks	are	programmed,	simulated	and	tested	using	KUKA	SIMPRO	software,	which	includes	3D	models	of	the	KUKA	KR350	and	beamline	inserts.	The	software	determines,	in	detail,	the	robot	motion	sequences	necessary	to	perform	various	subtasks.	It	also	ensures	that	all	points	are	within	reach	of	the	robot	and	that	no	operation	errors	or	critical	robot	trajectories	occur.	Once	a	task	sequence	is	refined	in	KUKA	SIMPRO,	it	is	carried	out	using	an	actual	test	platform.	Finally,	the	robots	are	installed	in	the	desired	target	location	(e.g.	the	target	chamber	or	focal	planes)	[3].	
2.1.2.2 RH at ISOLDE, CERNThe	ISOLDE	facility	is	a	world-leading	laboratory	for	ISOL	production	and	studies	of	radioactive	nuclei.	ISOLDE	 belongs	 to	 CERN’s	 accelerator	 complex,	 and	 the	 facility	 has	 been	 in	 operation	 since	 CERN	opened	in	1967.	ISOLDE’s	typical	proton	beam	energies	range	between	1	and	1.4	GeV.	The	facility	has	two	target	stations	(Figure	45):	a	High-Resolution	Separator	(HRS)	and	a	general-purpose	separator	(GPS).	The	target	at	ISOLDE	has	a	dose	rate	of	several	Sv/h;	hence,	maintenance	is	only	possible	using	RH	equipment.	 ISOLDE	 targets	are	exchanged	30	 times	per	year,	on	average.	These	 targets	must	be	exchanged	approximately	every	10	days,	and	they	have	a	residual	radiation	dose	of	approximately	200	mSv	on	contact	[45][93][94].	In	 the	past,	 the	 ISOLDE	 target	stations	were	 remotely	maintained	with	Stäubli	RX	 industrial	 robots	(Figure	45).	These	robots	were	installed	on	the	ground	and	were	utilized	to:	(i)	remove	and	transport	the	spent	target	from	the	(front	end)	target	station	to	shielded	storage	shelves	and	(ii)	transport	and	install	a	fresh	target	from	the	shielded	storage	shelves	to	the	(front	end)	target	station.		Between	 2012	 and	 2013,	 the	 robots	 experienced	 various	 breakdowns	 during	 remote	maintenance	procedures.	The	Stäubli	RX	 industrial	robots	were	20	years	old,	and	 in	the	coming	year,	they	will	no	longer	be	supported	 for	spare	parts	and	software	by	 their	manufacturer.	The	 ISOLDE	 facility	 is	cur-
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rently	set	 to	be	upgraded	to	Hi-ISOLDE,	which	will	require	new	 types	of	 targets,	new	target	storage	locations	and	new	maintenance	 trajectories.	As	 the	 robots	were	 installed	on	 the	ground,	 they	could	only	move	along	a	fixed	trajectory,	which	made	them	unsuitable	for	this	upgrade.		
Figure	45.	ISOLDE	facility	with	RH	setup:	Stäubli	RX	robots;	the	front	end	target;	and	the	stor-
age	of	activated	parts	in	lead-shielded	storage	racks	[93].	In	2013,	the	Stäubli	RX	industrial	robots	were	replaced	with	two	new	KUKA	industrial	robots	(Figure	
46),	which	were	mounted	on	the	roof	of	the	ISOLDE	target	area.		The	removal	of	the	Stäubli	RX	indus-trial	robots	and	the	installation	of	KUKA	arms	was	executed	over	a	16-month	duration	by	90	workers	sharing	a	total	dose	of	13.4	mSv,	with	dose	rates	ranging	up	to	several	mSv/h	[93].			The	KUKA	robot	selected	is	a	foundry	robot	that	can	withstand	harsh	environments.	The	KUKA	robot	can	lift	up	to	30	kg	and	has	an	arm	reach	of	2.23	m,	with	a	precision	range	of	0.5	mm.	Due	to	the	radio-active	environment,	various	modifications	were	made	to	the	robot	in-house,	as	follows	[93]:	
· Alteration	of	the	robot	positioning	so	that	it	was	based	on	resolver	technology	(to	promote	re-liable	use	in	a	radiation	environment).	
· Addition	of	viton	seals	to	the	robot	arm	to	make	the	robot	partially	radiation-hardened.	
· Removal	of	on-board	electronics.	
· Removal	of	a	normal	cable	on-board	the	robot	and	 installation	of	a	radiation-hardened	cable	on-board	the	robot.	
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· Replacement	of	cable	support	on-board	the	robot	to	enable	robot	movements	without	obstruc-tion.	
· No	extra	sensors	needed	for	the	protection	of	infrastructure.	
· Modification	and	redesign	of	the	gripper.	A	recovery	method	was	included,	for	use	in	the	event	that	the	gripper	or	target	becomes	stuck.	
· Sensor	feedback	for	each	movement.	
· Collision	detection.	The	modifications	to	the	KUKA	robot	were	done	in-house	at	CERN	in	order	to	develop	in-house	expert-ize	related	to	utilizing	industrial	robots	in	a	radiation	environment.	The	development	took	five	years,	with	four	full-time	workers	assigned	to	the	task.	The	total	cost	was	10	million	euros	[93].		The	task	sequences	for	the	robots	were	initially	optimized	using	3D	software	and	later	tested	on	a	full-scale	mockup	of	the	facility	at	CERN.	This	enabled	the	final	 installation	team	to	make	only	minor	ad-justments	in	the	real	environment.		The	robots	became	operational	within	the	ISOLDE	facility	in	March	2015.	
Figure	46.	Old	and	new	ISOLDE	robot	setups	[93].	
2.1.2.3 Target remote maintenance at BigRIPS at Rikagaku Kenkyusho (Institute of Physi-
cal and Chemical Research, Japan) (RIKEN)The	BigRIPS	(radioactive-isotope	beam	separator)	at	Rikagaku	Kenkyusho	(Institute	of	Physical	and	Chemical	Research,	 Japan)	(RIKEN)	uses	a	water-cooled,	high-power	rotating	disk	target	with	a	 238U	primary	beam.	The	rotating	target	is	designed	to	be	an	“all-in-one	target.”	The	flange	unit	is	attached	to	
a	vacuum	chamber.	It	 is	constructed	 in	this	way	to	facilitate	the	RH	During	remote	maintenance,	the	target	 flange	unit	and	 the	vacuum	pump	unit	are	dismounted	using	a	remote-handling	maintenance	cart	(Figure	47)	[95],	which	runs	on	guide	rails	and	is	remote-controlled.	The	complete	target	assem-bly,	including	the	pump	unit,	can	be	removed	from	the	BigRIPS	target	station	using	this	maintenance	cart.	To	release	the	vacuum,	the	pneumatic	locks	on	the	flange	are	released.	When	the	target	chamber	is	flushed	with	air,	the	cart	transports	the	complete	assembly	through	the	access	tunnel	to	a	temporary	storage	area	[95].	
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Figure	47.	The	BigRIPS	target	RH	setup	(left);	schematics	of	the	target	flange	unit	and	the	pump	
unit,	with	the	maintenance	cart	pictured	as	an	inset	and	the	guideline	rails	for	the	maintenance	
cart	outlined	from	the	target	chamber	to	the	shielding	storage	container	(right)	[95].	
2.1.3 Conclusions: State of the Art  survey of RH in HEP facilitiesThe	State	of	the	Art	survey	of	described	 in	this	section	reveals	that	HEP	facilities	can	be	divided	into	the	following	categories:	
· The	first	type	(closed	tunnel)	of	facility	is	developed	with	a	closed	tunnel	design	concept	and	a	vertical	plug	system	(Figure	13).	 In	such	 facilities,	 the	hotcell	 is	 located	separately	 from	 the	beamline	 region.	 Such	 facilities	 require	 the	 remote	 transfer	 of	 beamline	 equipment	 during	maintenance.	Normally,	a	shielding	flask	is	used	to	transport	the	beamline	insert	between	the	hotcell	and	 the	beamline	region.	This	process	 involves	 the	 total	shutdown	of	 the	 facility	and	can	only	be	performed	after	a	cool-down	period.	The	beamline	 inserts	 in	such	 facilities	have	radiation	doses	of	up	 to	several	mSv/h.	Examples	 include	PSI,	 J-PARC	MUSE,	Fermilab	NuMI	and	T2K	at	J-PARC.			
· The	second	type	(Integrated	hotcell	and	target	area)of	facility	builds	the	hotcell	on	top	of	the	target	area	(Figure	33,	Figure	37,	Figure	39).	SNS,	JSNS,	ISIS,	FRIB	and	SPIRAL	2	are	exam-ples	of	facilities	in	which	the	hotcell	is	located	near	the	target	region.	The	other	important	as-pect	of	these	facilities	 is	that	their	 liquid	targets	have	pumping	equipment	that	 is	radioactive	due	 to	beam	 interaction.	The	hotcell	 is	built	on	 top	of	 the	 target	 in	order	 to	safely	drain	and	store	the	radioactive	fluid	before	transportation	to	a	disposal	site.	At	such	facilities,	the	target	is	mounted	on	top	of	a	horizontal	base,	which	can	be	retrieved	into	the	hotcell.	The	target	as-sembly	as	 a	whole	 is	dissembled	within	 the	hotcell	using	Master	Slave	manipulators,	power	manipulators	and	cranes.	The	waste	products	are	stored	in	secure	containers,	which	are	later	transported	to	 long-term	storage	facilities.	New	targets	are	then	 installed	onto	the	horizontal	target	assembly	and	the	beamline.	The	hotcell	 is	equipped	RH	equipment	and	waste	disposal	management	systems	to	conduct	maintenance	on-site.	
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· The	third	type	(facilities	with	very	high	energy)	of	facility	uses	very	high-energy	beams.	Exam-ples	of	such	facilities	 include	LHC	and	CNGS	at	CERN.	These	facilities	are	built	with	open	un-derground	tunnels	to	provide	natural	shielding	as	shielding	of	the	at	such	high	energies	is	im-practical.	To	keep	these	facilities	operational,	some	parts	such	as	the	collimators	require	regu-lar	inspection	and	replacement	if	damaged.	Facilities	like	the	LHC	are	very	large	in	nature	and	require	mobile	equipment	to	conduct	remote	inspections	and	maintenance.	The	LHC	TIM	and	the	 remotely	operated	crane	 for	collimator	exchange	are	very	good	examples	of	customized	tools	 that	were	 designed	 once	 it	was	 realized	 that	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 LHC	 collimators	 could	cause	facility-wide	shutdowns.	Aside	from	collimator	replacement,	remote	maintenance	is	not	typically	needed	in	the	LHC	tunnel.	
· The	fourth	type	(Open	tunnel)	of	facility	was	developed	with	an	open	tunnel	that	uses	localized	shielding	around	the	target	area.	Activated	parts	are	replaced	using	modified	industrial	robots	or	mobile	carts.	Examples	include	the	target	exchange	systems	of	FRS,	ISOLDE	and	the	BigRIPS	at	RIKEN.	These	facilities	develop	dedicated	systems	for	target	or	beamline	insert	exchange	by	modifying	COTS,	 since	 the	development	of	 a	 completely	new	 system	 is	 typically	 impractical	from	a	cost	point	of	view.	The	remote	maintenance	space	 in	such	 facilities	 is	very	restricted	and	is	shared	with	radiation	workers.	
2.2 State of the Art robotic equipment for RH
2.2.1 Robotics equipment used at HEP facilitiesThe	RH	survey	of	HEP	facilities	(see	Section	2.1)	provides	a	detailed	overview	of	existing	particle	ac-celerator	facilities	and	the	equipment	they	use	to	conduct	remote	maintenance.		This	section	will	pro-vide	a	summary	review	of	the	State	of	the	Art	equipment	(currently	in	use	for	RH	in	various	HEP	facili-ties	(some	of	which	was	already	introduced	in	Section	2.1).		HEP	facilities	require	that	RH	equipment	can	transport	radioactive	targets	and	beamline	 inserts	that	directly	interact	with	beams.	Such	objects	can	have	dose	rates	as	high	as	5	Sv/h	(on	the	surface).	Hence,	they	require	shielding	during	transportation,	which	is	normally	achieved	using	shielding	flasks.	Shield-ing	 flasks	 are	 normally	 equipped	 with	 internal	 cranes	 that	 can	 handle	 loads	 in	 tons.	 Self-aligning	mechanisms	are	used	to	retrieve	or	install	the	targets	and	transfer	them	to	storage	units	or	a	hotcell.	Shielding	flasks	provide	the	necessary	protection	during	the	transportation	of	activated	beamline	 in-serts	and	reduce	dose	rates	to	between	10	and	100	µSv/h.	The	PSI	(Figure	16	)	and	J-PARC	(Figure	21,	
Figure	22)	facilities,	introduced	in	the	previous	section,	use	multiple	shielding	flasks	to	transport	tar-gets	and	other	beamline	inserts.	PSI	uses	individual	shielding	flasks	to	handle	Target	M,	Target	E	and	the	 SNS	 target	during	 the	 remote	maintenance	process	 (see	 Section	2.1.1.1	 for	description	of	 these	parts).	Similarly,	J-PARC	successfully	achieved	the	replacement	of	 its	Muon	target	 in	December	2014	using	a	shielding	 flask.	 It	 is	clear	 that	shielding	 flasks	represent	an	 integral	aspect	of	RH	equipment	across	HEP	facilities	and	are	critical	to	the	safe	transportation	of	radioactive	components.	The	facilities	with	targets	in	open	tunnels,	such	as	FRS	at	GSI,	ISOLDE	at	CERN	and	BigRIPS	at	RIKEN,	use	 industrial	equipment	to	conduct	remote	maintenance.	The	FRS	and	ISOLDE	targets,	for	example,	are	handled	using	industrial	robots	from	KUKA.	Their	equipment	has	been	modified	by	removing	sen-sitive,	on-board	electronic	equipment	to	make	the	robots	more	radiation-hardened.	These	robots	per-form	RH	by	directly	removing	and	installing	targets	and	beamline	components	from	beamline	vacuum	chambers.	The	BigRIPS	at	RIKEN	uses	very	unique	equipment	modified	from	COTS,	which	transports	targets	to	safety	and	does	not	perform	any	remote	manipulation	directly	on	the	target.	The	open	tun-
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nel	facilities	also	use	localized	shielding	to	protect	RH	equipment	from	damage	and	degradation	due	to	radiation	doses	in	irradiating	environments.		The	inspection	and	RH	of	tunnels	and	irradiated	areas	with	restricted	accessibility	are	conducted	us-ing	mobile	equipment.	The	LHC	tunnel	at	CERN	is	inspected	for	damage	and	radiation	using	TIM	and	TAN,	which	are	remotely-controlled	devices	that	are	mounted	on	the	monorail	that	runs	along	the	top	of	the	LHC	tunnel.	The	Telemax	ROV	and	the	remotely	operated	crane	for	collimator	exchange	are	also	used	at	CERN.	They	are	both	mobile	equipment	and	are	used	 to	 retrieve	 radioactive	parts	and	LHC	collimators	remotely	from	the	beamline.	The	SNS	ORNL	facility	also	uses	a	mobile	manipulator	vehicle	system,	which	can	be	remotely	controlled	to	perform	maintenance	tasks.	The	post-processing	of	radioactive	beamline	inserts	is	an	important	step	in	RH	at	particle	accelerator	facilities.	It	can	be	divided	into	two	parts:	(i)	the	repair	of	beamline	inserts	and	(ii)	the	long-term	stor-age	and	disposal	of	radioactive	waste	material.		The	post-processing	of	radioactive	beamline	inserts	is	performed	within	a	hotcell.	PSI,	J-PARC,	ORNL,	ISIS	and	Fermilab	all	use	hotcells	to	repair,	dispose	of	and	store	radioactive	beamline	inserts.	These	hotcells	are	paired	with	storage	compartments,	in	which	the	 radioactive	waste	 is	securely	 stored	 for	 certain	duration	before	being	 transported	 to	 long-term	storage	facilities.	The	hotcells	in	all	HEP	facilities	utilize	Master	Slave	Manipulators,	power	manipula-tors,	visual	systems,	overhead	cranes,	specialized	remote	maintenance	tools,	clamping	(table)	mecha-nisms	 (to	hold	 radioactive	components	during	 remote	maintenance),	 and	 radioactive	waste	dispos-al/packing	systems.	
2.2.2 Robotics equipment in the nuclear power production industryThis	section	will	describe	some	of	the	robotic	RH	equipment	that	is	currently	used	to	conduct	remote	maintenance	 in	 the	nuclear	 industry.	Specifically,	 this	section	 focuses	on	 the	utilization	of	 industrial	and	 customized	 robot	 arms	 for	RH.	 Since	 radiation	 and	 radioactive	waste	 levels	 in	 nuclear	 power	plants	are	far	higher	than	those	 in	HEP	facilities,	 it	 is	 logical	to	study	the	State	of	the	Art	equipment	used	by	such	plants	for	RH,	in	order	to	utilize	the	latest	technologies	to	design	reliable	RH	systems	for	HEP	facilities.	
2.2.2.1 RH at the Joint European Torus (JET) facilityIncreased	future	energy	needs	present	a	challenge	for	today’s	society,	and	fusion	energy	is	seen	as	one	solution	to	fulfill	future	requirements.	The	Joint	European	Torus	(JET)	project	is	currently	the	world’s	largest	tokamak,	and	is	located	in	Oxfordshire,	UK.	This	fusion	research	facility	is	a	joint	European	pro-ject	with	the	main	purpose	of	paving	the	way	to	a	future	of	nuclear	fusion	energy	on	the	electricity	grid.	In	 1997,	 for	 first	 time,	 the	 JET	 project	 produced	 16	 megawatts	 of	 fusion	 power	 and	 successfully	demonstrated	the	key	technologies	required	for	the	production	of	fusion	power.	Due	to	the	high	levels	of	radiation	in	the	environment,	the	JET	project	has	had	to	undergo	regular	remote	maintenance		since	1998	[96].		
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Figure	48.	JET	RH	equipment	setup	(images	courtesy	of	EFDA-JET).	The	JET	RH	team	uses	State	of	the	Art	equipment	specifically	designed	for	fusion	reactor	maintenance	(Figure	48).	This	equipment	is	supported	by	the	EU.	The	RH	setup	includes	the	following	two	pieces	of	equipment,	which	are	both	controlled	by	operators	from	a	main	control	room:	
Mascot	The	Mascot	RH	system	(Figure	49)	 is	 the	main	piece	of	equipment	used	 to	conduct	remote	mainte-nance	at	the	JET	facility.	It	consists	of	two	force	feedback	Master	Slave	Manipulators	to	extend	an	op-erator’s	 own	 arms	 into	 the	 radioactive	 environment	 [41][96].	 Each	 Mascot	 slave	 arm	 has	 servo-manipulators	with	 load	capacities	of	20	kg.	The	master-slave	 connections	are	not	mechanical,	as	 in	many	devices,	but	instead	are	connected	via	computer	links.	This	means	that	that	the	slave	units	can	be	operated	from	any	distance	from		the	master	arms.	Mascot	is	used	to	perform	various	tasks,	includ-ing	welding,	cutting,	bolting,	handling	and	inspection.	Many	of	these	tasks	are	performed	using	special	tools	that	have	been	designed	and	developed	at	JET.	The	Mascot	manipulator	is	connected	to	the	JET	articulated	boom,	described	below,	which	provides	the	maneuverability	necessary	to	perform	the	re-quired	tasks.	Mascot	operations	are	directly	monitored	using	a	CCTV	system.	
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Figure	49.	JET	Mascot	RH	system:	performing	remote	maintenance	in	the	JET	project	(images	courte-sy	of	EFDA-JET).	
JET	articulated	boom	To	gain	access	to	the	inside	of	the	JET	torus,	two	of	entry	ports	are	reserved	for	remote	maintenance	only.	The	JET	articulated	boom	(Figure	50)	is	a	10	m	long	articulated	robot	that	is	used	to	transport	both	material	and	the	Mascot	into	the	torus	for	maintenance. This	device	has	19	DOF	and	is	controlled	using	either	a	joystick,	a	keyboard	or	through	pre-taught	sequences	of	motion	[97].	
Figure	50.	JET	articulated	boom	(images	courtesy	of	EFDA-JET).	Based	on	success	of	the	JET	experiment,	the	International	Thermonuclear	Reactor	(ITER)	is	under	de-velopment	in	France.	The	systems	for	the	ITER	have	been	tested	at	JET.	During	the	operations	at	ITER	operation,	plasma	temperatures	are	expected	to	rise	to	100	million	degrees	Celsius.	The	Ion	Cyclotron	Resonance	Heating	(ICRH)	antenna	(Figure	51),	which	is	one	of	the	heating	systems	for	the	ITER,	was	first	tested	with	the	JET	machine.	In	2007,	the	ICRH	antenna	was	installed	at	the	JET	facility	during	a	
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shutdown	period.	The	300	kg	antenna	was	transported	into	the	torus	using	the	JET	articulated	boom	via	a	specially	designed	end-effector.	The	installation	task	sequence	was	carried	out	using	pre-defined	smooth	trajectories	until	the	final	approach.	The	final	stage	to	install	the	antenna	was	performed	with	“man-in-the-loop”	guidance.	Feedback	was	provided	using	the	contact	forces	exerted	on	the	antenna	by	 its	wall-mounted	 supports,	which	 utilized	 force	 and	 torque	 sensors	 installed	 on	 the	 articulated	boom	end-effector	[98].		
Figure	51.	Installation	of	an	ITER	ICRH-like	antenna	installation	at	the	JET	facility	in	2007	(images	courtesy	of	EFDA-JET).	
2.2.2.2 RH at nuclear reactor decommissioningConventional	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 that	 have	 reached	 their	 designed	 lifetime	 require	 an	 extensive	dismantling	process,	which	follows	various	stages.	Due	to	higher	dose	rates,	of	well	above	several	Sv/h,	sophisticated	RH	devices	have	been	developed	to	carry	out	these	dismantling	processes.	 	In	this	sec-tion,	we	will	discuss	the	various	types	of	RH	equipment	used	in	such	procedures.	
Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage	Karlsruhe	Rückbau-und	Entsorgungs-GmbH	(WAK-GmbH)	The	 Karlsruhe	 Reprocessing	 Plant	 (WAK)	 was	 built	 between	 1967	 and	 1971	 by	 WAK–Betriebsgesellschaft	(WAK-BG)	in	Germany.	During	its	20	years	of	operation,	the	WAK	plant	processed	208	tons	of	heavy	metal	and	irradiated	oxide	fuel	from	the	research	and	power	reactors.	On	June	30,	1991,	the	plant	was	closed.	Plant	decontamination	and	dismantling	began	in	1994.	Dismantling	activi-ties	were	conducted	variously	using	hands-on	 techniques,	 remote	 techniques,	or	 a	mixture	of	both,	depending	on	the	radiological	conditions.	Significant	upfront	planning	was	conducted	on	this	project,	which	included	the	use	of	a	mockup	facility	for	operator	training,	operations	planning,	and	equipment	testing	and	dose	rate	analysis.	Particular	attention	was	paid	to	the	parallel	development	of	radiation	protection	measures	and	an	optimal	organization	structure	 for	ensuring	the	safety	of	personnel	and	the	environment.	Due	to	this	extensive	planning,	no	serious	safety	incidents	were	reported	during	the	cleanup	operations,	and	the	project	appears	to	have	met	its	baseline	cost	and	schedule	targets	[99].		
	The	dismantling	of	the	WAK	facility	concentrated	on	the	use	of	RH	equipment.	The	radioactive	waste	and	the	decommissioned	equipment	had	very	high	surface	dose	rates	of	up	to	100	mSv/h,	along	with	very	high	levels	of	human	safety	risk	factors[100].		
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The	dismantling	system	for	the	WAK	facility	consisted	of	the	following	equipment	[100][101]	(Figure	
52):		
· EMSM3,	a	Master	Slave	Manipulator	with	bilateral	force	feedback.	
· A	gantry	(crane-like)	manipulator,	which	carried	 the	EMSM3	across	 the	WAK	 facility	 for	RH	tasks.	
· Cutting	tools	and	devices	for	the	EMSM3,	such	as	hydraulic	shears,	compass	saws,	disc	grinders,	etc.	
· Auxiliary	 crane	 and	 crane-supported	 auxiliary	manipulators	 for	 remote-controlled	 recovery	and	repair	work	to	manipulator	carrier	systems	and	Master	Slave	Manipulator.	
· Radioactive	waste	processing	and	packaging	systems.	
· A	control	room	for	managing	remote	controlled	operations.	
Figure	52.	Dismantling	system	for	the	WAK	facility	(images	courtesy	of	WAK-GmbH).	Remote	maintenance	of	the	facility	was	carried	out	primarily	through	the	use	of	the	EMSM3	Electrical	Master	Slave	Manipulator	 (Figure	52).	 	To	achieve	 the	vertical	dismantling	of	 the	cells	of	 the	WAK	facility,	a	manipulator	carrier	system	with	a	mono-bridge	gantry	crane	was	constructed	3	m	above	the	cell	 floor.	 It	 included	50	kN	hoists,	which	carried	an	8	DOF	platform	which	carried	 the	EMSM3.	The	EMSM3	used	various	 tools	 to	reduce	 the	size	of	 the	radioactive	waste,	ultimately	packing	 the	waste	into	150	L	drums.	These	 tools	 included	a	hydraulic	shear,	a	grinder	with	a	diamond	disc	and	a	hack	saw,	which	were	all	stored	in	a	tool	carrier	magazine.		The	EMSM3	was	remotely	controlled	by	an	op-erator	and	it	had	bilateral	force	feedback.	Its	arms	were	used	to	cut	and	dismantle	large	blocks	of	radi-oactive	waste.	Certain	activated	sections	and	pieces	of	equipment	within	the	WAK	facility	could	only	be	dismantled	using	equipment	which	was	capable	of	accessing	the	area	horizontally.	The	commercial	crawler-digger	BROKK	150	Carrier	was	modified	as	a	power	tool	carrier.	The	SAMM	arm	is	mounted	on	the	end	of	the	BROKK	150	Carrier	to	conduct	remote	manipulation.	The	SAMM	arm	was	a	six-axis	hydraulic	manipu-lator	capable	of	performing	tasks	in	a	radioactive	environment,	and	the	SAMM	arm	had	a	104	Gy	radia-
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tion	tolerance.	This	remotely	controlled	manipulator	was	equipped	with	a	grinder,	a	stone	saw	or	hy-draulic	cutter.	The	SAMM	arm	could	be	used	in	either	robotic	mode	(i.e.,	automated	sequences)	or	in	manual	remote	control	mode.	The	mobile	horizontal	RH	equipment	was	used	to	disassemble	the	col-lection	tank	for	medium-level	liquid	waste.5.		
	
Figure	53.	Horizontal	RH	and	dismantling	equipment	for	WAK	facility	(images	courtesy	WAK-GmbH).	
The	Dual	Arm	Work	Platform	 (DAWP)	at	 the	dismantling	of	 the	Chicago	Pile	 5	 (CP5)	
reactor		The	Chicago	Pile	5	(CP5)	reactor	was	a	heavy	water-cooled	reactor	that	operated	from	1954	until	1979.	The	reactor	underwent	18	years	of	cool-down	before	dismantling	was	conducted.	The	Dual	Arm	Work	Platform	(DAWP)	was	a	remotely	operated	piece	of	equipment	that	was	deployed	to	carry	out	the	de-commissioning	of	the	nuclear	reactor	and	its	bio-shield	structures.	It	was	developed	by	a	consortium	of	national	laboratories	and	industry	manufacturers.	Schilling	Robotics	Systems	and	Red	Zone	Robot-ics	provided	the	components	for	DWAP,	and	 it	was	produced	by	ORNL	and	the	Idaho	National	Engi-neering	and	Environmental	Laboratory.	The	DAWP	was	composed	of	the	following	components,	which	were	tested	and	deployed	to	assist	in	CP5	decontamination	[102][103]:	
Platform	base:	This	was	fabricated	from	a	steel	plate	with	bolted	gaskets	and	a	panel	for	hydraulic,	electrical	and	electronic	components.	The	2245	kg	base	had	2	DOF,	which	translates	to	46	cm.	It	rotat-ed	by	90	degrees	so	that	the	manipulator	base	could	be	moved	horizontally	to	extend	the	working	en-velope.	An	overhead	crane	was	used	to	transport	the	DAWP	from	the	platform	base	across	the	activat-ed	area	to	conduct	RH	tasks.	
Manipulators:	The	DAWP	had	 two	Schilling	Titan	 III	manipulators,	which	were	 fitted	on	 top	of	 the	base	to	carry	out	remote	manipulations.	Each	of	the	hydraulic	manipulators	had	a	110	kg	payload	ca-pacity,	6DOF,	a	maximum	extension	of	200	cm,	and	could	be	controlled	remotely	using	a	specially	de-signed	 joystick.	The	Schilling	Titan	 III	used	a force/torque	sensor	 to	measure	 the	contact	 forces	ap-plied	to	objects	 in	the	task	space.	Electrical	cabling	and	hydraulic	piping	routing	were	all	done	 inter-nally	within	the	arms,	which	were	radiation	hardened.		
5 The WAK carrier was designed by CYBERNETIX: http://www.cybernetix.fr/en/produit/102/motorized-carriers
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Minimal	 on-board	 electronics:	 The	 number	 of	 onboard	 electronics	 and	 hydraulics	 on	 the	 DAWP	were	reduced	 to	avoid	electronic	 failures	and	hydraulic	 leakages	and	 improve	 its	reliability	within	a	radioactive	environment.	These	reductions	necessitated	a	100	ft	long	tether,	which	was	used	to	main-tain	remote	control	of	the	DAWP.	After	accounting	for	floor	pass-through,	cable	routing,	strain	relief	and	mounting	at	both	ends,	the	DAWP’s	useable	length	was	60	ft.		The	tether	was	separated	into	two	bundles,	which	were	each	wrapped	so	that	the	electrical	cables	would	not	be	damaged	in	the	event	of	a	hydraulic	 leak.	One	of	the	bundles	contained	all	of	the	electrical	power	and	signal	cables.	The	second	bundle	provided	the	hydraulic	supply	and	return.	
Figure	54.	The	DAWP	at	the	dismantling	of	the	CP5	reactor.	
ATENA	machine	at	Atelier	de	Traitement	(AT1)	facility	The	Atelier	de	Traitement	(AT1)	(Figure	55)	facility	near	Cherbourg,	on	the	AREVA	NC	La	Hague	site,	was	built	 to	 reprocess	 fuels	 from	 fast-breeder	 reactors.	The	plant	was	operational	 from	1969	until	1979.	After	 the	completion	of	 the	cool-down	period,	 following	 the	processing	of	 the	 fuel	 rods,	dose	rates	ranged	from	0.01	to	1	Gy/h	[104],	preventing	human	access	to	cells	902	to	904	and	allowing	ac-cess	to	cells	902,	905,	908	and	909,	but	only	with	shielding.	Cells	903,	904	and	905	were	designed	to	be	dismantled	with	RH	equipment.	The	ATENA	machine	(Figure	55)	was	developed	to	carry	out	this	task.	The	AT1	facility’s	dismantling	sequence	was	divided	into	the	following	steps	[104]:	
· Dismantling	of	unshielded	alpha	cells	and	glove	boxes.	
· Installation	of	the	ATENA	remote	dismantling	machine.	
· Dismantling	within	 the	ATENA	machine	of	 the	 three	main	shielded	blind	cells	(i.e.	cells	905,	904	and	903).	
· Dismantling	of	 the	various	 storage	 cells	 (e.g.	 the	 liquid	waste	 stored	 in	 cell	907,	 the	 fission	products	 in	cells	908	and	909	and	 in	the	extension	building)	and	general	decontamination	of	the	building.	
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Figure	55.	AT1	facility	near	Cherbourg	on	the	AREVA	NC	La	Hague	site	and	the	ATENA	machine	
for	remote	maintenance.	The	ATENA	machine	was	used	to	dismantle	the	 inaccessible	parts	of	the	AT1.	It	was	built	by	Atelier	Chantier	de	Bretagne	(ACB)	in	Nantes,	where	tests	in	non-radioactive	surroundings	were	conducted	in	late	1988	to	early	1989.The	MA	23M	and	RD	500	remote-controlled	manipulators	(Figure	56)		were	also	tested	in	this	environment.	The	ATENA	machine	was	installed	on	top	of	the	facility	using	an	over-head	crane	that	enabled	 it	to	access	the	different	cells	for	remote	decommissioning.	The	machine	 in-cluded	an	11	m	long	telescopic	link,	which	was	connected	to	a	robotic	arm	that	could	be	retracted	back	under	a	very	thick	shielding	flask.	The	shielding	flask	provided	both	containment	and	biological	pro-tection	for	the	remote	operators.	The	telescopic	arm	was	equipped	with	either	a	cutting	tool	or	an	MA	23M	or	RD	500	remote	manipulator.
Figure	56.	Remotely	controlled	ATENA	manipulators:	RD500	and	MA23M.	The	MA	23M	and	RD	500	remote-controlled	manipulators	were	controlled	from	the	control	desk	in	the	ATENA	machine	operations	room.		The	MA	23M	was	capable	of	handling	a	payload	capacity	of	25	kg.	The	slave	arm	and	master	arm	were	connected	via	an	electrical	cable.	The	MA	23M	encountered	sev-eral	problems	during	 its	operation	and	was	only	 fully	operational	after	18	months	of	delay.	The	MA	23M	was	then	replaced	by	the	RD	500,	which	had	a	50	kg	payload	capacity.	The	RD	500	was	developed	and	designed	by	the	French	Alternative	Energies	and	Atomic	Energy	Commission	(CEA;	Commissariat	
62
à	 l'énergie	atomique	et	aux	énergies	alternatives),	and	was	equipped	with	the	following	components	[104]:	
· Force	feedback	and	ambient	sensors	to	assist	with	remote	operations.	
· Programmable	controllers	with	reliable,	safe	computer	controls.	
· Computer-assisted	remote	operators	capable	of	performing	autonomous	or	semi-autonomous	work.	During	the	remote	decommissioning	operations,	the	ATENA	machine	itself	broke	down;	and	hence,	a	special	work	cell	was	set	up	to	conduct	maintenance	on	the	ATENA	machine.	The	ATENA	machine	was	later	disposed	of	as	radioactive	waste	[104].	
Areva	La	Hague	nuclear	fuel	reprocessing	plant	hotcell	equipment	France	opened	the	La	Hague	reprocessing	plant	in	1966	to	recycle	spent	nuclear	fuel.	The	reprocessing	effort	was	supported	by	the	EU	and	Japan,	and	between	1976	and	2006,	approximately	23,000	tons	of	fuel	 from	Light	Water	Reactors	were	 reprocessed	 in	La	Hague’s	 two	 reprocessing	 lines.	The	goal	of	reprocessing	is	to	dramatically	reduce	the	volume	of	radioactive	waste.	Reprocessing	plants	represent	
a	complex	area	for	the	performance	of	various	chemical	and	mechanical	operations,	leading	to	a	wide	variety	of	radiological	hazards	that	require	RH.	To	reduce	the	doses	for	radiation	workers,	RH	equip-ment	was	made	an	integral	part	of	the	La	Hague	hotcell	facilities	[105].		Initially,	RH	in	the	plant	has	been	carried	out	using	conventional,	through-the-wall,	MT200	telescopic	manipulators,	developed	by	La	Calhene.	However,	since	2005,	the	MT200-TAO	CEA telerobotic	system	(Figure	57)	has	been	under	evaluation	in	the	COGEMA-La	Hague	reprocessing	plant	hotcell.	The	aim	of	this	system	is	to	eventually	replace	the	conventional	manipulators.	The	main	targets	of	this	project	are	to	improve	the	security	of	difficult	tasks	and	to	improve	the	ergonomics	of	the	workstation	[105].	The	CEA	developed	the	TAO2000	[105]	software	platform	as	a	dedicated	solution	to	computer-aided	force-feedback	 teleoperation	 (TAO	 is	 the	 French	 acronym	 for	 computer-aided	 teleoperation).	 The	TAO2000	 enables	 an	operator	 to	perform	 such	 functions	 as	 active	weight	balancing,	 accurate	 force	surveillance,	 tool	weight	compensation,	velocity	adjustments	and	pursuit	of	 a	gripper	using	 remote	cameras	The	TAO2000	enables	operators	to	perform	tasks	very	effectively,	which	was	also	due	to	de-sign	changes	to	the	basic	mechanical	manipulator.	The	TAO2000	also	enables	operators	to	use	virtual	guides	and	automatic	robotic	modes	 to	provide	assistance	during	remote	maintenance.	 In	2012,	 the	MT200-TAO	was	tested	for	10	months	inside	the	AREVA	hotcell	without	any	failures	[106].	In	2014,	it	was	listed	for	sale	as	an	industrial	product	by	Getinge-LaCalhène	[107].	
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Figure	57.	MT200	TAO	AREVA	hotcell	operations	[106].	The	slave	manipulator	for	the	MT200-TAO	(Figure	57)	is	a	six-DOF,	4	m	long	manipulator	with	a	pay-load	capacity	of	20	kg.	Its	transmission	is	based	on	gears	and	screws	for	the	upper	joints	and	on	cables	and	chains	for	the	lower	joints.		The	automated	playback	modes	assist	the	operators,	and	the	repetitive	tasks	are	performed	automatically	so	 that	 they	do	not	put	strain	on	the	operator.	HEP	 facilities	cur-rently	 do	 not	 use	 such	 capabilities	 for	 waste	 handling	 within	 their	 hotcells.	 Thus,	 the	 experience	gained	from	the	MT200-TAO	development	and	testing	of	the	computer-aided	force-feedback	teleoper-ator	system	can	be	useful	for	optimizing	tasks	within	the	hotcell.	
Figure	58.	Hardware	architecture	of	an	MT200-based	AREVA	CAT	system	[106].	
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Mobile	system:	Rosie	system	for	the	dismantling	of	the	CP5	reactor		The	dismantling	 and	decommissioning	of	 the	CP5	 radioactive	 structure	were	 carried	out	using	 the	Rosie	mobile	robot	work	system.	The	Rosie	system	(Figure	59)	was	designed	to	move	across	the	facil-ity	and	dismantle	various	structures,	while	storing	and	 retrieving	 radioactive	waste	so	 that	 it	could	later	be	disposed	of	safely.	The	system	could	be	remotely	controlled.	Its	power	and	telemetry	subsys-tems	 allowed	 the	 control	 signals	 to	 be	 transmitted	 from	 the	 console	 to	 the	 locomotor	 and	 routed	onboard	to	the	various	sensors	and	actuators[108].		
Figure	59.	Rosie	mobile	robot	system.	The	system	was	divided	 into	two	major	subassemblies:	 the	 locomotor	(i.e.	 the	mobile	platform)	and	the	heavy	(hydraulic)	manipulator	[108].	The	 locomotor	was	a	hydraulically	powered	platform,	such	that	 each	wheel	module	had	 independent	drive	 and	 steering	motions,	 resulting	 in	omni-directional	capabilities.	The	hydraulic	 reservoir	was	 located	 at	 the	 front,	 center	part	of	 the	 locomotor,	directly	behind	the	hydraulic	pump	and	its	electric	motor	drive,	which	powered	the	system.	On	the	right	hand	side	of	 the	platform	was	 the	hydraulic	processing	system,	 including	 filters,	 the	accumulator	and	 the	hydraulic	cooling	system.	The	onboard	electronics	were	located	in	a	sealed	enclosure	on	the	left	side	of	the	frame.	This	enclosure	housed	transformers,	control	computing,	power	supplies,	video	modulation	equipment,	and	heat	exchanger	units.	In	the	rear	of	the	locomotor	was	a	tether	reel,	which	could	carry	up	to	50	m	(165	feet)	of	tether.	If	required	up	to	100	m	(335	ft)	of	unreeled	tether	could	be	included	to	extend	the	vehicle's	range	[109].	The	steering	mode	for	the	locomotor	was	divided	into	three	different	types,	as	follows	[108][109][110]:	
· 4-wheel	Mode:	The	front	and	rear	wheels	steered	in	opposition,	allowing	turns	in	any	radius,	including	pivots	about	the	vehicle's	center.	
· Crab	Mode:	All	wheels	steered	in	the	same	direction,	allowing	the	vehicle	to	translate	linearly	in	any	direction.	
· Point	Mode:	The	wheels	automatically	steered	 to	 turn	 the	 locomotor	about	a	predetermined	point.	Assigning	a	tool’s	 location	as	this	point	allowed	the	vehicle	to	be	repositioned	without	moving	the	tool.	The	second	major	part	of	the	Rosie	was	the	heavy	manipulator,	which	had	a	payload	capacity	of	900	kg.	The	heavy	manipulator	consisted	of	four	joints:	a	vertical	axis	with	waist	rotation	motion	on	the	loco-motor	deck,	 a	 shoulder	pitch	motion,	 a	 linear	 forearm	extension,	and	 a	wrist	pitch	at	 the	 tip	of	 the	
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forearm.	Each	of	 these	 four	 joints	provided	 integral	position	 feedback.	Due	 to	 the	possible	 tip-over	scenario	at	 full	 extension,	 the	heavy	manipulator	was	only	able	 to	 lift	680	kg	with	 a	counterweight	mounted	on	the	turret	and	the	rear	pivoting	axle	in	its	locked	position.	This	full	load	could	be	carried	at	full	extension	for	approximately	±45	degrees	of	waist	rotation	[109].	The	heavy	manipulator	could	be	controlled	in	either	of	two	modes	[109][110]:	
· Joint	Mode:	Allowed	the	operator	to	individually	control	each	joint	on	the	heavy	manipulator	at	
a	continuously	variable	speed.	
· Coordinated	Mode:	Allowed	the	operator	to	steer	the	endpoint	of	the	heavy	manipulator,	with	all	four	joints	automatically	coordinating	to	achieve	Cartesian	motion.	The	Rosie	 itself	was	designed	 to	operate	 in	 radioactive	 regions.	 Its	materials	and	components	were	selected	to	reduce	the	potential	for	radiation	degradation.	The	robot	arm	of	the	Rosie	structure	could	withstand	a	cumulative	radiation	dose	of	at	least	103	Gy.	The	electronics	were	adequately	shielded	and	replaced	with	components	that	were	radiation-hardened.	All	onboard	components	of	the	system	were	also	sealed	for	pressurized	wash-down.	The	system’s	structures	were	designed	to	minimize	both	the	exposed	surfaces	and	the	areas	capable	of	collecting	and	trapping	contamination	[109][110].		The	Rosie’s	tooling	includes	both	hydraulic	and	electric-powered	tooling.	These	tools	were	specifically	modified	to	fit	the	heavy	manipulator	as	end-effectors.	Some	of	the	key	tools	used	to	remotely	handle	radioactive	waste	were	a	dexterous	manipulator,	a	dual-arm	work	system	and	a	steel	transfer	can.	The	Predator	 arm	 was	 used	 to	 remotely	 remove	 graphite.	 Operations	 revealed	 that	 the	 Predator	 arm	(Figure	60)	was	not	well	suited	to	the	severe	environments	it	experienced	during	graphite	removal. In	fact,	only	227kg	of	 graphite—out	of	 a	 total	of	 approximately	2268	kg	originally	planned—were	 re-moved	and	packaged	by	 the	arm	without	any	human	exposure	 to	radiation.	The	 traditional	removal	and	dismantlement	of	such	an	area	would	have	resulted	 in	significant	exposure	 to	radiation	by	per-sonnel.	However,	with	 its	steel	 transfer	can,	Rosie	safely	off-loaded	a	 total	of	3832	kg	of	radioactive	materials.	 Table	 3	 shows	 a	 detailed	 list	 of	 the	 tools	 used	 with	 the	 Rosie	 mobile	 robot	 system	[109][110].	
Figure	60.	Rosie	mobile	robot	system	with	Kraft	Predator	arm.	
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Table	3.	Rosie	mobile	robot	system	tool	list	
Rosie	Tools	 hydraulic	 pipe	 shear,	 abrasive	 water	 jet,	 reciprocating	 saw,	 excavation	 bucket,		abrasive	disk,	drum	grapple,	impact	wrench,	concrete	hole	saw,	plasma	torch	cable	winch,	jackhammer/breaker,	mechanical	scabbler,	pulverizer,	dexterous	manipula-tor,	dual-arm	work	system,	steel	transfer	can.		
The	Rosie	was	typically	controlled	by	a	single	operator	working	 in	an	adjacent	control	room.	 In	 this	way,	personnel	could	maintain	a	safe	distance	from	the	radiation	in	the	CP-5	reactor.	The	Rosie	was	a	reliable	system,	and	its	down-time	was	limited	up	to	one	hour	and	50	minutes.	It	was	subjected	to	only	two	unplanned	down-times.	Neither	event	caused	any	safety	or	operational	concerns.	The	Rosie	mo-bile	robot	system	was	one	of	the	first	mobile	robot	systems	used	for	the	remote	dismantling	of	reactor	facilities,	and	it	helped	to	establish	the	technologies	used	in	mobile	RH	systems		[109][110]. 	
2.3 Classification of RH equipment for remote maintenance tasks
This	section	presents	a	classification	of	RH	equipment,	based	on	the	study	and	survey	in	the	previous	sections.	RH	systems	and	techniques	used	in	both	HEP	facilities	and	the	nuclear	sector	can	be	catego-rized	into	the	following	systems	(Figure	61):	
· RH	transporter	systems	
· Manipulators	(Master	Slave	Manipulators,	power	manipulators,	autonomous	manipulators)	
· Tooling	systems	(cutting	tools,	grinding	tools,	lifting	tongs)	
· Shielding	 (mobile	 shielding,	 such	 as	 shielding	 flasks,	 and	 permanent	 shielding,	 such	 as	hotcells	or	shielding	walls)	
· Supportive	systems	(visual	systems,	material	handling	or	packing	systems,	storage	units,	ra-diation	warning	and	protection	systems,	communication	systems,	power	supply	networks)	Each	of	these	categories	are	described	in	detail	below.	
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Figure	 61.	 Design	 classification	 for	 the	 selection	 of	 RH	 equipment	 for	 remote	 maintenance	
tasks.	
2.3.1 RH transporter systemsDuring	RH	operations,	manipulators	are	typically	used	to	perform	tasks	within	hostile	environments.	Manipulators	are	normally	stored	in	a	secure	 location	and	are	deployed	to	hot	(activated)	zones	only	for	 the	duration	of	 the	 remote	maintenance	 tasks.	 	RH	 transporter	systems	are	used	 to	move	 these	manipulators	 into	the	hot	zones.	They	have	various	components,	 including	the	tool	exchange	mecha-nisms,	parking	setups,	carriers	to	transport	the	load,	and	mobility	mechanisms	(e.g.	mobile	platforms	or	guiderails).		The	type	of	transporter	systems	used	depends	on:	
· The	nature	and	type	of	the	RH	task.	For	example,	if	only	remote	inspection	needs	to	be	per-formed,	the	carrier	can	be	small;	however,	if	a	task	includes	the	handling	of	heavy	loads,	the	carrier	must	be	larger.		
· The	required	load	capacity.	The	carrier	is	mainly	used	to	transport	the	manipulator	and	the	tools.	Hence,	the	load	(e.g.	weight,	forces,	momentum,	etc.)	applied	by	these	components	in-fluences	the	choice	of	carrier.	
· The	 intervention	environment	and	accessibility.	Environmental	 factors	 include	 risk	of	 fire,	space	restrictions,	chemical	state,	and	system	integration.	
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· The	radiation	resistance	capacity	of	 the	 transporter	system.	This	 is	 a	critical	 factor.	 In	 the	handling	of	highly	radioactive	waste,	the	chosen	carrier’s	ability	to	establish	a	truly	realistic	level	of	protection	needs	to	be	taken	into	account.	
· The	possibility	for	decontamination.	Some	RH	tasks,	such	as	dismantling,	generally	 involve	accessing	 regions	within	maintenance	 zones	which	 have	 contamination.	The	 transporters	normally	used	in	such	facilities	are	expensive	and	designed	for	this	dedicated	purpose.		This	means	that	they	are	developed	using	complex,	high-cost	technologies	that	allows	for	decon-tamination.	 	 It	 is	essential	 to	design	 transporters	that	can	be	easily	decontaminated	 in	the	event	of	any	undesired	or	unforeseen	event.		RH	transporters	can	be	divided	into	two	major	types:	
· Overhead	bridge,	guiderails	and	suspended	lifting	units	
· Mobile	platform	or	guiderails	ground-based	
2.3.1.1 Overhead bridge, guiderails and lifting unitsThis	category	includes	vertical	lifting	elements	which	contain	the	RH	system	The	ATENA	machine	de-scribed	 in	Section	2.2.2.2	 is	a	perfect	example	of	 this	category.	The	vertical	 lifting	carrier	has	a	 tele-scopic	link	that	can	be	extended	downwards,	and	this	is	powered	by	hydraulic	and	electrical	systems.	The	telescopic	link	is	equipped	with	a	robotic	arm,	which	is	remotely	controlled	to	carry	out	RH	tasks.		The	robotic	arm	is	equipped	with	various	end-effectors	for	dedicated	tasks.	Most	robotic	arms	are	con-trolled	by	operators,	but,	 in	rare	cases,	 they	perform	 the	RH	tasks	automatically.	Vertical	 lifting	sys-tems	of	 this	 type	are	normally	used	 to	dismantle	nuclear	reactors	 in	which	 the	radioactivity	 is	very	high.	The	dismantling	task	sequences	at	nuclear	power	plants	are	normally	carried	out	using	a	human-in-the-loop	methodology.	These	robust	systems	allow	deployments	over	a	 length	of	up	to	25	m.	 	The	vertical	lifting	system,	manipulator	arm	and	tooling	system	are	contained	inside	a	flask	to	protect	the	equipment	from	unintended	radiation	and	to	ease	the	transport	of	the	whole	unit.	The	vertical	 lifting	container	is	mounted	on	rails	so	that	it	can	cover	a	larger	area.	Some	RH	manipulators	are	directly	attached	 to	overhead	 rails,	which	 transfer	 them	 to	hot	zones	 to	perform	RH	tasks.	The	CERN	ISOLDE	robots,	 introduced	 in	Section	2.1.2.2,	are	mounted	on	overhead	guide	rails	that	can	remotely	install	ISOLDE	radioactive	targets.	Such	systems	are	very	useful	for	RH	of	light	loads	and	for	repetitive	tasks.	In	this	specific	example,	the	target	that	is	handled	is	30	kg,	and	its	installation	and	removal	are	carried	out	30	times	per	year,	depending	on	the	number	of	experiments	carried	out	in	the	facility.		Overhead	suspended	units	are	another	commonly	used	transporter	mechanism.	The	WAK	arm	at	the	Karlsruhe	reprocessing	plant	and	the	DAWP	at	CP5,	both	introduced	in	Section	2.2.2.2	,	are	suspended	from	the	ceiling.	Overhead	suspended	lifting	units	are	connected	to	the	rest	of	the	system,	via	cables	or	equivalents,	which	 are	hung	under	 a	 travelling	 crane	bridge	or	 gibbet.	The	overhead	units	 are	 also	equipped	with	robotic	arms	and	tools	that	are	remotely	controlled	to	conduct	RH	task	sequences.	
2.3.1.2 Mobile platforms (ground-based)Regions	that	are	normally	not	accessible	from	the	top	are	accessed	using	horizontal	mobile	platforms.		Such	platforms	are	very	commonly	used	 in	 inspection,	maintenance	and	dismantling	processes.	The	RH	equipment	in	the	LHC	at	CERN,	described	in	Section	2.1.1.4,	is	a	good	example	of	this.	The	remotely	operated	crane	 for	collimator	exchange	and	 the	ROV	are	both	mounted	on	 top	of	mobile	platforms.	These	mobile	carriers	are	also	commonly	used	with	robotic	arms	to	carry	out	dismantling	and	waste	
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removal	processes	at	plant	decommissioning.	The	WAK	facility	in	Karlsruhe	(Section	2.2.2.2)	uses	the	BROKK	150	carrier	SAMM	arm	from	a	commercial	crawler	digger.	Similarly,	the	CP5	facility	used	the	Rosie	system	 (Section	2.2.2.2),	uses	KRAFT	Predator	 robotic	arms	 to	 remove	 radioactive	waste	and	carry	out	the	decommissioning	of	the	reactor	power	plant.	
2.3.2 ManipulatorsManipulators	are	pieces	of	RH	equipment	that	perform	direct	manipulations	on	activated	components	using	specific	end-effectors.	Manipulators	have	one	or	more	DOF,	which	allows	them	to	handle	radio-active	components	from	various	positions.	In	most	cases,	such	manipulators	have	six	DOF,	plus	an	ad-ditional	gripping	 function.	RH	 tongs	and	all	similar	systems	with	 limited	motion	capabilities	are	as-signed	to	a	sub-category	of	the	manipulator	family.	Robotic	arms	are	programmable	robotic	manipula-tors	that	function	similarly	to	human	arms.	These	can	be	articulated	with	either	with	rotational	or	lin-ear	movement.		Manipulators	can	be	autonomous	or	manually	controlled.		The	wide	application	of	manipulators	 in	 the	nuclear	 industry	and	HEP	 facilities	 is	evident	 from	 the	extensive	 literature	review	presented	earlier	 in	Sections	2.1	and	2.2.	Manipulators	are	often	a	basic	part	of	remote	handing	equipment,	and	they	are	used	to	reduce	the	need	for	human	presence	to	carry	out	operations	involving	handling	hazardous	materials	in	radioactive	environments.	Manipulators	are	normally	used	for	non-repetitive	tasks,	but	in	certain	cases,	industrial	robots	are	deployed	to	carry	out	repetitive	 tasks	such	as	changing	of	 the	 targets	at	the	 ISOLDE	 facility.	 It	 is	of	utmost	 important	that	manipulators	have	the	option	for	end-effector	interchangeability,	in	order	for	them	to	cope	with	evolv-ing	environments.	Manipulators	can	be	either:	
· Fixed:	In	this	case,	the	manipulator	is	mounted	to	the	wall,	floor	or	celling.	The	manipulator	can	carry	out	tasks	within	the	range	of	its	work	envelope.	Such	manipulators	are	dedicated	to	limited	areas,	such	as	the	mechanical	Master-Slave	Manipulators	in	a	hotcell.	
· Mobile:	In	this	case,	the	manipulator	is	mounted	on	top	of	a	transporter	(see	Section	2.3.1),	which	can	carry	it	to	the	necessary	location,	where	the	RH	task	will	be	performed.	The	oper-ating	space	is	equivalent	to	the	combined	work	envelopes	of	the	carrier	and	the	manipulator.	The	tools	for	the	manipulator	are	also	mounted	on	top	of	the	transporter,	so	that	the	manip-ulator	can	carry	out	a	variety	of	task	sequences	during	maintenance.	The	 transmission	 of	 manipulator	 movements	 is	 provided	 with	 the	 help	 of	 mechanical,	 electrical,	pneumatic	or	hydraulic	power	systems.	These	have	primarily	been	developed	to	comply	with	the	rules	listed	 in	 Section	1.3.2.	Components	 containing	 sensitive	 equipment	 are	kept	 away	 from	 radioactive	sources,	and	shielding	can	be	provided	if	needed.	Manipulators,	whether	manually	or	autonomously	controlled,	can	be	divided	into	following	main	cate-gories:	
· Mechanical	Master	Slave	Manipulators	
· Power	manipulators	
· Servo	manipulators	
· Autonomous	industrial	manipulators	Manipulators	have	high	 levels	of	dexterity	that	are	capable	of	performing	a	variety	of	tasks	with	ap-propriate	tooling;	however,	the	experiences	at	JET	and	PSI	indicate	that	manipulators	takes	more	time	than	if		the	task	was	completed	through	hands-on	experience.	
70
2.3.2.1 Mechanical Master Slave ManipulatorsMechanical	Master	Slave	Manipulators	(Figure	62)	are	the	most	commonly	used	type	of	equipment	to	remotely	handle	radioactive	waste	within	hotcells	in	the	nuclear	industry,	such	as	reprocessing	plants	and	 laboratories.	 A	detailed	definition	of	 a	mechanical	Master	Slave	Manipulator	 is	provided	 in	 ISO	17874-2	[111].	
Figure	62.	Mechanical	Master	Slave	Manipulator.	These	devices	are	composed	of	master	and	slave	manipulators,	which	are	connected	 to	one	another	through	a	connection	tube	via	mechanical	 links	(e.g.	cables,	pinions,	chains,	shafts	or	metallic	tapes).	Mechanical	manipulators	have	six	DOF.	Due	to	their	mechanical	backdrivability	and	mechanical	design,	they	provide	force	feedback	to	the	operator.	The	connection	tube	separates	the	master	and	slave	ma-nipulators	through	the	wall	to	ensure	communication	between	the	hotcell	and	the	operating	zone.	The	operator	visually	monitors	 the	hotcell	manipulations	 through	 lead	glass	windows	and	camera-based	visual	monitoring	systems.	Mechanical	Master	Slave	Manipulators	can	be	 further	classified	 into	 two	categories	(Figure	62):	
· Articulate-arm:	The	translation	of	the	arm	in	this	type	of	Mechanical	Master	Slave	Manipula-tors	is	achieved	through	the	use	of	two	rotations	of	the	shoulder	and	elbow	joints.	These	are	normally	used	for	medium-load	applications	and	in	small	work	spaces.	
· Telescopic-arm:	The	translation	in	these	types	of	arms	is	achieved	with	the	help	of	telescopic	booms.	Telescopic	arms	usually	have	higher	load	capacities	and	bigger	working	spaces.	
	
2.3.2.2 Power manipulatorsPower	manipulators	(Figure	63)	are	used	in	hotcell	and	in	environments	where	heavy	lifting	is	need-ed.	They	 are	usually	used	 in	 large	work	spaces	 (e.g.	hotcells)and	are	mounted	on	 top	of	guide	 rails	which	cover	large	areas	of	manipulation.	Power	manipulators	have	4	to	7	DOF,	with	payload	capacities	of	50-500	kg.	They	use	telescopic	links	to	extend	from	between	1	and	7	meters	to	access	the	working	area. Control	of	this	system	is	typically	achieved	with	help	of	potentiometers	and	buttons	which	con-trol	the	speed	of	each	axis.	Generally,	it	is	possible	to	define	a	force	limit	and	to	send	feedback	signals	to	 the	operator	concerning	 the	gripping	 force.	 	Power	manipulators	are	very	simple	 in	design,	with	
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high	mechanical	gear	ratios,	very	few	(or	no)	sensors,	and	no	sophisticated	control	technology.	These	qualities	make	 them	suitable	 for	heavy-duty,	 low-dexterity	 tasks.	 In	rare	cases,	power	manipulators	can	 include	dexterous	arms	capable	of	performing	remote	manipulation;	however,	power	manipula-tors	are	normally	used	for	very	simple	tasks.		
Figure	63.		Power	manipulators.	Power	manipulators	are	used	to	handle	and	move	objects,	to	create	high	forces	throughout	the	entire	volume	of	a	cell	and	to	bring	elements	to	mechanical	master	slave	workstations	when	high-skill	tasks	are	required.	ISO	standard	ISO	17874-4	defines	power	manipulator	systems	for	RH	radioactive	devices	[112].	One	of	the	most	dexterous	robots	currently	in	existence	is	TELBOT	(Figure	63),	which	was	pro-duced	by	Walischmiller	Engineering	 [113].	TELBOT	 is	very	versatile	and	suitable	 for	 the	nuclear	 in-dustry	and	chemical	plants.	Its	arms	have	payload	capacities	ranging	from	5	kg	to	150	kg,	are	radia-tion-resistant,	and	it	has	a	modular	design	that	enables	the	TELBOT	arm	to	experience	unlimited	rota-tion	of	all	axes.	Finally,	TELBOT	is	a	program-enabled	robot,	which	means	that	it	is	capable	of	carrying	out	automated	task	sequences,	if	needed.		
2.3.2.3 Telerobotic servo manipulators (remotely controlled)Telerobotic	servo	manipulators	are	remotely	operated	systems	that	are	either	electrically	or	pneumat-ically	powered.	They	include	bilateral,	electrical	position	control	of	both	the	master	and	slave	devices	(Figure	64),	providing	force-feedback	capabilities	to	the	operator.	Current	telerobotic	systems	can	use	dissimilar	master	and	slave	arms,	due	the	absence	of	mechanical	linkages	between	the	two.	Advances	in	telerobotics	have	allowed	the	reduction	of	the	size	of	the	umbilical,	which	passes	through	the	shield	of	the	hot	zone,	as	well	as	rad-hardened	multiplexing	systems	and	embedded	systems.	
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Figure	64.	Outline	of	a	telerobotic	system	for	RH.	Telerobotics	RH	systems	can	be	divided	into	two	main	types,	based	on	their	kinematic	configurations:	
· The	kinematics	configurations	of	 the	master	and	slave	arms	are	 identical.	 In	such	configura-tions,	access	to	the	torque	applied	by	the	payload	on	each	axis	is	available	at	each	articulation	of	the	arms,	and	very	fine	force	feedback	is	achievable.	Mascot	at	JET	and	the	Master	Slave	Ma-nipulator	at	SNS	ORNL	use	similar	configurations.	
· The	kinematics	configurations	of	the	master	and	slave	arms	are	dissimilar.	Force	information	feedback	quality	is	usually	lower,	due	to	loss	in	the	slave	arm	structure.	On	the	other	hand,	this	scheme	facilitates	the	use	of	different	slave	arm	kinematics	with	the	same	master	arm. It	also	makes	 it	easier	 to	use	slave	arms	powered	by	different	 technologies	(e.g.	electricity,	hydrau-lics...),	and	 its	 indexing	capabilities	usually	 facilitate	work	 in	wider	workspaces.	Examples	of	such	systems	 include	MT200	TAO[107],	 the	Maestro	hydraulic	arm	 	cybernetix6		and	Stäubli	RX170	at	La	Hague[106].	
2.3.2.4 Autonomous industrial manipulatorsIndustrial	robots	are	used	to	carry	out	certain	repetitive	remote	maintenance	 tasks	of	RH.	These	 in-dustrial	robots	have	higher	reparability	and	reliability	 levels.	However,	they	are	frequently	modified	so	that	the	equipment	can	be	used	in	radioactive	environments	with	relatively	higher	doses.	The	cost	of	developing	new	technologies	for	customized	tasks	during	RH	is	very	high;	hence,	industrial	robots	are	modified	to	carry	out	task	sequences.	For	example,	HEP	facilities	like	GSI	and	ISOLDE	use	the	KU-KA	and	Stäubli	RX	series	robots	to	carry	out	remote	maintenance	tasks.	
6 http://www.cybernetix.fr/en/produit/99/slave-arms. This is a hydraulic manipulator arm designed specifically for
work in extreme environments. It is the result of 10 years of research in close collaboration with the CEA (French Atomic
Energy Commission). Maestro is designed to perform inspection, maintenance, dismantling, cleaning tasks, etc. It can be
used in robot mode (automatic sequence) and in remote control mode, either with or without force feedback control. Its
main qualities are its dexterity, its precision and its strength.
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2.3.3 Tooling (end-effector) systemsThe	lifting,	cutting,	removing,	installation	and	storage	of	radioactive	waste	material	are	essential	parts	of	RH	task	sequences	in	HEP	and	nuclear	facilities	hotcells.	These	tasks,	as	mentioned	previously,	are	performed	by	manipulator	arms	equipped	with	relevant	 tools.	These	 tools	play	very	critical	roles	 in	remote	maintenance.	Hence,	various	tools	are	designed	as	end-effectors	for	manipulators	to	carry	out	remote	maintenance	tasks	effectively	and	in	a	flexible	manner.	Materials	generated	during	decommis-sioning	and	remote	maintenance	can	be	 lifted	using	grapples,	clamshells	or	specially	designed	tools.	For	example,	at	CERN	and	GSI,	specialized	tooling	has	been	developed	to	handle	targets	and	beamline	inserts.	Since	the	RH	tasks	at	CERN	and	GSI	are	close	to	the	beamlines,	such	that	any	unintended	oper-ation	could	damage	the	beamlines,	fail-safe	mechanisms	to	detach	the	tools	are	also	available	for	cases	in	which	a	handled	part	gets	stuck.	 	At	 the	PSI	hotcell	 facility,	various	conventional	 tools	have	been	modified	to	cut	and	dismantle	targets	and	beamline	 inserts.	Similarly,	cutting	and	cleaning	tasks	are	also	performed	using	specially	designed	tools.		Cutting	operations	are	normally	performed	using	circu-lar	saws,	nibblers,	arc	saws,	plasma	arc	cutters,	reciprocating	saws,	laser	cutters,	friction	saws,	grind-ers	or	rotary	hammers.		
2.3.4 Supportive systems
2.3.4.1 Communication (communication, visual, light and sound) systemsThe	control	of	RH	equipment	 is	conducted	using	dedicated	communication	systems	within	the	facili-ties.	At	CERN	LHC,	there	 is	a	GPRS	network	that	is	used	to	communicate	between	the	RH	equipment	and	the	control	room.	Some	the	facilities	have	 leaky	cables	or	dedicated	Wi-Fi	networks	for	this	pur-pose.	 	Some	RH	systems	rely	heavily	on	real-time	operator	 feedback.	Operator	 feedback	 is	 the	main	link	between	operators	and	RH	equipment,	and	a	good	communication	link	is	essential	for	performing	tasks	accurately	and	effectively.		Currently,	telemanipulators	and	robots	are	assisted	by	camera,	light-ing	and	sound	systems. Signals	from	the	assisting	equipment	are	transmitted	to	a	receiver	and	visually	displayed	on	 large	monitors	 for	 the	operator’s	use.	With	 the	use	of	stereo	camera	systems,	data	can	also	be	fed	to	stereo	monitors,	providing	the	operator	with	limited	depth	perception.		
2.3.4.2 Radiation detection systemRadiation	detection	systems	are	used	to	determine	the	most	highly	radioactive	materials	in	a	region,	in	order	to	remove	these	first	from	the	site.	In	certain	cases,	radiation	detection	systems	are	assisted	by	infrared	detection	systems,	which	monitor	heat-sensitive	areas	with	radioactive	elements.	Radiation	detection	systems	are	used	for	various	applications,	including	measuring	alpha,	beta,	gamma	and	neu-tron	radiation;	checking	floors	for	volatile	organics	and	mercury;	using	infrared	cameras	to	detect	heat;	using	microphones	and	radios	to	detect	sound;	and	taking	temperature	and	humidity	measurements.		
2.3.4.3 Decontamination systemsThe	RH	equipment	used	to	handle	radioactive	components	may	require	decontamination,	depending	on	environmental	conditions.	Decontamination	techniques	are	suitable	for	remote	operation,	and	they	include	such	processes	as	scrabbling,	vacuuming,	steam	cleaning	and	spraying.	Normally,	RH	equip-ment	is	covered	with	a	protective	coating	to	prevent	it	from	becoming	contaminated	with	dust	parti-cles.	Typically,	a	specific	area	 is	designated	for	the	decontamination	process,	and	this	area	offers	the	equipment	required	to	carry	out	the	task.	
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2.3.4.4 Material packing and storage systemsLifting,	packing,	 removing	and	storing	 radioactive	waste	systems	are	 integral	 functions	of	 those	RH	systems	which	are	designed	to	safely	store	waste.	Material	packing	systems	are	normally	attached	to	hotcell	 setups.	 Storage	mechanisms	 are	 provided	 to	 store	 the	waste	 in	 standard-sized	 barrels.	The	waste	packing	and	handling	positions	are	built	from	scratch	in	order	to	reduce	operating	costs	during	waste	handling.
2.3.4.5 CAD/CAM virtual mockup test systemsCAD/CAM	virtual	mockup	(e.g.	VR4robots,	DELMIA	etc)	is	needed	to	carry	out	RH	tasks	in	virtual	envi-ronments	before	they	are	deployed	on	the	real	devices.	CAD/CAM	systems	are	used	to	establish	virtual	environments	with	the	desired	RH	equipment	and	waste	setups.	Virtual	mockup	tests	enable	the	sys-tem	to	carry	out	remote	maintenance	tasks	virtually,	while	also	enabling	the	designer	to	see	possible	short	comings	within	the	system	design.	
2.3.4.6 Full scale mockup test systemsThe	design,	once	finalized,	requires	testing	through	a	full	scale	mockup	to	validate	the	design	and	carry	out	 real-time	 testing.	This	process	also	enables	 the	RH	crew	 to	gain	necessary	 training,	which	 later	becomes	useful	in	the	real	environment.	Mockup	testing	also	enables	engineers	to	determine	the	relia-bility	and	acerbity	of	the	RH	equipment.	If	necessary,	changes	that	have	not	been	identified	in	virtual	mockup	testing	are	identified	at	this	stage	and	corrected	before	the	RH	system	is	operational.	
2.4 Systems Engineering (SE) and project management: State of the Art
knowledge and practice
2.4.1 SE practices and theoryAccording	 to	 the	 International	Council	on	 Systems	Engineering	 (INCOSE),	 SE	 can	be	defined	 as	 “an	interdisciplinary	 approach	 and	means	 to	 enable	 the	 realization	of	 successful	 systems.	 It	 focuses	on	defining	customer	needs	and	required	functionalities	earl	 in	the	development	cycle,	documenting	re-quirements	and	 then	proceeding	with	design	synthesis	and	system	validation	while	considering	 the	complete	problem:	performance,	cost	and	disposal”	 [114].	 In	other	words,	we	can	assume	 that	SE	 is	the	knowledge	that	deals	with	the	development	of	complex	systems	with	multiple	dimensions	(mainly	hardware	and	software)	in	large-scale	projects.		The	key	 literature	which	addresses	 the	SE	 framework	 for	developing	complex	systems	are:	The	 IN-COSE	SE	handbook	 [114],	 the	National	Aeronautics	and	Space	Administration	 (NASA)	SE	handbook	[70],	and	the	European	Space	Agency	(ESA)	European	Cooperation	for	Space	Standardization	(ECSS)	standards	[115].		These	handbooks	and	standards	address	various	processes	and	activities	related	to	the	development	of	complex	mechatronic	systems.	SE	addresses	various	dimensions	of	system	devel-opment,	 including	requirements	development	(e.g.	 functional	and	nonfunctional	requirement	defini-tions,	 integration,	verification	and	validation,	solution-finding	and	qualification).	However,	according	to	research	carried	out	on	SE	practices	by	INCOSE,	the	most	significant	project	failures	are	caused	by	poor	requirements	gathering	and	a	failure	to	develop	compatible	concept	system	designs	[114].		
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SE	also	 identifies	 the	 term	 “life	cycle”,	which	 it	defines	as	an	application	of	 the	SE	approach	 for	 the	purpose	of	understanding	and	 implementing	processes	 that	addresses	all	phases	of	 its	existence	 to	include	 system	 conception,	 design	 and	 development,	 production	 and/or	 construction,	 distribution,	operation,	maintenance	and	support,	retirement,	phase-out	and	disposal	[114].	The	SE	approach	con-siders	life	cycles	to	be	very	important	in	the	accomplishment	of	particular	complex	objectives,	ensur-ing	that	those	objectives	are	achieved	according	to	the	original	plan	and	in	an	organized	manner.			Various	generic	and	specific	life	cycles	exist	in	SE	and	project	management	(Figure	65).	One	example	of	a	project	life	cycle	is	the	so-called	“innovation	funnel,”	in	which	the	life	cycle	development	of	a	sys-tem	begins	with	various	inputs	that	are	gradually	refined,	analyzed	and	selected	over	time,	resulting	in	only	one	or	a	few	formal	project	ideas	that	can	be	implemented	for	rapid	completion	[116].	Similarly,	the	“axiomatic	design	model”	supplements	the	 innovation	funnel	by	dividing	the	design	process	 into	various	domains.	The	“customer	domain”	phase	seeks	to	gather	user	needs.	The	“functional	domain”	phase	seeks	to	transform	those	needs	into	requirements.	The	“physical	domain”	phase	seeks	to	trans-form	these	requirements	 into	design	parameters.	Finally,	the	“process	domain”	phase	 is	dedicated	to	the	processes	that	will	be	used	to	transform	the	designed	concepts	into	physical	objects	[117].	These	two	afore-mentioned	life	cycles	originate	primarily	from	project	management	approaches.		The	V-Model	and	Spiral	model	(Figure	65)	both	originate	primarily	from	SE	 itself.	In	the	V-model,	a	project	consists	of	six	phases:	conception	of	operations;	requirements	and	architecture;	detailed	de-sign;	 implementation;	 integration,	 testing	 and	 verification;	 and	 systems	 verification	 and	 validation.	These	phases	are	 then	optionally	 followed	by	an	operation	and	maintenance	phase	 [118].	The	other	most	common	 life	cycle	 for	system	development	 is	 the	Spiral	model.	The	Spiral	model	embodies	 the	iterative	nature	of	systems	development,	and	it	also	includes	six	major	phases:	requirement	analysis,	functional	 definition,	 physical	 definition,	 design	 validation,	 production/development,	 and	 mainte-nance[119].		
Figure	65.	Lifecycles	from	project	management	and	Systems	Engineering.	
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There	are	various	other	model	standards	and	life	cycles	for	systems	development	(Figure	66).	These	life	cycle	models	are	normally	divided	 into	half	a	dozen	or	so	steps	that	separate	the	major	decision	mile	stones.	Koissiakoff	[120]	presents	a	general	SE	 life	cycle	that	divides	the	various	 life	cycles	 into	three	main	SE	stages,	with	each	stage	further	subdivided	into	three	phases:	
· Concept	development	
o Need	analysis	
o Concept	exploration	
o Concept	definition	
· Engineering	development	
o Advance	development	
o Engineering	design	
o Integration	and	evaluation	
· Post	development	
o Production		
o Operation	and	support	
o Disposal	and	decommissioning	The	 study	of	various	 life	 cycles	 indicates	 that,	 in	SE,	 generic	 life	 cycle	descriptions	 share	 a	 relative	heaviness	(detailed	procedure	that	require	extensive	resources	to	 implement)	 in	their	definition	and	elaboration.	As	a	result,	research	projects	in	HEP	facilities	(see	the	following	section)	are	typically	not	explicitly	developed	using	any	particular	SE	approaches.	
2.4.1 Development processes for RH systems in HEP facilitiesTo	study	the	SE	practices	 in	the	development	of	RH	systems,	close	contact	and	collaboration	was	es-tablished	with	teams	from	PSI,	CERN,	JPARC	and	SPIRAL.	To	observe	and	understand	the	State	of	the	Art	practices	in	these	facilities,	multiple	visits	were	conducted	during	the	research	period.	Simultane-ously,	contacts	with	Japan	National	Laboratory	for	High	Energy	Physics	(KEK),	Fermi	Lab,	and	TRIUMF	were	also	established	to	facilitate	a	deeper	understanding	of	their	RH	system	and	the	development	of	each	facility.		The	studies	conducted	at	these	HEP	facilities	were	focused	on	the	design	and	development	processes	for	RH	systems.	The	analyses	of	the	facilities	revealed	that	the	RH	teams	typically	comprised	engineers,	most	of	whom	do	not	implement	SE	practices	to	develop	RH	equipment.	The	discussions	with	the	vari-ous	teams	revealed	a	pattern,	as	shown	in	Figure	68.	It	was	found	that	RH	teams	are	heavily	depend-ent	on	support	from	organizations	outside	the	HEP	facilities,	due	to	a	lack	of	manpower	and	resources	to	develop	RH	equipment.	CERN,	JPARC,	PSI,	KEK	and	GSI	rely	heavily	on	engineering	firms	for	their	RH.	Discussions	with	the	teams	also	revealed	a	 lack	of	documentation	concerning	RH	systems.	CERN	has	a	relatively	good	documentation	system;	however,	studies	concerning	design	and	development	of	RH	are	only	partially	documented.	Information	is	normally	present	in	the	form	of	presentation	slides,	with	very	few	detailed	design	documents	existing	which	address	RH.		
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Figure	66.	Comparison	of	different	models	of	life	cycles.	
Figure	67.	Generic	SE	life	cycle	model	by	Koissiakoff	[120].	
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Figure	68.	HEP	steps	for	developing	RH	equipment.	It	was	concluded	from	the	study	that	SE	practices	to	develop	RH	concepts	are	nonexistent	within	HEP	facilities.	Deficiencies	in	recording	and	documentation	are	two	of	the	most	chronic	issues	caused	by	a	lack	of	SE	practices.	The	consequences	of	these	issues	make	it	hard	to	transfer	knowledge	among	the	RH	 teams	 in	HEP	 facilities.	 In	 particular,	 this	 research	 project	 collaborated	 closely	 with	 the	 CERN	ISOLDE	 robot	exchange	process,	 the	PSI	RH	equipment	development	and	 the	 J-PARC	RH	equipment	development	processes.	Documentation	in	all	three	of	these	cases	is	very	limited,	and	there	is	a	greater	dependency	on	outside	engineering	firms.		
2.4.2 Distinctiveness of HEP facilities and the State of the Art in SEThe	development	of	HEP	 facilities	 is	normally	accomplished	 through	one-of-a-kind	projects,	and	 the	equipment	developed	during	such	projects	 is	also	unique.	There	are	numerous	differences	between	regular	facility	production	and	HEP	facility	production.	The	RH	equipment	developed	during	the	HEP	projects	tended	to	be	one-off	equipment,	and	could	be	termed	“prototypes.”	Due	to	this,	its	development	was	slow	as	a	result	of	changes	in	functional	needs	and	demands	over	time.	The	aim	of	equipment	development	is	to	develop	a	system	with	the	best	pos-sible	performance.	This	approach	causes	delays,	since	technical	decisions	are	made	very	late	in	order	to	get	 the	widest	possible	 range	of	solutions.	 It	 is	sometimes	 impossible	 to	 fix	 requirements	 for	RH	systems,	due	changes	in	the	facilities.	Moreover,	on	occasion,	RH	systems	can	also	trigger	major	design	changes	within	facility	development.	The	development	of	RH	equipment	in	HEP	facilities	is	also	normally	carried	out	with	the	collaboration	of	various	teams.	The	equipment	designs	are	carried	out	 in	different	regions	across	the	globe,	which	causes	 problems	 at	 both	 the	 organizational	 and	 technical	 levels.	 Projects	 of	 such	 magnitude	 are	marred	by	project	delays	and	slow	design	progress.	Such	projects	progress	in	very	different	manner	to	other	large	projects	in	differ	sectors.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	they	are	public-sector-funded	projects	with	non-profit	operations.	The	research-focused	operation	of	 the	 facilities	makes	 them	prone	 to	 funding	changes,	cuts	and	delays	 that	directly	affect	their	equipment	development	resources	and	manpower.			HEP	RH	equipment	 is	deployed	 in	 ionizing	radiation	environments.	For	 this	reason,	equipment	con-cept	development	needs	to	involve	careful	consideration	of	radiation	dose	analyses	and	planning.	
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Many	State	of	the	Art	SE	practices	provide	very	detailed,	elaborative	tasks	and	processes,	which	make	them	 impossible	 for	HEP	 facilities	 to	adopt	whilst	also	 reducing	 their	 resources	and	workforces.	To	expect	HEP	facilities	to	implement	and	adopt	State	of	the	Art	SE	practices	is	unrealistic	on	a	full-scale	level.	However,	 the	 findings	discussed	 above	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	 adopt	 a	 leaner	 SE	 ap-proach	 for	 the	development	of	RH	equipment	concepts,	 to	avoid	costs	and	unexpected	 failures.	For	example,	the	development	of	the	shielding	flasks	at	PSI	was	 integrated	 later	 in	the	facility’s	 life	cycle	and	was	not	 foreseen	at	earlier	stages;	 thus,	more	 than	 three	shielding	 flasks	exist	at	the	 facility	 for	three	different	 targets.	Similarly,	robots	can	replace	 the	 targets	and	beamline	 inserts	at	 ISOLDE	and	GSI	were	added	to	the	respective	facilities	at	later	stages		and	due	that,	the	post	processing,	including	logistics	related	to	moving	radioactive	elements	from	the	beamline	to	the	storage	zone,	is	a	high-risk	operation	 that	 can	 only	 be	 carried	 out	 after	 a	 long	 cool-down	 time.	The	 aforementioned	 examples	shows	that	lack	of	SE	approach	from	start	can	solve	the	problem	only	partially.		Implementing	SE	prac-tices	during	the	development	stages	of	RH	concepts	can	provide	answers	to	such	questions	as:	i)	What	are	the	requirements	and	needs?	 ii)	Which	equipment	 is	suitable	for	the	RH	tasks?	 iii)	What	task	se-quences	can	carry	out	 logistics	for	maintenance?	iv)	What	are	the	future	anticipated	costs	of	the	sys-tem?	v)	What	effects	will	radiation	have	on	the	system?	vi)	What	are	the	functional	and	RAMS	analyses	of	the	system?		
A	SE	approach	is	needed	for	developing	future	accelerator	facilities,	such	as	FAIR,	ESS,	FRIB,	and	SPI-RAL2.	The	Open	SE	approach,	developed	by	the	PURESAFE	network,	is	an	effort	to	provide	such	a	lean	SE	approach.	It	will	incorporate	best	practices	and	techniques	from	SE	and	project	management,	to	be	used	when	developing	equipment	specifically	for	particle	accelerator	facilities.		The	following	chapter	of	this	thesis	will	focus	specifically	on	the	SE	approach	for	the	conceptual	design	of	RH	equipment	and	its	logistics	in	an	HEP	facility.	In	particular,	the	study	will	address	the	RH	equip-ment	used	in	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel.	Using	this	case	study	will	show	the	feasibility	and	benefit	of	applying	a	simpler	SE	approach	to	a	small-scale,	complex,	multi-disciplinary	research	project.	The	sys-tem	engineering	approach	proposed	in	this	thesis,	along	with	the	case	study	can	be	considered	a	refer-ence	for	future	integration	into	the	Open	SE	project.	
2.5 Summary
This	chapter	has	presented	a	review	and	in-depth	analysis	of	the	State	of	the	Art	of	RH	systems	in	HEP	facilities.	It	has	studied	the	technologies,	practices,	logistics	and	design	strategies	of	RH	systems,	along	with	a	review	of	the	RH	equipment	currently	in	use	for	remote	maintenance	in	some	of	the	facilities.	The	RH	system	State	of	the	Art	analysis	conducted	in	this	chapter	has	resulted	in:	
· A	detailed	 analysis	of	 logistics	 scenarios	 at	HEP	 facilities	 across	 the	 globe.	This	 survey	 also	sought	to	 identify	various	trends	 in	 logistics	within	HEP	facilities.	During	the	development	of	this	 survey,	 close	 cooperation	 was	 established	 with	 other	 facilities	 in	 order	 to	 learn	 about	equipment	design	practices	and	tools	used	during	design	processes.	
· A	survey	of	the	RH	equipment	used	in	both	HEP	facilities	and	nuclear	power	plants	for	remote	maintenance,	disposal,	decommissioning	and	dismantling.	
	
· The	categorization	and	classification	of	RH	equipment.	This	categorization	enables	design	en-gineers	to	select	the	right	equipment	from	conceptual	developments	for	remote	maintenance	tasks.	
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This	chapter	also	studied	the	State	of	the	Art	in	SE	practices	for	the	development	of	complex	machines.	The	SE	practices	used	within	HEP	facilities	were	also	examined	in	the	context	of	RH	equipment.	With	regard	to	SE	practices,	the	study	revealed:	
· The	practices	used	by	NASA,	ESA	and	ITER	concerning	the	management	of	very	complex	pro-jects	and	equipment.	The	direct	application	of	such	practices	may	be	labor	and	time-intensive.	For	this	reason,	the	direct	application	of	such	practices	may	result	in	project	cost	increase	and	delays.	Hence,	a	leaner	SE	approach	will	be	suitable	for	RH	system	integration	into	HEP	facility	infrastructure.		
· There	are	no	specific	SE	approaches	 for	developing	RH	equipment	within	HEP	 facilities.	The	study	 revealed	 that	SE	and	project	management	practices	 in	 the	HEP	 facilities	surveyed	are	nonexistent	for	the	development	of	RH	systems.	RH	for	facilities	is	normally	developed	based	on	experience.	
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3 Development of a RH logistics concept for the Super-FRS
main tunnel project at the FAIR Facility using an SE ap-
proach
As	found	from	the	State	of	the	Art	survey	described	 in	the	previous	chapter,	SE	and	project	manage-ment	practices	are	either	very	limited	or	nonexistent	in	the	development	of	RH	systems	at	HEP	facili-ties.	RH	for	in	these	facilities	is	normally	developed	based	on	the	experience	of	engineers	and	there	are	no	existing	SE	approaches	specifically	designed	for	developing	RH	equipment.	In	this	chapter,	a	gener-ic	SE	approach	 is	proposed	 for	 the	development	of	RH	 logistics	concepts	 for	HEP	 facilities.	This	ap-proach	has	been	developed	so	that	 it	can	be	generalizable	and	can	be	applied	to	the	development	of	any	other	RH	concept	within	HEP	 facilities.	The	 integration	of	 the	proposed	system	 into	existing	SE	frameworks	would	require	further	studies,	which	lies	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	This	chapter	also	addresses	the	development	of	a	specific	RH	system	and	logistics	concept	for	the	Su-per-FRS	main	tunnel.	This	demonstrates	how	applies	 the	proposed	SE	approach	can	be	applied	 to	a	real	world	problem,	and	can	serve	as	a	case	study	for	future	reference.	The	design	and	development	process	is	elaborated	in	detail,	with	supporting	information	provided	in	an	appendix.		The	chapter	is	arranged	as	follows:	Section	3.1	presents	the	proposed	SE	framework	developed	as	part	of	this	research.	Section	3.2	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	Super-FRS	facility	within	the	FAIR	project,	which	serves	as	the	case	study.		Section	3.3	goes	into	detail	about	the	specific	areas	within	the	facility	which	require	RH.	It	explains	the	Super-FRS	beam	losses	along	with	key	radiation	hotspots,	radiation	environment	and	studies	of	the	layout	to	develop	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	requirements	and	needs	 for	RH	 in	 the	Super-FRS.	Section	3.4	explains	 the	 three	main	RH	concepts	developed	 for	Super-FRS,	based	on	these	requirements	and	needs,	using	COTS	equipment.	It	also	lists	the RH	chang-es	identified	during	the	concept	design	stage.	Section	3.4.5	discusses	a	survey	of	RH	expert	opinion	and	the	key	tradeoff	analyses	which	was	carried	out	to	select	between	the	concept	designs	Finally,	Section	3.6	presents	the	results	from	the	tradeoff	analysis	and	a	detailed	discussion	of	these	result.	
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3.1 Proposed SE approach for developing a RH systems logistics
concept for HEP facilities
RH	equipment	is	needed	for	the	maintenance	of	those	radioactive	components	which	require	regular	replacement	in	HEP	facilities.	Even	though	various	RH	equipment	systems	are	currently	in	use	at	vari-ous	HEP	facilities,	very	little	documentation	is	available	regarding	the	methods	and	practices	used	in	their	RH	system	design.	In	this	regard,	HEP	facilities	are	very	different	when	compared	to	the	Eurpean	Space	Agency	(ESA),	the	ITER	nuclear	fusion	project	and	commercial	nuclear	power	plants,	where	SE	practices	are	highly	developed	and	documented	 [70]	 [114][115].	The	 lack	of	SE	practices	can	cause	delays	and	increases	in	the	cost	of	RH	system	design	and	development.	It	also	results	in	a	shortage	of	knowledge	being	 transferred	via	high	quality	documentation,	which	 could	 link	 the	 system	 require-ments	 to	 the	various	design	phases.	This	 thesis	proposes	 a	SE	approach	 for	 the	development	of	RH	logistics	concepts	within	HEP	facilities.	A	visual	representation	of	the	approach	is	shown	in	Figure	69.	In	this	section,	this	SE	approach	will	be	explained	in	more	detail	and	in	later	sections	it	will	be	imple-mented	on	a	case	study.	As	discussed	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	SE	practices	have	reputation	of	being	labor	and	cost-intensive	 to	carry	out.	However,	as	will	be	shown,	 the	proposed	SE	approach	can	be	implemented	in	a	straight-forward	manner	and	on	a	small	scale.	The	proposed	SE	approach	can	be	divided	into	seven	major	processes:	
· Step1	:	Systems	Requirement	Development	
· Step2	:	State	of	the	Art	Survey	
· Step3	:	Concept	Design	
· Step4	:	Design	Trade	Off	and	Analysis		
· Step5	:	Architecture	Design		
· Step6	:	System	Digital/Prototype	Mockup	Testing		
· Step7	:	System	Commissioning	and	Operation	In	this	thesis,	only	the	first	four	of	these	processes	are	applied	to	the	case	study.	The	remaining	three	processes	are	more	oriented	 towards	detailed	design	and	designed	 implementation,	 in	which	 is	be-yond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		The	two	most	critical	phases	of	any	product	development	are	requirements	development	and	concep-tual	design,	since	during	 these	phases	most	of	 the	cost	 is	built	 into	 the	system.	The	 concept	design	phase	for	RH	equipment	in	HEP	facilities	can	be	divided	primarily	into	four	process	and	12	sub-tasks,	as	follows:	
Systems	Requirement	Development:	The	needs	and	requirements	within	IT,	construction,	engineer-ing	and	industrial	projects	are	of	utmost	importance.	The	RH	equipment	within	an	HEP	facility	inter-acts	with	other	systems	and	infrastructures	within	the	facility.	Hence,	it	is	very	important	to	obtain	a	clear	picture	of	 the	needs	and	 requirements	 for	 a	RH	system.	The	 first	subtask	 in	 this	process	 is	 to	gather	together	all	of	the	needs	and	requirements	put	forward	by	all	stakeholders,	in	order	to	obtain	clear	picture	of	the	comprehensive	needs.	The	second	subtask	is	to	carry	out	an	initial	feasibility	study	
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with	the	engineering	team,	in	order	to	identify	the	viability	of	the	project	needs	and	requirements.	The	next	step	is	to	draft	detailed	operational	requirements	for	the	RH	systems.	The	final	step	 is	to	refine	both	the	functional	and	nonfunctional	requirements.		From	this	process,	two	major	documents	will	be	obtained:	 the	 Systems	 Requirements	 Document	 (SRD)	 and	 the	 Technical	 Performance	 Measures	(TPMs).		
Technology	Survey:	The	design	and	development	of	an	engineering	project	 is	based	on	the	study	of	existing	RH	equipment.	This	can	be	carried	out	in	parallel	with	the	development	of	requirements.	The	study	of	RH	systems	for	HEP	facilities	can	be	subdivided	into:	the	study	of	State	of	the	Art	RH	equip-ment	currently	used	within	other	HEP	facilities	and	nuclear	power	plants;	and	the	study	of	current	RH	concepts	within	the	facility	in	question	(e.g.	solutions	that	have	been	considered	or	drafted	during	the	design	of	the	facility)..	This	practice	generates	a	list	of	equipment	and	technologies	that	can	be	used	to	develop	the	RH	system.	
Conceptual	Designs:	Here,	the	data	obtained	during	the	first	system	requirements	development	and	technology	survey	are	compared.	The	TPMs	are	compared	to	the	equipment	list	in	order	to	short-list	the	viable	equipment	candidates,	which	can	be	used	 in	conceptual	designs	of	 the	RH	concepts.	The	equipment	 list	 is	then	evaluated,	alongside	the	requirements.	At	the	end	of	this	practice,	a	sub-set	of	the	concept	designs	 is	 identified	as	suitable	 to	carry	out	RH	 task	sequences	within	 the	HEP	 facility.	These	concept	designs	are	then	proposed	to	the	engineering	team	for	further	analysis.	The	output	of	this	process	is	documented	in	the	form	of	a	Conceptual	Designs	Document	(CDD).	
Design	Tradeoff	and	Analysis:	During	this	process,	the	conceptual	designs	are	evaluated	against	each	other.	This	process	includes:	
· Functional	task	sequence	analysis:	The	RH	task	sequences	for	each	concept	are	studied,	ana-lyzed	 and	 optimized	 by	 determining	 the	 critical	 path	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 task	 sequences.	This	analysis	addresses	issues	of	equipment	utilization	and	task	optimization.	It	also	addresses	key	logistics	issues	and	contact	points	with	other	HEP	systems.	
· Radiation	analysis:	During	this	analysis,	the	doses	received	by	RH	equipment	are	calculated	in	mSv/h	and	to	determine	the	total	dose	in	mSv.	Measurements	should	be	carried	out	in	Sv	to	show	the	doses	for	humans	working	in	the	area,	rather	than	for	the	robot	which	would	be	cal-culated	in	Gy.	The	doses	in	Gy	can	be	derived	from	doses	in	Sv.	This	analysis	is	an	integral	part	of	concept	evaluation,	as	 it	deals	directly	with	 the	doses	 received.	Radiation	safety	concerns	must	be	fully	integrated	into	the	needs-gathering	exercise	from	the	start	of	the	project,	and	are	also	 important	 in	 later	stages	with	regard	to	accurately	evaluating	equivalent	dose	estimates.	The	radiation	analysis	will	directly	address	the	requirements	concerning	project	feasibility	(i.e.	whether	 the	 RH	 system	 can	 perform	 the	 tasks)	 and	 manufacturing	 and	 performance	 (i.e.	whether	the	equipment	is	radiation-hardened	and	what	modifications	are	needed).	This	radia-tion	 analysis	 can	 also	 serve	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 an	ALARA	 evaluation	 if	 human	 intervention	 is	needed	in	certain	cases.		
· Failure	mode	and	effects	analysis	(FMEA):	Here,	the	RH	concepts	are	evaluated		to	identify	all	possible	failures	in	a	concept	design	and	task	sequence.	Failures	are	prioritized	according	to	how	serious	their	consequences	are,	how	frequently	they	occur	and	how	easily	they	can	be	de-tected.	The	purpose	of	 a	FMEA	 is	 to	 eliminate	or	 reduce	possible	 failures,	 starting	with	 the	highest-priority	 ones.	This	 addresses	RAMS	 issues,	while	 also	 identifying	 key	 failure	 points	that	require	attention.		
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· Cost	analysis:	This	analysis	addresses	the	cost	issues	for	the	developed	concepts	and	provides	cost	estimates.	
· Requirements	 traceability	 analysis:	 During	 the	 requirements	 traceability	 it	 important	 to	compare	the	concept	design	to	the	 initial	systems	requirements	 in	order	to	assess	the	design	feasibility.	The	concept	designs	are	proposed	based	on	initial	analyses,	using	TPM	at	an	early	stage.	 However,	 as	 the	 designs	 are	 suggested	 and	 developed,	 requirements	 traceability	 be-comes	a	key	analysis	feature	to	insure	the	concept	design	is	in	accordance	with	the	system	re-quirements.	The	requirements	developed	during	an	early	stage	must	be	 traceable	within	the	design.	This	can	be	considered	one	subtask	of	system	evaluation.		
· Expert	criteria	evaluation:.	The	RH	and	HEP	facilities	development	research	fields	are	very	narrow,	and	there	are	various	people	with	experience	in	developing	technologies	for	such	RH	task	sequences.	Hence,	it	is	imperative	to	include	the	opinions	of	these	experts	in	the	selection	of	equipment.	It	 is	also	 important	to	run	designs	past	these	experts	and,	based	on	their	feed-back,	to	develop	criteria	to	evaluate	the	concept	designs.	Here,	the	RH	experts	from	HEP	facili-ties	and	other	fields	are	consulted	in	order	to	develop	criteria	to	evaluate	the	concept	designs.	The	RH	experts	are	asked	for	their	opinion	(concerning	RH	problem)	to	develop	weighted	cri-teria	that	is	later	used	to	assess	the	concept	designs	during	tradeoff	analysis	The	output	of	this	analysis	process	is	a	Detailed	Design	Document	(DDD)	that	describes	the	most	suit-able	equipment,	technologies	and	tools	that	can	be	developed	into	final	designs	for	RH	task	sequences	within	the	HEP	facility.	The	detailed	design	obtained	at	this	stage	can	be	further	developed	into	proto-types	that	can	be	tested	using	digital	CAD	mockups	and	full-scale	prototype	testing.		In	the	following	sections,	this	proposed	SE	model	will	be	applied	to	the	development	of	RH	equipment	and	logistics	concepts	for	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel.
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Figure	69.	Proposed	SE	approach	for	developing	RH	systems	logistics	concepts	for	HEP	facilities.
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3.2 Application area: Super-FRS at the FAIR facility
The	practical	part	of	this	research	 is	primarily	focused	on	developing	a	RH	system	and	 logistics	con-cept	for	the	Super-FRS	facility	 in	FAIR.	Through	the	SE	model	proposed	 in	the	previous	section,	 it	 is	proposed	that	this	work	can	be	generalized	to	be	used	at	other	facilities.	This	section	and	the	following	section	present	the	Super-FRS	and	its	RH	requirements.		When	 it	 is	completed,	 the	Super-FRS	will	be	 the	powerful	 in-flight	separator	 for	exotic	nuclei.	Rare	isotopes	of	all	elements	(up	to	uranium)	will	be	able	to	be	produced	and	spatially	separated	within	a	few	hundred	nanoseconds,	thus	allowing	the	study	of	very	short-lived	nuclei	[2].	Presently,	two	com-plementary	experimental	methods	are	applied	to	achieve	this	goal:	the	inflight	method	and	the	isotope	separation	on-line	(ISOL)	method	and	the	projectile	fragmentation	and	fission.	ISOL	schemes	produce	radioactive	 ions	 at	 rest	 and	 employ	 post-accelerators	 to	 produce	 secondary	 beams.	 The	 produced	fragments,	including	the	rare	isotopes	of	interest	and	the	surviving	primary	beam	leave	the	target	in	a	forward	direction.	In	the	Super-FRS,	the	isotopes	are	separated	via	magnetic	rigidity	analysis	and	their	different	energy	losses	in	matter	[13].	To	accomplish	this,	precision-shaped	energy	absorbers	are	em-ployed.	However,	the	primary	beam	intensity	after	the	target,	which	has	a	maximum	50%	interaction	probability,	is	still	so	strong	that	it	must	never	hit	the	degraders	directly.	The	in-flight	method	employs	projectile	 fragmentation	 and	 fission,	 involving	 30	 MeV/u	 to	 1500	 MeV/u	 heavy	 ions.	 The	 three	branches	of	 the	Super-FRS	 large-acceptance	superconducting	 fragment	separator	serve	different	ex-perimental	purposes	(Figure	70).	The	Super-FRS	is	the	application	area	for	this	research,	and	the	de-tails	concerning	its	layout	and	beam	loss	are	explained	in	detail	in	Section	3.3.2.	
Figure	 70.	 Layout	 of	 the	 proposed	 superconducting	 fragment	 separator	 (Super-FRS)	 for	 the	
production,	 separation	 and	 investigation	 of	 exotic	 nuclei.	 Spatially	 separated	 rare-isotope	
beams	are	delivered	 to	 the	 experimental	areas	via	 three	different	branches.	The	 ion-optical	
layouts	 of	 the	 focusing	 systems,	 both	 in	 front	 of	 the	 production	 target	 and	 in	 the	 energy-
buncher	 system	 (LEB-spectrometer),	 have	 been	 significantly	 modified	 to	 match	 the	 experi-
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mental	conditions.	A	high-resolution	magnetic	spectrometer	(HEB-Spectrometer)	has	also	been	
designed	for	the	high-energy	experimental	area	(R3B	project)	[14].	
3.3 Requirements development
Identifying	the	correct	requirements,	according	to	user	needs,	 is	key	to	a	project’s	success.	However,	identifying	 these	needs	 is	also	 “the	most	difficult,	most	critical,	most	error	prone	and	most	communica-
tion-intensive	aspect	of	development”	[121].	This	task	can	be	even	more	challenging	for	a	research	pro-ject,	where	needs	tend	to	change	more	easily	than	they	do	during	any	other	project.		The	needs	collection	for	the	Super-FRS	project	was	carried	out	by	the	current	project	team	within	GSI.	The	needs	collection	for	the	RH	was	conducted	through	meetings,	informal	conversations,	discussions	and	 studies	of	project	documentation,	 in	 collaboration	with	 the	 Super-FRS	project	 engineering	 and	user	teams.	The	requirements	development	process	involved:	
· Initial	studies	of	the	Super-FRS	facility’s	beam	losses	and	radiation	environment.	
· Studies	of	the	Super-FRS	facility	layout.	
· Super-FRS	group	meeting	to	streamline	the	Super-FRS	RH	requirements.	
3.3.1 Super-FRS facility beam losses and radiation environment
3.3.1.1 Beam losses in the Super-FRSBased	on	the	experience	gained	from	the	existing	FRS	facility,	GSI	is	also	responsible	for	the	develop-ment	of	the	Super-FRS	facility	shown	in	Figure 71.	The	new	FAIR	accelerators	produce	primary	beam	intensities	of	up	to	1012	ions/s	of	238U	at	up	to	1.5	GeV/u	[14].		In	general,	the	FAIR	ion	beams	have	100	to	1000	times	higher	intensity	than	those	currently	available	at	GSI	[13].	
Figure 71. Super-FRS layout for production and separation.
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The	purpose	of	the	Super-FRS	is	to	select	certain	species	of	mostly	exotic	nuclei	out	of	the	large	variety	of	different	nuclides	produced.	This	is	done	through	the	so-called	Bρ-ΔE-Bρ	method	[21],	in	which,	in	addition	to	simple	analysis	through	magnetic	rigidity	(Bρ),	 ions	are	further	separated	through	a	sec-ond	Bρ	analysis	after	passing	 through	a	 layer	of	matter	(a	degrader),	 in	which	 ions	of	different	ele-ments	 lose	different	amounts	of	energy	 (ΔE).	While	 the	 first	step	primarily	selects	 ions	with	similar	mass-to-charge	ratios,	the	second	step	adds	selectivity	through	the	ions’	atomic	numbers.	In	the	Super-FRS,	this	method	is	applied	twice:	once	each	in	the	pre	and	main	separators.		For	effective	radiation	protection	and	maintenance	planning,	the	beam	 losses	 in	different	sections	of	the	Super-FRS	must	be	carefully	estimated	to	predict	prompt	dose.	The	goal	is	to	select	only	a	few	ions	out	of	up	to	10	12/s;	thus,	the	losses	and	their	exact	locations	of	occurrence	can	be	predicted	accurately.	However,	given	the	many	different	Super-FRS	settings	for	either	fewer	or	more	rare	isotopes,	intensi-ties	within	the	main	separator	vary	greatly.	To	illustrate	this	situation,	two	examples	were	chosen:	the	selection	of	132Sn	produced	in	a	fission	reac-tion	from	a	238U	beam	and	the	selection	of	100Sn	produced	through	a	projectile	fragmentation	of	124Xe	(Figure 72).	132Sn,	and	many	other	fission	fragments	with	a	similar	mass	and	atomic	number,	can	be	produced	 in	high	quantities	and	are	difficult	 to	separate	due	 to	 the	 larger	momentum	spread	of	 the	fragments	behind	the	target	[13] .	In	contrast,	100Sn	and	its	neighbors	on	the	chart	of	nuclides	are	pro-duced	much	less	frequently	and	at	higher	energies.	
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Figure 72: Number of ions lost along the path of the Super-FRS beamline per meter and second.
For cases (i.e., 132Sn and 100Sn settings), an initial energy of 1.5 GeV/u and an intensity of 3.3x1011
ions (238U or 124Xe, respectively) was assumed. For clearer presentation, the numbers were aver-
aged over 5 m wide bins. Key loss points are labelled [122].The	simulations	were	performed	using	the	Monte	Carlo	code	MOCADI	[123]	for	ion	transport	in	beam-lines.	We	collected	the	losses	for	all	relevant	nuclides	produced	as	a	function	of	the	position	along	the	
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Super-FRS	beamline.	This	corresponded	to	around	1000	different	nuclides	for	132Sn	and	490	for	100Sn.	Since	we	are	 interested	 in	estimating	the	 level	of	activation	of	beamline	components,	the	number	of	ions	is	not	a	good	criterion	on	its	own.	The	energy	of	the	ions	and	their	mass	and	atomic	number	are	also	 important	 to	 include.	 Heavier	 ions	 contain	 more	 nuclides,	 but	 ions	 of	 higher	 charges	 can	 be	stopped	faster.	These	conditions	were	considered	by	comparing	the	number	of	emitted	neutrons	for	each	 ion	derived	 from	 a	 simplified	 scaling	 rule,	 as	described	 in	 [124].	The	number	 of	 ions	 lost	 (as	shown	in	Figure 72)	actually	refers	to	the	number	of	114Pd	ions	at	1300MeV/u	per	ion.	This	measure-ment	lies	roughly	in	the	middle	of	the	distributions	of	mass	and	energy	for	all	ions	in	the	Super-FRS.	This	MOCADI	procedure	also	allows	 loss	numbers	 to	be	defined	for	 inserts	 like	targets	or	degraders,	through	which	the	ions	fly	without	being	lost.		It	 is	clear	 from	 the	results	 that	 the	main	 loss	points	are	 the	 target	and	 the	beam	catchers;	however,	local	maxima	also	occur	 later	 in	the	system.	Such	maxima	appear	at	the	degrader	wedges	and	at	the	exit	slits,	where	significant	degrees	of	separation	occur.	Some	ions	drop	out	even	before	the	slits	(e.g.	in	the	dipole	regions).	The	Super-FRS	has	three	branches	[92],	but	only	the	path	towards	the	storage	rings	was	considered	here,	since	 this	 is	 the	scenario	 in	which	 the	highest	beam	 intensities	can	pass	through	the	whole	separator.	In	the	other	branches,	beam	tracking	with	detectors	is	used—something	that	is	not	possible	at	the	high	particle	rates	used	in	this	scenario.	The	difference	between	 the	 two	cases	at	 the	exit	slit	 is	also	significant.	Thus	 far,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	foresee	how	often	each	case	will	be	used	during	operation.	However,	it	is	clear	that	the	high-intensity	case	is	only	one	of	many—and,	thus,	will	not	run	for	the	whole	operation	time,	but	will	instead	run	for	only	a	small	fraction	of	this	time,	with	correspondingly	lower	activation.	Only	in	the	pre-separator	is	it	desirable	to	have	a	high	intensity	on	the	target	for	all	of	the	operation	time.	
3.3.1.2 Radiation Environment in the Super-FRSThe	Super-FRS	seeks	to	stay	far	below	the	annual	dose	limit	of	20mSv	per	year	for	radiation	workers	in	controlled	areas.	For	 free	 access,	 the	annual	dose	 rate	 limit	 is	0.5	µSv/h	 [125][126].	The	highest	activation	occurs	in	the	target	area	(Figure 73)	at	the	beginning	of	the	pre-separator.	This	area	begins	with	the	beamline	inserts	(e.g.	the	Super-FRS	production	target)	and	ends	with	the	three	beam	catcher	chambers.	These	components	have	the	highest	 level	of	activation	as	they	are	directly	exposed	to	the	intense	primary	beam	[14].	After	the	beam	has	interacted	with	the	target,	a	series	of	graphite	and	iron	beam	catchers	are	used	to	stop	the	beam	at	locations	where	the	primary	beam	and	selected	fragments	are	separated.	The	pre-separator	is	exposed	to	a	large	amount	of	radiation	and,	thus,	is	activated	even	after	the	cooling	period.		
Figure 73	shows	that,	according	to	FLUKA	[125]	simulations,	radiation	levels	inside	the	shielding	are	well	above	0.5µSv/h	during	beam	operation.	FLUKA	is	a	fully	integrated	Monte	Carlo	simulation	pack-age	used	to	simulate	interaction	and	transport	of	particle	and	nuclei	in	matter.	The	beam	catchers	ex-perience	high	levels	of	activation,	since	they	absorb	up	to	85%	of	the	beam.	The	target	and	the	beam	catchers	are	develop	radiation	damage	and	will	require	multiple	replacements	during	the	course	of	the	Super-FRS	operation.	
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Figure 73. Dose rate calculation with FLUKA during beam operation.
Figure 74	 illustrates	 the	 activation	 levels	 in	 the	 target	 region,	 calculated	 using	 FLUKA	 simulations.	According	to	these	simulations,	the	residual	dose	for	the	beam	catchers	falls	 in	the	Sv/h	region	even	after	120	days	of	cooling.	The	working	platform	has	a	radiation	level	of	10	µSv/h	and	can	be	accessed	by	humans	to	make	and	break	connections.	However,	human	access	to	the	top	of	the	working	platform	is	limited	and	controlled	[125][126].	
Figure 74. Activation levels (calculated from FLUKA simulations) near the beamline and on the
working platform following various irradiation periods, as indicated at the top of the image.The	parts	which	 experience	 the	highest	 levels	of	 activation	 can	only	be	 remotely	handled	within	 a	hotcell.	The	beamline	 inserts,	 for	example,	are	directly	exposed	 to	the	primary	beam	as	well	as	high	temperatures	and	pressures.	The	work	required	to	hold,	move	and	exchange	these	inserts	can	only	be	accomplished	by	using	RH	 inside	 the	hotcell	 [14]. Within	 the	hotcell,	 the	part	which	has	 the	highest	
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level	of	activation	 is	the	beam	catcher	(Figure 72	&	Figure 73).	The	residual	dose	rate	calculation	for	gamma	shielding	 for	 the	beam	catcher	shows	 that	a	hotcell	with	a	1	m	 thick	wall	 is	suitable	 for	RH	(Figure 75).			The	Super-FRS	 includes	a	130	m	 long	main	separator,	which	 is	composed	of	 four	dipole	stages	with	focusing	 elements	 in	 front	 and	behind	 the	dipole	magnets.	The	main	 separator	 is	 also	divided	 into	three	branches:	a	 low-energy	branch	(LEB),	a	high-energy	branch	(HEB)	and	a	ring	branch	(RB),	as	shown	in	Figure 71	[13].		The	beam	intensity	and	losses	are	reduced	along	the	focal	planes	in	the	main	separator,	and	radiation	levels	in	the	main	separator	are	much	lower	than	those	in	the	pre-separator.	The	exposure	of	focal	planes	FMF1	and	FMF2	to	the	high-intensity	beam	also	causes	higher	 levels	of	activation,	as	can	be	seen	in	Figure	15	[51].	The	residual	dose	in	the	main	separator	is	also	lower,	since	it	has	lower	levels	of	activation	than	the	pre-separator.	The	radiation	analysis	presented	 in	this	section	 indicates	that	the	main	separator	experiences	condi-tions	similar	to	those	of	the	existing	FRS,	with	the	second	half	of	the	pre-separator	exhibiting	similar	characteristics	 to	 the	current	FRS	 target	region.	This	means	 that,	with	regard	 to	 the	RH	system	and	logistics	concept,	the	experiences	and	lessons	learned	from	the	FRS	can	be	implemented	in	the	Super-FRS.	
Figure 75. FLUKA simulation for beam catchers inside the hotcell with 1 m thick walls after 120
days of cooling.
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Figure 76. Main separator radiations prompt dose rates.
3.3.1.3 Studies of the Super-FRS facility layoutTo	develop	the	requirements	for	the	RH	system	and	logistics,	it	is	critically	important	to	conduct	a	de-tailed	analysis	of	the	beamline	facility	(Figure 77),	as	is	being	presented	here.	Specifically,	in	order	to	define	the	requirements	for	the	RH	task	sequence,	it	is	important	to	answer	the	following	questions:	
· What	parts	require	RH?	(Record	their	size,	weight,	location,	fragility,	etc.)	
· Which	path	must	be	followed	during	the	RH	task	sequence?	
· What	forms	the	interface	between	the	components	and	the	RH	systems?	
· What	are	the	space	requirements	for	the	RH	system?	
· What	level	of	dexterity	is	required	during	RH	tasks?	
· Are	there	environmental	issues	(e.g.	heat,	fire,	chemical)?	
· How	many	operations	need	to	be	carried	out	during	RH?	
· How	 fragile	 is	 the	surrounding	environment?	 (e.g.	 the	beamline	 is	designed	 to	very	delicate,	and	any	damage	to	the	beamline	can	disrupt	facility	operations)	
· Are	there	any	access	issues?	(e.g.	reachability,	obstruction,	power	supply,	or	commination	sig-nal	losses)	In	order	 to	study	 the	 layout	of	 the	Super-FRS	 facility,	comprehensive	studies	were	conducted	of	 the	system	designs	 (see	Appendix	 I)[122][127].	Based	on	 an	 analysis	of	 the	 Super-FRS	 facility	plans,	 it	became	clear	 that	 the	 facility	could	be	divided	 into	 three	major	sections	 for	RH	purposes:	 the	 target	area,	the	separator	main	tunnel	and	the	hotcell	region.		The	rest	of	this	chapter	addresses	the	RH	logis-tics	of	the	Super-FRS	facility;	however,	 in	order	to	present	the	research	at	a	sufficient	 level	of	detail,	this	is	primarily	limited	to	the	RH	logistics	of	the	separator	main	tunnel.		
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Figure 77. Super-FRS RH regions
3.3.1.4 Requirements development results and RH challengesDetailed	requirements	for	the	Super-FRS	Main	Tunnel	Remote	Handling	(MTRH)	system	were	devel-oped	and	documented	as	part	of	this	research.	The	requirements	development	was	carried	out	in	col-laboration	with	 the	engineers	and	physicists	at	 the	existing	GSI	Fragment	Separator.	As	part	of	 this	process,	one-on-one	and	group	meetings	were	conducted	in	order	to	further	understand	the	environ-ment	of	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel	and	its	RH	needs.	The	detailed	requirements	were	documented	in	the	form	of	Systems	Requirement	Documents	(SRDs),	which	is	provided	in	Appendix	II.			The	process	of	requirements	development	enabled	the	identification	of:	the	equipment	requiring	RH;	the	basic	configuration	of	the	Super-FRS	RH	environment,	a	functional	tree	of	the	RH	task,	an	interface	map	between	the	components	of	the	system	and	environment,	a	aintenance	plan	and	classification	of	equipment	requiring	maintenance;	and	the	Technical	Performance	Measures.	These	are	expanded	 in	detail	in	the	following	pages:			
· Equipment	requiring	RH:	 	RH	 in	 the	 Super-FRS	 tunnel	primarily	 involves	 the	 exchange	of	beamline	inserts.	This	involves	the	removal	and	replacement	of	vertical	cartridges,	as	shown	in	
Figure	78.	The	task	also	involves	the	transportation	of	activated	beamline	inserts	to	their	cor-rect	 locations	within	the	 tunnel,	as	well	as	 the	retrieval	of	 the	active	beamline	 inserts	 to	 the	storage	area.	The	focal	points	FPF2,	FPF3,	FPF4	and	FMF	2	(Figure 79)	have	critical	X-slit,	Y-slit	and	degrader	wedge/disc	elements	that	directly	interact	with	the	beam.	Hence,	these	piec-es	of	equipment	are	 the	most	activated	beamline	 inserts	which	require	remote	maintenance.	
Table	4	provides	 a	detailed	 list	of	 the	Super-FRS	main	 tunnel	beamline	chambers	 requiring	remote	maintenance.	Many	of	the	beamline	inserts	have	different	dimensions,	shapes	and	sizes	(see	Appendix	 III).	 In	 total,	26	beamline	 inserts	centered	on	 four	 focal	areas	will	require	re-mote	maintenance	during	the	lifespan	and	operation	of	the	FAIR	facility.		
· The	basic	configuration	of	the	Super-FRS	RH	environment:	The	basic	configuration	is	com-posed	primarily	of	the	FRS	main	tunnel,	the	vacuum	chambers,	the	beamline	inserts,	the	con-nector	plates	and	 the	hotcell.	Based	on	 the	analysis	performed,	 two	key	drawbacks	were	de-
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tected	in	the	design	of	the	Super-FRS:	i)	a	lack	of	a	temporary	storage	facility	within	the	tunnel	and	ii)	the	lack	of	a	decontamination	area	for	the	RH	equipment	at	the	final	parking	area.	The	analysis	also	identified	the	key	parking	positions	for	the	RH	equipment,	as	well	as	the	need	for	
a	power	 supply.	Figure 79	 shows	 the	key	RH	points	 and	 travel	paths	within	 the	 Super-FRS	tunnel.		
Table 4. Super-FRS chambers (including dimensions and equipment) in the tunnel that require
remote maintenance. The focal planes termed FPF are located in the pre-separator section of the
Super-FRS, and the focal planes termed FMF are located in the main separator of the Super-FRS.FPF	 Chamber	Dimension	Length,	width,	height/mm	 Beamline	insert	
2	 3352*970*1280	 Beam	stop	Single	detector	X-slits	Scintillator	detector	Degrader	discs	Degrader	wedges	and	plates	Detector	(space	reserved)	Single	detector	
3	 990*720*1130	 Y-slits	XY-detectors	
4	 3552*970*1130	 XY-detectors	PDC	detector	Reserved	space	Y-slits	Secondary	target	X-slits	TOF-Detectors	XY-detectors	FMF	 Chamber	Dimension	Length,	width,	height	/mm	 Beamline	Insert	2a	 1190*970*1130	 XY-detector	X-slits	2b	 1195*720*280	 Y-slits	Degrader	discs	Degrader	wedges	and	plates	Finger	detector	2c	 1154*660*1130	 TOF	Detector	XY-Detector	
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Figure 78. Interface points of the Super-FRS focal plane vacuum chamber, beamline insert and
connector plate.
Figure 79. Basic configuration of the Super-FRS main tunnel RH area.
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· Functional	tree	of	the	RH	task:	The	functional	tree	of	the	Super-FRS	RH	system	was	identi-fied	based	on	the	system’s	RH	task	sequence.	The	functional	tree	provides	a	three-layer	hierar-chy,	which	divides	the	functions	 into	various	 layers.	The	functions	are	 later	used	as	compari-son	 tools	 to	track	 the	different	 features	of	the	RH	system.	These	basic	 functions	must	be	 ful-filled	 by	 the	 developed	 RH	 equipment.	 The	 basic	 functions	 for	 Super-FRS	 main	 tunnel	 RH	equipment	are	listed	in	the	following	Table 5.	
Figure 80. Initial functional tree of the MTRH system.
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Table 5. Breakdown of basic functions into sub-functions of the Super-FRS main tunnel’s RH
equipment.
	S.No.	 Function	
1	 To	conduct	remote	maintenance	 in	 the	Super-FRS	main	 tunnel	using	the	MTRH	system.	(i.e.	To	install	new	beamline	inserts	and	retrieve	used	or	activated	beamline	inserts.)	1.1	 To	protect	the	working	personnel	from	radiation	during	maintenance	and	to	minimize	doses.	1.1.1	 To	minimize	human	presence	in	the	main	tunnel	during	remote	maintenance	tasks	(ALARA).	1.1.2	 To	provide	mobile	RH	equipment	 that	can	conduct	 remote	maintenance	 tasks	 (i.e.,	 remove,	store	and	transfer	beamline	inserts).	1.1.3	 To	provide	shielding	from	radiation	to	negate	harmful	effects	to	both	humans	and	on-board	electronic	equipment.	1.2	 To	 handle	 (manipulate,	 repair,	 store,	 hold	 and	 transfer)	 beamline	 inserts	 during	 remote	maintenance.	1.2.1	 To	remove	activated	beamline	inserts,	securely	hold	the	activated	beamline	inserts	and	install	new	beamline	inserts.	1.2.2	 To	securely	transfer	beamline	 inserts	during	remote	maintenance	and	to	eliminate	the	need	for	decontamination.		1.2.3	 To	handle	connector	plates	during	maintenance	(i.e.	 to	remove	and	 install	connector	plates	from	beamline	inserts	during	maintenance).	1.2.4	 To	conduct	remote	inspections	of	the	beamline	equipment	and	their	surroundings	in	the	main	tunnel.		1.3	 To	maintain	compatibility	with	the	interacting	environment.	1.3.1	 To	create	a	unified	lifting	interface	for	various	beamline	interfaces	and	the	equipment	requir-ing	RH.	1.3.2	 To	maintain	compatibility	with	tunnel	dimensions	(i.e.,	to	achieve	movement	across	the	tun-nel).	1.3.3	 To	maintain	compatibility	with	equipment	requiring	RH	(i.e.,	to	ensure	co-existence	with	tun-nel	equipment).	1.4	 To	power	the	system	during	the	RH	task	sequence.	1.4.1	 To	power	the	mobile	system	during	transportation.	1.4.2	 To	 power	 the	 RH	 equipment	 when	 performing	 tasks	 like	 the	 removal	 and	 installation	 of	beamline	inserts.	
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· Interface	map:	Since	complex	systems	have	multiple	interfaces,	it	is	very	important	to	identify	and	document	them.	An	interface	refers	to	the	functional	and	physical	characteristics	required	at	a	common	boundary	between	two	or	more	systems,	end	products,	enabling	products	or	sub-systems.	Functional	and	physical	interfaces	include	physical,	electrical,	electronic,	mechanical,	hydraulic,	 pneumatic,	 optical,	 software	 and	 control	 interfaces.	 At	 this	 stage,	 it	 is	 most	 im-portant	to	 identify	the	key	physical	and	control	 interfaces;	due	the	fact	the	 interfaces	are	the	most	critical	shaping	factors	in	RH	system	design.	Therefore,	in	the	case	of	the	Super-FRS,	we	are	currently	only	investigating	these.	The	interface	map	is	shown	in	Figure 81.	It	shows	both	the	 control	 and	 physical	 interface	 connections	 between	 the	 MTRH	 system,	 the	 Super-FRS	equipment	and	disposal	equipment.	The	different	types	of	interfaces	are	defined	in	detail	with-in	the	requirements	document.	The	interface	identification	process	enables	the	system	design	engineers	to	specifically	identify	the	key	RH	requirements	and	critical	design	issues.	
Figure 81. Super-FRS MTRH system interface map. The solid lines represents mechanical inter-
face and the dotted lines shows the control interface.
· Maintenance	plan	(classification	of	equipment	requiring	maintenance):	It	is	critically	im-portant	to	classify	and	categorize	the	equipment	that	requires	remote	maintenance,	in	order	to	allow	 the	development	of	RH	 task	 sequences	 for	maintenance	 and	 the	development	of	 ade-quate	systems	and	tools	to	carry	out	that	maintenance.	RH	classes	and	categorizations	of	the	equipment	requiring	remote	maintenance	enable	the	designer	to	define	the	system	functions	
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and	 interfaces.	Based	on	 the	 frequency	of	planned	maintenance	and	 the	 likelihood	of	 failure,	four	RH	(RH)	classes	were	defined:	
o RH	class	1	=	components	requiring	regular,	planned	replacement	
o RH	class	2	=	components	likely	to	require	repair	or	replacement	
o RH	class	3	=	components	that	are	not	expected	to	require	maintenance	or	replacement	during	the	lifetime	of	the	facility,	but	would	need	to	be	replaced	remotely	in	the	event	of	failure		
o RH	class	4	=	components	that	do	not	require	RH	
Table 6	 lists	 and	 classifies	 the	 equipment	 that	may	 require	RH	during	 the	FAIR	operational	lifecycle.	
	In	addition	to	such	RH	classes,	it	is	important	to	further	divide	the	equipment	in	order	to	de-termine	the	facility’s	downtime.		Based	on	the	survey	study,	the	remote	maintenance	for	acti-vated	parts	can	be	divided	into	two	categories:	scheduled	and	unscheduled.	Each	of	the	afore-mentioned	categories	can	be	further	subdivided	into	two	sections,	depending	on	time	and	re-source	constraints:	long-term	maintenance	(LTM)	and	short-term	maintenance	(STM).	For	the	Super-FRS	 facility,	remote	maintenance	(scheduled	or	unscheduled)	was	divided	using	 these	concepts	of	LTM	and	STM,	as	shown	in	the	RH	operational	status	table	(Table 7).		At	this	stage,	it	is	still	not	clear	how	the	beamline	insert	will	behave	during	facility	operations	or	how	often	maintenance	will	be	needed.		
	
Table 6. RH classification of Super-FRS main tunnel beamline equipment.
RH	Class	 Beamline	component	
1	,2	 Connection	plate	1,2	 Experiment	specific	instrumentation	2,4	 X	and	Y	slits	2,4	 Degrader	disk	
2	 Drivers	for	beamline	inserts	2,4	 Degrader	wedges	
3	 Magnets	and	vacuum	Chambers	
4	 Permeant	detector	
· Technical	Performance	Measures	(TPMs):	To	develop	the	Super-FRS	concept	design,	which	is	detailed	in	the	following	section,	it	is	important	to	identify	the	key	technical	and	operational	parameters.	Technical	performance	measures	(TPMs)	were	used	to	identify	key	technical	per-formance	parameters	for	the	Super-FRS	RH	concept	design.	Table 8	provides	a	 list	of	the	key	TPMs	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system,	which	can	used	for	the	development	of	concept	designs.		
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Table 7. RH operational maintenance status table (Inspired from ITER approach).
Super-FRS	Operation	State	
	
Long	Term	
Maintenance	
(LTM)	
Short	Term	
Maintenance	
(STM)	
Test	&	
Conditioning	
State		
(TCS)	
Short	Term		
Stand-by				
(STS)	RH	shut	down	operations	state:	 X	 	 	 	Scheduled	vacuum	chamber,	magnets	 X	 	 	 	Unscheduled	vacuum	chamber,	magnets	 X	 	 	 	Scheduled	target	area	beam	line	inserts		 X	 	 	 	Unscheduled	 target	 area	 beam	 line	 inserts	(pre-separator)	 X	 	 	 	Scheduled	 beam	 line	 inserts	 (main	separator)	 X	 X	 	 	Unscheduled	 beam	 line	 inserts	 (main	separator)	 X	 X	 	 	Schedule	inspection	of	beamline	inserts	 	 X	 	 	Unscheduled	inspection	of	beamline	insert	 	 X	 	 	RH	shutdown	maintenance	state:	 X	 	 	 	Failure	 recovery/rescue	 of	 shutdown	equipment	 X	 	 	 	Scheduled	 maintenance	 on	 shutdown	equipment	 X	 	 	 	Unscheduled	 maintenance	 on	 shutdown	equipment	 X	 	 	 	Test	stand	mock-up	operations	state	 	 X	 X	 X	Test	stand	operations	 	 X	 X	 X	Failure	 recovery/rescue	 of	 RH	 test	 stand	equipment	 	 X	 X	 X	Planned	 RH	 test	 stand	 equipment	maintenance	 	 X	 X	 X	Unplanned	 RH	 test	 stand	 equipment	maintenance	 	 X	 X	 X	RH	equipment	maintenance	state:	 X	 X	 X	 X	Planned	RH	equipment	maintenance	 X	 X	 X	 X	
	
101
Table 8. MTRH system technical performance parameters
S.No.	 Remote	maintenance	system	design	requirements	1.	 To	conduct	remote	maintenance		
		1.1.	 			Removal	and	installation	of	connector	plates	
		1.2.	 			Removal	and	installation	of	heavy	beamline	insert	up	to	750kgs	(plus	safety	factor)	
		1.3.	 				Safe	environment	for	operator	
		1.4.	 			Longest	beamline	insert		to	be	handled	2080mm	2.	 Remote	inspection	of	surroundings	3.	 Transport	of	activated	parts	(within	tunnel)	(2x176m)	4.	 Transport	of	activated	parts	(	to	main	hot	cell)	(2x500m)	5.	 Remote	maintenance	on	beamline	insert	
		5.1.	 					Minor	repairs	(short	term	maintenance	i.e.	inspection)	
		5.2.	 					Major	replacements	and	repairs	(Long	term	maintenance	 i.e.	repair	and	replacement	of	parts)	includes	transfer	of	equipment	to	hot-cell.	
		5.3.	 					Disposal	of	activated	components	(HotCell)	6.	 Suitable	remote	handling	 lifting	point	2295mm	(Critical	 for	 lifting	 interface	design	and	connector	plate	design	position	for	beamline	inserts)	7.		 Parking	space	maximum	width	for	remote	maintenance	equipment	3047mm	(Critical	for	remote	handling	system	parking	interface	design)	one	side	of	the	tunnel.	8.	 Remote	 maintenance	 equipment	 must	 be	 prevented	 from	 becoming	activated/contaminated	itself	
3.3.1.5 Output of the Super-FRS facility studyDuring	this	first	part	of	the	requirements	development	stage,	we	were	able	to	identify:	
· The	key	radiation	hotspots	within	the	Super-FRS	facility.	
· A	list	of	equipment	requiring	remote	maintenance.	
· The	RH	environment.	
· The	system	interfaces.	
· System	functional	capabilities	and	operational	needs.	
· Classification	of	equipment	requiring	RH.	
· Non-functional	requirements.	
102
· Technical	performance	parameters.	
· Technical	performance	parameters	
3.3.2 State of the Art survey and existing concept analysis
3.3.2.1 Existing concept analysisTo	effectively	develop	a	new	RH	concept,	it	is	critically	important	to	study	any	existing	concept	solu-tions	which	have	 already	been	developed.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	Super-FRS,	engineers	had	already	pro-posed	two	RH	concepts	before	this	research	work	began.	The	experience	at	the	existing	GSI	FRS	target	area	had	prompted	engineers	to	adopt	the	same	solutions	for	the	remote	maintenance	of	the	Super-FRS.	However,	the	studies	performed	in	this	research	revealed	that	this	approach	would	not	be	suita-ble,	due	to	the	differences	between	the	two	environments.		The	concepts	suggested	for	the	Super-FRS	at	the	FAIR	facility	included	the	installation	of	two	industri-al	robots	on	FPF2	and	FPF4	to	carry	out	remote	maintenance,	as	well	as	the	installation	of	a	single	in-dustrial	robot	mounted	on	guide	rails	to	move	across	the	tunnel.			
Concept	one:	Stationary	 industrial	robots:	The	 first	 concept	was	 to	deploy	 two	 industrial	 robots	with	partial	mobility	to	carry	out	RH	tasks	within	the	main	tunnel	using	a	guide	rail.	The	concept	was	in	its	initial	phases;	however,	problems	were	identified	following	the	initial	radiation	assessment	and	main	tunnel	layout	design	analysis	for	the	Super-FRS	facility.	The	problems	were	as	follows:	The	first	concept	was	to	deploy	two	 industrial	robots	with	partial	mobility	(via	a	guide	rail)	to	carry	out	RH	tasks	within	 the	main	tunnel.	At	the	beginning	of	 this	research,	 the	concept	was	 in	 its	 initial	phases;	however,	problems	were	 identified	following	the	 initial	radiation	assessment	and	analysis	of	the	main	tunnel	layout.	The	problems	were	as	follows:	
· The	 industrial	 robots	would	 accumulate	 high	 radiation	 doses	 during	 beam	 operations	 and,	hence,	may	be	damaged.	The	on-board	electronics	would	be	the	first	to	suffer	damage	due	the	high	level	of	prompt	doses.	
· The	industrial	robots	will	cover	a	restricted	beamline	area	and	would	not	be	flexible	enough	to	carry	out	additional	tasks.	
· The	logistics	to	retrieve	the	activated	beamline	inserts	from	FPF2	and	FPF	3	would	be	severely	compromised.	
· During	 emergencies,	 access	 to	 the	 beamline	 for	 human	 intervention	would	 be	 severely	 re-stricted.	
· The	design	included	a	temporary	storage	area	for	beamline	inserts	within	the	tunnel	that	can	cause	radiation	protection	issues	within	the	tunnel.	
· In	the	event	of	accidents,	the	robots	could	become	activated	and	would	have	to	be	termed	radi-ation	waste	due	to	contamination.	
· No	decontaminant	area	within	the	tunnel	was	identified	for	the	RH	equipment.	
· The	transport	and	post-processing	concepts	of	the	activated	beamline	insert	were	not	defined	and	neither	were	the	disposal	issues.	
Concept	two:	Mobile	 industrial	robot	on	ground-mounted	guide	rails:	This	concept	design	pro-posed	the	installation	of	a	six-axis	industrial	robot	on	ground-mounted	guide	rails.	The	concept	design	was	based	on	the	experiences	of	existing	solutions	in	ISOLDE,	CERN,	and	the	aforementioned	GSI	FRS.		It	was	found	to	be	much	more	acceptable	than	the	first	concept	solution;	however,	the	guide	rail	instal-lation	was	a	major	hurdle.	Specifically,	the	conceptual	guide	rails	presented	the	following	issues:	
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· Robot	ground	rails	 leads	to	restricted	tunnel	access,	due	to	additional	equipment	presence	 in	the	tunnel.	In	the	case	of	a	magnet	or	vacuum	chamber	failure,	removal	of	both	the	RH	system	and	 the	 rail	would	be	needed.	Hence,	 a	 system	 failure	would	cause	 a	major	 restructuring	of	equipment	within	 the	Super-FRS	main	 tunnel.	Such	restructuring	(including	removal	and	re-installation)	would	be	very	costly	and	time	consuming,	thus	adding	to	the	facility’s	down	time.	
· The	rail	itself	would	be	located	within	the	tunnel	during	beam	operations;	and	hence,	the	guide	rails	themselves	could	be	activated	during	the	facility’s	operations.	In	the	event	of	an	accident	or	contamination,	the	guide	rail	would	become	radioactive	waste	which	would	require	decon-tamination	before	it	could	be	retrieved	from	the	tunnel.	
· The	installation	of	guide	rail	was	found	to	be	very	expensive,	as	calculated	from	the	cost-per-meter	for	installation	and	maintenance	within	a	radioactive	environment.	Due	to	all	these	drawbacks,	it	was	necessary	to	rethink	and	redesign	the	entire	RH	system	and	logistics	concept	for	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel.	However,	although	the	concepts	themselves	were	not	used,	the	valuable	 lessons	 learned	 from	studying	 them	clearly	demonstrate	 the	 importance	of	such	 a	concept	analysis	within	the	SE	approach.	
3.3.2.2 State of the Art surveyThe	GSI	and	FAIR	facility	is	a	research	institution	with	a	limited	available	budget	for	the	development	of	bespoke	RH	equipment.	For	this	reason,	GSI/FAIR	does	not	tend	to	invest	in	developing	new	tech-nologies	for	remote	maintenance.	Instead,	it	selects,	modifies	and	adopts	existing	solutions	within	the	market	for	its	remote	maintenance	needs.	Since	the	requirements	for	the	RH	of	the	Super-FRS	facility	are	unique,	it	was	important	to	conduct	a	State	of	the	Art	survey	to	identify	the	key	technologies	that	could	be	used.	The	survey	was	conducted	 in	extensive	detail	to	study	the	various	RH	 logistics	within	HEP	facilities	around	the	world,	as	well	as	to	review	the	RH	techniques	used	in	the	decommissioning	of	the	nuclear	power	plants.	This	State	of	the	Art	survey	has	been	described	 in	detail	 in	Chapter	2	(see	Section	2.1	and	section	2.2).	The	RH	equipment	described	 in	the	survey	was	then	also	classified	and	generalized	to	facilitate	the	use	of	the	information	by	other	researchers	and	RH	engineers	wishing	to	apply	the	results	of	this	research	to	their	own	use	cases	(see	Section	2.3).	
3.3.2.3 Output of existing concept analysis and State of the Art surveyThe	analysis	of	existing	concepts	reveals	issues	with	the	RH	system	and	logistics	concepts	for	the	Su-per-FRS	main	tunnel.	Based	on	the	existing	concepts	analysis	following	issues	needs	to	be	considered	while	developing	Super-FRS	RH	concept:	
· The	RH	system	needs	to	be	mobile	in	order	to	avoid	radiation	exposure	and	conduct	RH	tasks	at	different	location	within	Super-FRS	tunnel	using	one	RH	system.	
· The	onboard	electronics	from	the	RH	system	needs	to	be	reduced,	protected	and	replaced	with	radiation	harden	electronics	to	eliminate	the	risk	of	electronics	damage	due	to	radiation	expo-sure.	
· Decontamination	area	and	system	is	needed	to	maintain	the	RH	equipment	in	operable	condi-tion.	
· The	installation	of	guiderails	on	the	ground	is	not	fishable	for	Super-FRS	mobile	robot	due	ra-diation	safety	issues,	due	to	tunnel	accessibility	for	personal	during	system	failure	or	emergen-cies,	due	to	the	high	cost	of	 installation	and	maintenance,	and	due	the	use	of	air-cushion	sys-tem	for	transporting	heavy	beamline	equipment	such	as	magnets.	
· A	safe	and	secure	storage	location	for	activated	beamline	inserts	needs	to	be	identified	and	de-veloped.	
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· Additional	system	for	transporting	active	beamline	inserts		within	beamline	and	hotcell	needs	to	be	developed	The	State	of	the	Art	survey	HEP	facilities,	technologies	and	logistics	techniques	enables	the	researcher:	
· To	identify	the	key	technologies	and	practices	currently	used	in	the	maintenance	and	decom-missioning	of	HEP	facilities	and	nuclear	power	plants.		
· The	analysis	output	is	mapped	in	the	form	of	equipment	classification	for	RH	design	purposes	(see	section	2.3).		
· The	survey	provides	a	detailed	list	of	the	technologies	and	companies	capable	of	providing	the	services	needed	for	the	Super-FRS;	however,	the	needs	of	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	and	lo-gistics	are	unique	 in	that	they	require	a	new	concept	design	using	existing	technologies	prior	to	the	initiation	of	the	equipment	development	phase.		
· The	survey	list	of	technologies	developed	during	the	survey	will	be	used	as	a	basis	for	the	de-velopment	of	RH	concepts.		
· The	survey	divides	HEP	facilities	 into	categories	in	order	to	systematically	study	the	relevant	RH	systems	and	document	the	shortcoming	in	each	RH	systems	and	logistic	designs.	The	identification	of	major	design	issues	at	an	early	stage	of	concept	development	based	on	experience	will	enable	the	designer	to	avoid	additional	costs	and	any	 loss	of	RH	functions	that	could	occur	once	the	facility	is	operational.		In	studying	current	State	of	 the	Art	systems,	especially	studies	 related	 to	 the	procurement	of	CERN	ISOLDE	robot	systems	and	GSI	robot	systems,	it	is	evident	that	the	requirements	development	process	is	currently	either	limited	or	non-existent.	System	implementation	starts	with	technical	specifications,	which	 lead	 to	 the	selection	of	 robots	 that	can	be	 installed	by	 a	company	 to	 carry	out	maintenance.	However,	logistics	are	often	ignored,	which	is	why	CERN	still	has	no	post-processing	facility	for	spent	targets	at	ISOLDE.	This	is	also	why	the	GSI	FRS	beamline	inserts	are	located	in	a	very	tight	space,	from	which	retrieval	 is	very	time-consuming	and	challenging.	The	existing	concept	studies	provide	insight	into	the	target	plane	and	help	to	establish	the	needs	of	the	MTRH	system.		
3.4 Concept design development
To	develop	the	concept	designs	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system,	the	TPM	was	compared	against	the	list	of	equipment	generated	by	the	State	of	the	Art	survey.	This	resulted	 in	a	 list	of	equipment	which	was	suitable	for	the	RH	needs	of	the	Super-FRS.	The	TPMs	from	the	requirements	development	pro-vided	the	technical	basis	for	the	concept	design	development.	 	 	During	this	process,	 it	was	critical	to	incorporate	the	following	considerations:	
· Teleoperated	vs.	fully	automated	operation	for	RH.	
· Shielding	to	protect	the	personnel	and	equipment.	
· Maintenance	of	the	RH	equipment.	
· Viewing	capabilities.	
· Risk	of	failure.	
· Radiation	tolerance	issues	of	equipment.	
· Access	to	maintenance	and	recovery.	
· Who	would	operate	and	maintain	the	system.
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Based	on	 the	 above	 considerations	 and	 the	TPM	 analysis	described	 above,	 three	 concept	 solutions	were	developed.	These	three	concept	solutions	are	based	on	the	use	of	COTS	equipment	which	fulfills	the	RH	needs	with	regards	to	reliability,	availability,	maintainability	and	safety.	Some	of	the	concept	designs	 include	COTS	equipment	that	will	require	modification	to	ensure	safe	use	within	a	radiation	environment.	The	Concept	Design	Document	 (CDD)	 (see	Appendix	 IV: Requirements and Functional
Analysis)	explains	the	concept	designs	in	detail,	along	with	the	RH	task	sequences	to	maintain	beam-line	inserts	in	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel.		
3.4.1 MTRH system concept one:  Fully automated mobile robot
3.4.1.1 MTRH system concept one componentsThe	MTRH	system	concept	one	(Figure 82)	consists	of:	
· Six-axis	(KUKA	Titan)	industrial	robot:	A	six-axis	robot	is	needed	to	perform	remote	manip-ulation	(i.e.	to	remove	and	 install	the	beamline	 insert	onto	the	vacuum	chamber	and	to	carry	out	the	connection	and	disconnection	of	the	control	panel).		
· Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	/	Automated	Guided	Vehicle	(AGV)):	Two	mobile	plat-forms	are	need	in	this	concept.	The	first	one	is	equipped	with	the	six-axis	robot	(KUKA	Titan),	
a	tool	system	for	the	KUKA	Titan,	a	guidance	system	to	guide	the	Omnimove	across	the	tunnel,	and	a	battery	pack	to	power	the	mobile	platform	during	the	transfer	between	the	maintenance	area	 (FPF	 2-4	 and	 FMF2)	 and	 the	 parking	 area	 (Figure 79).	The	 second	mobile	 platform	 is	equipped	with	shielding	container	to	transport	the	activated	beamline	inserts	to	hotcell.	
· Tools	for	RH:	The	robot	must	be	equipped	with	specific,	task-based	tools	to	carry	out	RH	tasks.	
· Shielding	container:	There	must	be	a	container	to	securely	hold	and	transport	the	activated	beamline	 insert	from	the	remote	maintenance	area	(FPF	2-4	and	FMF2)	to	parking	area	and,	later,	to	the	hotcell	(Figure 79).	The	hotcell	will	be	used	in	post-processing	of	the	beamline	in-serts.	
· Power	supply	system:	The	power	system	includes	a	battery	pack	to	power	the	MTRH	system	during	transportation	and	to	power	the	robot	supply	system	once	 it	 is	parked	at	the	mainte-nance	location.	In	the	event	of	a	power	failure,	a	redundant	power	supply	is	required	to	ensure	the	recovery	of	the	mobile	platform	and	the	robot.	
· Navigation:	To	safely	guide	 the	MTRH	system	across	 the	 tunnel,	an	autonomous	navigation	system	(laser	or	magnetic)	is	required.	The	navigation	system	will	be	used	to	avoid	collisions	when	guiding	the	robot	to	target	locations.	
· Parking	system:	 In	order	 to	 securely	park	 the	MTRH	 system,	 the	mobile	platform	must	be	equipped	with	a	parking	system	to	ensure	the	absolute	position	of	the	MTRH	system	within	the	environment.		The	parking	system	can	be	equipped	with	hydraulic	jacks.	
· Communication	system:	To	ensure	communication	between	the	robot	system	and	the	control	room,	dedicated	wireless	communication	equipment	 is	 required	 (e.g.	 leaky	cable,	Wi-Fi	net-work,	4G,	etc.).		
· Visual	feedback:	Networks	of	cameras	are	required	across	the	tunnel	and	on-board	the	MTRH	system	to	monitor	the	RH	tasks.	In	the	event	of	a	failure	in	automatic	mode,	a	camera	system	is	important	to	enable	the	manual	control	and	operation	of	the	MTRH	system.	
· Remotely	controlled	crane:	A	crane	must	be	used	to	rescue	the	robotic	system	in	the	event	of	failure.	
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3.4.1.2 MTRH system concept one: Task sequence (logistics)This	concept	(Figure 82)	is	based	on	the	idea	that	RH	is	carried	out	with	full	automation	and	minimal	presence	of	a	human-in-the-loop.	However,	 in	the	event	of	any	failure	within	the	MTRH	system’s	au-tomated	process,	a	human	operator	must	be	able	 to	 take	charge	 in	order	 to	minimize	system	down	time.	 	The	concept	also	requires	high	 levels	of	 	sensory	control	 	 to	carry	out	RH	tasks	automatically	within	the	Super-FRS	tunnel.	Also,	beamline	inserts	need	to	be	designed	to	be	compatible	with	RH	and	appropriate	interfaces	developed	for	tooling	and	connectors.	The	RH	task	sequence	for	this	concept	is:	
· The	first	mobile	platform,	fitted	with	the	six-axis	robot,	is	deployed	from	its	parked	state	to	the	remote	maintenance	position	(FPF	2-4	and	FMF	2).	The	mobile	platform	uses	a	battery	pack	to	power	automated	travel	between	the	two	locations	and	deploys	a	parking	system	to	park	the	MTRH	system	at	the	target	location	(with	an	accuracy	of	±2	mm)	using	optical	and	mechanical	guiding	mechanisms.	
· Once	the	mobile	platform	 is	parked	and	connected	to	a	power	source,	the	six-axis	robot	cali-brates	its	position	within	the	space	and	prepares	to	perform	the	remote	maintenance	task.	
· The	second	mobile	platform,	which	 is	equipped	with	a	shielding	box,	 is	moved	and	parked	 in	the	maintenance	 area	 (FPF	2-4	 and	FMF2)	 along	with	 a	new	beamline	 insert	on	board	 and	space	for	one	activated	beamline	insert.	
· The	six-axis	robot	carries	out	the	remote	manipulation	in	the	following	sequence:		
o Equips	itself	with	the	appropriate	tooling.	
o Carries	out	a	preliminary	inspection	of	the	surroundings.	
o Removes	the	connector	plate	from	the	beamline	insert	and	places	it	in	a	secure	location.	
o Removes	the	activated/damaged	beamline	insert	from	the	vacuum	chamber.	
o Securely	places	the	activated/damaged	beamline	insert	into	the	shielding	flask.	
o Lifts	the	new	beamline	insert	from	the	shielding	container.	
o Installs	the	new	beamline	insert	onto	the	vacuum	chamber	
o Attaches	the	connector	plate	to	the	new	beamline	insert.	
o Conducts	a	final	 inspection	to	ensure	that	the	 installations	of	the	beamline	 insert	and	connector	are	secure	
o Finally,	it	returns	to	its	home	state.	
· The	second	mobile	platform	is	retrieved	from	the	maintenance	area,	transporting	the	activated	beamline	insert	into	the	hotcell	for	storage,	remote	maintenance	or	disposal.	
· The	first	mobile	platform	is	retracted	from	the	maintenance	area	to	the	parking	position.		One	important	requirement	is	to	envelop	the	RH	equipment	in	a	protective	cover,	to	reduce	the	chance	of	contamination.	Before	 the	 final	parking,	 the	RH	equipment	must	pass	 through	a	decontamination	zone	within	the	access	tunnel,	to	ensure	that	it	is	free	from	radiation	or	active	contamination.	
3.4.2 MTRH system concept two: Teleoperated RH concept
3.4.2.1 MTRH system concept two: ComponentsThe	 second	 concept	 (Figure 82)	 is	 based	 on	 having	 a	 human-in-the-loop.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 carry	 out	maintenance	using	a	remotely	controlled	master	slave	manipulator.	The	components	of	 this	concept	consist	of:	
· Remotely	controlled	Master	Slave	Manipulator	:	Various	options	exist	for	the	telemanipula-tor,	that	includes:	electrically	powered	MT200	TAOs,	hydraulically	powered	Schilling	Titan	ro-bots,	pneumatically	powered	Festo	Exohands,	or	customized	industrial	robots.	The	telemanip-
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ulator	 is	equipped	with	 tools	and	visual	aids	 to	carry	out	 the	 remote	operation.	The	Master	Slave	Manipulator	is	directly	controlled	by	an	operator,	which	implies	trained	personnel.	It	al-so	means	 that	 there	 is	a	need	 is	 to	ensure	effective	communication	between	 the	master	and	slave	arms.	This	component	can	only	be	used	to	carry	out	fine	manipulations,	as	it	is	not	suita-ble	for	heavy	lifting.		
· Tools	 for	RH:	The	 robot	will	 also	be	 equipped	with	 task-specific	 tools	 to	 carry	out	various	parts	of	the	task	sequence.	
· Mobile	platform:	This	concept	consists	of	a	single	mobile	platform	that	is	used	for	transport-ing	the	RH	equipment	between	the	maintenance	area	(FPF	2-4	and	FMF2)	and	the	parking	area	(Figure 79).	The	mobile	platform	is	equipped	with	the	MSM	supports	battery	packs,	shielding,	and	bays	for	holding	the	activated	and	new	beamline	inserts.		
· Shielding	wall	and	fixture	for	MSM:	The	mobile	platform	has	shielding	to	encapsulate	the	ac-tivated	beamline	insert	and	protect	the	surroundings.	If	a	mechanical	MSM	were	to	be	adopted,	shielding	for	the	operator	would	also	require;	however,	in	this	case,	a	remotely	controlled	te-lemanipulator	is	the	right	option	to	minimize	human	presence	in	the	tunnel.	
· Remotely	controlled	mobile	crane:	To	lift	and	transfer	the	beamline	insert	between	the	vac-uum	chamber	and	 the	mobile	platform,	a	remotely	controlled	mobile	crane	 is	required.	This	heavy	lifting	can	only	be	performed	using	a	remotely	controlled	crane,	due	to	the	low	payload	capacity	of	the	Master	Slave	Manipulator.	
· Navigation:	To	safely	guide	 the	MTRH	system	across	 the	 tunnel,	an	autonomous	navigation	system	is	required,	using	either	laser	or	magnetic	technology.	This	navigation	system	is	used	to	avoid	collisions	when	guiding	the	robot	to	target	locations.	
· Parking	system:	In	order	to	securely	park	the	MTRH	system,	the	mobile	platform	needs	to	be	equipped	with	a	secure	parking	system	 to	ensure	 the	absolute	position	of	 the	MTRH	system	within	the	environment.		This	parking	system	can	be	equipped	with	hydraulic	jacks	to	lock	the	platform	in	position.	
· Communication	system:	To	ensure	communication	between	the	robot	system	and	the	control	room,	a	dedicated	wireless	communication	system	(e.g.,	leaky	cable,	Wi-Fi	network,	4G,	etc.)	is	required.		
· Visual	feedback:	Networks	of	cameras	across	the	tunnel	and	on	board	the	MTRH	system	are	required	to	monitor	the	RH	tasks.	In	the	event	of	failure	in	automatic	mode,	a	camera	system	is	important	to	enable	manual	control	and	operation	of	the	MTRH	system.	This	requires	certain	system	modifications,	including:	
· Protection	of	the	on-board	electronic	system	by	removal	or	replacement	of	electronics,	or	with	shielding.	
· Replacement	of	the	supplied	system	cables	with	radiation-hardened	cables.	
· Protection	from	contamination,	which	is	achieved	through	covering	up	the	MTRH	system	with	protective	cover.	
· Customized	tooling	to	carry	out	RH	tasks.	
· Modifications	to	the	connector	plate	interface	and	the	beamline	insert	handling	interface.	
· A	special	tool	to	allow	the	crane	to	lift	the	beamline	insert.	
3.4.2.2 MTRH system concept two: Task sequence (logistics)The	human-in-the-loop	idea	of	this	concept	means	that	the	RH	tasks	are	performed	as	a	human	would	perform	them	by	hand.	As	with	the	previous	concept,	the	beamline	insert	must	be	designed	for	RH	and	appropriate	interfaces	developed	(tooling	and	connectors).	The	RH	task	sequence	for	this	concept	is:	
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· The	mobile	platform	with	an	MTRH	system	 is	deployed	from	the	parking	state	to	the	remote	maintenance	position	 (FPF	2-4	and	FMF2	 in	Figure 79).	The	mobile	platform	uses	 a	battery	pack	to	power	its	automated	travel	between	the	two	locations,	and	it	deploys	a	parking	system	to	park	the	MTRH	system	at	the	target	location	(with	an	accuracy	of	±2mm)	using	optical	and	mechanical	guiding	(due	to	radiation).	The	mobile	platform	also	contains	new	beamline	inserts.	
· Once	the	mobile	platform	is	parked	and	connected	to	a	power	source,	the	MSM	can	be	used	to	perform	remote	maintenance	tasks.	
· The	remotely	controlled	crane,	equipped	with	tooling,	is	moved	and	parked	at	the	maintenance	area,	and	a	parking	system	is	deployed.	
· The	MSM	is	used	to	survey	the	surroundings	using	the	appropriate	tooling.	If	the	beamline	re-quires	remote	maintenance,	the	connector	plate	is	disconnected.		
· The	remotely	controlled	mobile	crane	 is	use	to	remove	the	beamline	 insert	from	the	vacuum	chamber	to	the	holding	bay	on	board	the	mobile	platform.	If	repairs	to	the	beamline	insert	can	be	performed	on-site,	then	they	are	carried	out	using	the	MSM.	If	the	beamline	insert	requires	remote	maintenance	 in	 the	 hotcell,	 it	 is	 securely	 stored	 away	 in	 the	 shielding.	The	 remote	crane	then	installs	the	new	beamline	insert	to	the	vacuum	chamber	from	the	mobile	platform.	
· The	MSM	 is	 used	 to	 visually	monitor	 the	 installation	 of	 the	 beamline	 insert.	The	 connector	plate	is	attached	to	beamline	insert,	and	the	MSM	conducts	a	remote	inspection	to	ensure	that	the	installation	process	is	complete.	
· The	remotely	controlled	crane	is	retrieved	from	the	maintenance	area	and	brought	to	the	park-ing	space.	
· The	mobile	platform,	 along	with	 the	MSM	 and	 activated	beamline	 insert,	 are	 also	 retrieved	from	the	maintenance	area	to	the	parking	space.	
· The	activated	beamline	 insert,	along	with	 the	shielding,	 is	 transferred	 into	 a	 secure	 transfer	box	to	transport	it	into	the	hotcell	for	storage,	remote	maintenance	or	disposal.	
· The	remotely	controlled	crane	and	MSM	are	both	decontaminated	and	parked	until	 the	next	RH	task	sequence.		
3.4.3 MTRH system concept three: Overhead robot RH concept
3.4.3.1 MTRH system concept three: ComponentsThis	third	concept	(Figure	82)	consists	of:	
· Overhead	gantry	coordinate	robot:	An	overhead	gantry	coordinate	robot	(the	Hager	Portal	stacker	PLF/Jumbo)	is	used	to	remove	and	install	beamline	inserts	from	the	vacuum	chamber	and	 to	 inspect	 the	 surroundings.	 It	 can	 also	 be	 used	 as	 an	 overhead	 crane	 to	 handle	 other	beamline	 components,	 such	 as	 vacuum	 chambers	 and	 vacuum	 motors.	 The	 robot	 can	 be	equipped	with	an	additional	six-axis	robotic	arm	 to	carry	out	remote	manipulations,	such	as	the	inspection	and	repair	of	cryogenics	or	repair	of	connector	plate	onsite.	The	removal	and	in-stallation	of	a	connector	plate	 is	done	automatically	to	reduce	the	complexity	of	the	RH	task.	The	gantry	robot	will	require	specific	 tooling	to	 lift,	remove	and	 install	 the	beamline	 inserts,	while	also	performing	 inspection	tasks.	The	gantry	robot	 is	programmed	to	carry	out	routine	RH	tasks	automatically;	however,	in	the	event	of	an	unstructured	task	sequence	or	a	failure	to	carry	out	a	task	autonomously,	human-in-the-loop	(manual)	control	is	essential.	
· Overhead	guide	rails:	Overhead	guide	 rails	serve	as	pathway	 for	 the	gantry	 robot	 to	move	across	the	Super-FRS	tunnel.	The	rails	must	be	equipped	with	communication	signals,	power	supplies	(without	umbilical	cords)	and	parking	stations	which	correspond	to	the	RH	tasks.	The	guide	rails	cover	the	whole	tunnel,	from	the	FPF	2-4	and	FMF2	to	the	parking	space.	
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· Tools	for	RH:	The	robot	will	also	be	equipped	with	task-specific	tools	for	the	different	parts	of	the	 task	 sequence.	 Mobile	 platform	 (KUKA	 Omnimove	 /	 Automated	 Guided	 Vehicle	
(AGV)):	 	A	mobile	platform	 is	required	 for	 this	concept.	 It	will	be	equipped	with	a	shielding	box,	a	parking	system,	a	guidance	system	to	guide	the	Omnimove	across	the	tunnel	and	a	bat-tery	back	 to	power	 the	mobile	platform	during	 the	 transfer	between	 the	maintenance	 area	(FPF	2-4	and	FMF2)	and	the	parking	area	(Figure 79).	
· Shielding	 container.	 The	 shielding	 container	 securely	 holds	 the	 activated	 beamline	 insert	during	transportation	from	the	remote	maintenance	area	to	the	parking	area.	Later,	the	shield-ing	container	is	moved	into	the	hotcell	for	post-processing	of	the	beamline	insert	(Figure 79).	
· Power	supply	system:	The	power	system	 includes	a	battery	pack	to	power	the	mobile	plat-form	during	 transportation,	as	well	as	a	power	supply	system	 to	power	 the	mobile	platform	once	it	is	parked	at	the	maintenance	location.	In	the	event	of	power	failure,	a	redundant	power	supply	will	be	required	 to	ensure	 the	recovery	of	 the	mobile	platform	and	robot.	The	gantry	robot	 is	powered	via	overhead	rails	both	during	 its	movement	across	tunnel	and	 its	work	on	RH	tasks.	
· Navigation:	To	safely	and	autonomously	guide	the	mobile	platform	across	the	tunnel,	a	navi-gation	system	 is	required,	using	 laser	or	magnetic	technology.	This	navigation	system	will	be	used	to	avoid	collisions	when	guiding	the	platform	to	target	location.	
· Parking	system:	In	order	to	securely	park,	the	mobile	platform	needs	to	be	equipped	with	a	secure	parking	system	to	ensure	the	absolute	position	of	the	MTRH	mobile	platform	within	the	environment.	This	can	be	equipped	with	hydraulic	 jacks	to	 lock	the	platform	 in	position.	The	gantry	robot	also	requires	a	secure	parking	location.	Finally,	the	overhead	guide	rails	must	be	able	to	bear	the	load	of	all	components	during	the	RH	tasks.	
· Communication	system:	To	ensure	communication	between	the	robot	system	and	the	control	room,	dedicated	wireless	communication	systems	(e.g.,	leaky	cable,	Wi-Fi	network,	4G,	etc.)	are	required.		
· Visual	feedback:	Networks	of	cameras	across	the	tunnel	and	on	board	the	MTRH	system	are	needed	to	monitor	the	RH	tasks.	In	the	event	of	failure	in	automatic	mode,	camera	systems	are	important	for	ensuring	the	manual	control	and	operation	of	the	MTRH	system.	
3.4.3.2 MTRH system concept three: Task sequence (logistics)This	concept	(Figure 82)	is	based	on	the	idea	that	RH	is	carried	out	with	full	automation	and	minimal	presence	of	a	human-in-the-loop	(only	in	special	circumstances).	However,	in	the	event	of	any	failure	within	 the	 automated	 process,	 a	 human	 operator	 must	 be	 able	 to	 take	 charge	 to	minimize	 system	downtime.		This	concept	also	requires	a	high	level	of	accuracy	and	the	beamline	insert,	vacuum	cham-ber,	connector	panel	and	tunnel	 layout	must	undergo	engineering	changes	to	 incorporate	the	appro-priate	RH	interfaces	(for	tooling	and	connectors).	The	RH	task	sequence	is	as	follows:	
· The	overhead	 gantry	 robot	 is	deployed	on	 guide	 rails	 from	 the	parking	 state	 to	 the	 remote	maintenance	position	(FPF	2-4	and	FMF2	 in	Figure 79).	The	overhead	gantry	 robot	 receives	power	from	the	guide	rail	during	the	automated	travel	between	the	two	locations.	Once	it	is	at	the	 target	 location,	 the	 overhead	 gantry	 robot	 parks	 there	 using	 electrical	 and	 mechanical	parking	mechanisms.	
· Once	 the	overhead	gantry	 robot	 is	parked	and	connected	 to	 a	power	source,	 the	 robot	cali-brates	its	position	within	the	space	and	prepares	to	perform	the	remote	maintenance	task.	
· The	mobile	platform,	 equipped	with	 the	 shielding	box,	 is	moved	 and	parked	 in	 the	mainte-nance	area.	It	holds	the	new	beamline	insert	and	space	for	one	activated	beamline	insert.		The	mobile	platform	is	powered	with	a	battery	pack	during	its	travel	and,	at	the	target	location,	is	connected	to	a	power	source	to	charge	the	battery	pack	and	operate	the	shielding	box.	
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· Once	the	overhead	robot	and	shielding	box	are	in	their	locations,	the	connector	plate	is	discon-nected	automatically.	
· The	overhead	gantry	robot	conducts	the	remote	manipulation	using	the	following	sequence:		
o Equips	itself	with	the	appropriate	tooling.	
o Carries	out	the	inspection	of	the	surroundings.	
o Removes	the	activated/damaged	beamline	insert	from	the	vacuum	chamber.	
o Securely	places	the	activated/damaged	beamline	insert	into	the	shielding	flask.	
o Lifts	the	new	beamline	insert	from	the	shielding	container.	
o Installs	the	new	beamline	insert	onto	the	vacuum	chamber.	
o The	connector	plate	is	connected	automatically.	
o Conducts	an	 inspection	to	ensure	that	the	 installations	of	the	beamline	 insert	and	the	connector	are	secure.	
o Retrieves	itself	to	its	home	state.	
· The	mobile	platform	with	the	shielding	box	is	retrieved	from	the	maintenance	area	and	used	to	transport	 the	 activated	beamline	 insert	 into	 the	hotcell	 for	 storage,	 remote	maintenance	or	disposal.	
· The	overhead	gantry	robot	is	retracted	from	the	maintenance	area	to	its	parking	position.		It	is	important	cover	the	RH	equipment	with	a	protective	cover	to	minimize	the	chances	of	contamina-tion.	Before	the	final	parking,	the	RH	equipment	must	pass	through	a	decontamination	zone	within	the	access	tunnel	in	order	ensure	that	it	is	free	of	radiation	and	active	contamination.	
3.4.4 Modifications to the MTRH new concept designs and beamline equipmentThe	COTS	equipment	used	 in	all	 three	of	 the	concept	designs	of	 the	MTRH	system	are	normally	de-signed	for	commercial	industrial	use.	Therefore,	most	of	the	equipment	is	not	designed	specifically	for	handling	nuclear	waste.	Major	modifications	are	required	 in	order	to	use	such	 industrial	systems	for	the	maintenance	task	sequences	within	the	Super-FRS.	These	modifications	include:	
· Removing	and	replacing	on-board	electronics	from	those	robotics	and	communication	systems	which	 are	not	designed	 for	 survival	within	 radioactive	 environments.	These	 electronics	 are	removed	to	a	safe	distance,	replaced	with	radiation-hardened	electronics	or	provided	shielding.	This	step	protects	the	MTRH	system	from	failure.	
· Replacing	normal	cables	with	radiation-hardened	cables	to	ensure	safe	system	operation.	
· Selecting	 industrial	 equipment	 which	 has	 been	 designed	 for	 harsh	 environments,	 such	 as	foundry	robots.	Such	equipment	requires	fewer	modifications.			
· Taking	protective	measures	to	avoid	contamination	of	the	RH	equipment.	A	decontamination	area	 is	required	 if	 there	 is	any	danger	of	contamination	during	 the	RH	 tasks.	Contamination	protection	should	also	cover	the	MTRH	system.	
· Creating	customized	tools	to	conduct	RH	activities.		
· Modifying	the	vacuum	chamber,	beamline	inserts	and	connector	panel	designs	for	concepts	2	and	3.	
· Installing	guide	rails,	temporary	storage	areas	for	activated	beamline	inserts	and	decontamina-tion	areas,	all	of	which	will	require	major	facility	change	requests.	
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Figure 82. Concept designs for the Super-FRS MTRH system.
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3.4.5 Key RH changes identified during the concept designsThe	MTRH	systems	and	 logistics	concept	designs	studies	revealed	12	major	 issues	with	the	facility’s	current	planning,	design	and	RH	systems.	It	also	revealed	several	changes	which	can	be	solve	the	 is-sues.	These	issues	and	solutions	include:	
· The	need	for	a	temporary	storage	space	to	store	reusable	beamline	 inserts	within	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel.		
· The	need	for	additional	space	for	parking,	mockup	testing	and	repairs	of	the	MTRH	system.	
· The	need	for	a	decontamination	area	within	the	tunnel.	
· The	potential	for	unnecessary	radiation	exposure	to	any	MTRH	systems	parked	 in	the	tunnel	during	beam	operation.	MTRH	system	components	exposed	to	radiation	doses	can	be	damaged	or	activated.	
· The	impracticality	of	the	MTRH	system’s	initial	concept	designs	(see	section	3.3.2.1)	due	to	the	lack	of	mobility	within	the	tunnel.	These	initial	designs	proposed	that	the	MTRH	system	com-ponents	were	either	installed	on	fixed	stations	or	set	on	guide	rails	on	the	ground.	This	would	have	prevented	access	to	the	tunnel	 in	the	case	that	magnets,	vacuum	chambers	or	activated	beamline	parts	needed	to	be	recovered.	
· The	need	for	a	mobile	shielding	container	to	transfer	the	activated	beamline	 inserts	from	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel	region	to	the	hotcell.		
· The	need	 for	 a	 redundant	system	 (e.g.	an	extra	mobile	crane)	 in	 the	event	of	MTRH	system	equipment	failure.	
· The	sensitivity	of	modern	robotics	systems	to	radiation	damage,	due	to	their	electronics.	These	electronics	need	to	be	reduced,	replaced	with	radiation-hardened	equipment	and/or	shielded	in	order	to	ensure	reliable	operation	of	the	MTRH	system.	
· The	 tunnel	 space	 analysis	 revealed	 that	 the	KUKA	Titan	 is	 currently	 the	only	 six-axis	 robot	which	is	capable	of	conducting	heavy-duty	RH	to	the	specifications	required	of	this	application.	
· The	beamline	insert	designed	at	the	FAIR	partner	institution	must	be	designed	for	RH.	The	Su-per-FRS	beamline	 inserts	must	have	universal	handling	points	and	 interfaces	with	the	MTRH	system.	
· Before	this	research	began,	there	was	underdeveloped	planning	of	the	logistics	(task	sequenc-es)	required	to	carry	out	RH	within	the	tunnel.	
· The	cost	estimates	 for	MTRH	systems	and	 its	operations	 is	currently	overly	 limited	 in	the	 in	the	FAIR	budget.	These	will	need	to	be	re-adjusted	if	the	MTRH	system	is	to	be	built.	
3.5 Tradeoff analysis for the selection of an MTRH system design for
the Super-FRS tunnel
3.5.1 Survey of RH experts to identify key features of RH systems for a tradeoff
analysisIn	order	to	select	suitable	equipment	for	the	MTRH	system,	a	detailed	tradeoff	analysis	was	required	for	the	three	main	concepts	(see	section	3.4).	Interaction	with	several	experts	within	the	RH	field	was	deemed	necessary	 in	order	to	ensure	that	the	tradeoff	analysis	was	based	on	correct	assumptions	of	the	information	gained	in	the	State	of	the	Art	survey.	The	personnel	in	contact	with	the	development	of	RH	equipment	were	considered	suitable	individuals	to	provide	realistic	and	useful	information	for	this	
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purpose.	However,	surprisingly,	RH	 research	 teams	have	had	very	 limited	contact	with	such	RH	ex-perts.	The	lack	of	contact	among	the	different	RH	sectors	can	be	attributed	to:	
· Incentive:	Companies	are	sometimes	 involved	 in	fulfilling	contracts	and,	thus,	 lack	 incentives	to	 interact	with	 researchers.	Unlike	 research	 activities,	 industry	 activities	 are	mainly	profit-oriented.	
· Accessibility:	Researchers	may	find	it	difficult	to	contact	industry	professionals	due	to	a	lack	of	networking	opportunities	with	businesses.
· Reluctance:	Researchers	may	be	reluctant	to	contact	businesses	due	the	nature	of	the	(compet-itive)	research	or	other	reasons.	
· Specificity:	Research	 is	conducted	 in	an	open-ended	manner	and	 the	questions	asked	during	research	are	correspondingly	open-ended.	However,	industry	businesses	require	more	target-ed	and	focused	lines	of	questioning.	Despite	these	challenges,	it	was	first	necessary	to	contact	RH	experts	and	users	within	different	indus-trial	and	research	settings.	In	this	way,	the	tradeoff	analysis	could	be	based	on	key	features	considered	critical	within	the	RH	community.	This,	in	turn,	would	assure	a	better	assessment	of	the	MTRH	concept	designs.		Due	to	the	difficulties	in	receiving	suitable	written	feedback	from	industry	professionals,	it	was	decid-ed	to	conduct	a	survey	based	on	group	meetings	and	presentations.	The	feedback	was	not	only	limited	to	comments	made	during	group	meetings.	The	participants	were	also	encouraged	to	provide	feedback	via	email,	allowing	them	to	participate.	The	PURESAFE	network	provided	the	platform	for	bridging	the	gap	between	research	and	industry.	The	survey	was	divided	into	two	phases:	
· First	phase:	 A	 group	meeting	was	 held,	 during	which	 the	MTRH	 system	 requirements	 and	concepts	were	presented	in	detail.	The	meeting	sought	to	find	answers	to	the	following	ques-tions:	
o What	practices	are	most	often	used	to	evaluate	RH	concept	designs?	
o What	tradeoff	analysis	would	designers	like	to	perform,	but	feel	incapable	of	perform-ing	at	the	concept	stage?	
o What	are	the	expert	opinions	of	the	Super-FRS	concept	designs	and	their	tradeoff	anal-ysis?	The	 application	 specific	 questions	 above	 sought	 to	 answer	 to	 the	 following,	 more	 general,	questions:	
o What	are	the	most	common	practices	for	tradeoff	analysis	across	the	industry?	
o What	are	the	essential	features	critical	to	a	tradeoff	analysis	for	RH	equipment?	
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In	the	meetings,	participants	were	asked	to	provide	open	feedback	on	a	list	of	key	features	for	tradeoff	analyses	of	RH	equipment.	Based	on	detailed	group	meetings	with	experts	from	vari-ous	institutions,	lists	of	key	factors	were	identified.	These	are	summarized	in	Table 9.	
· Second	phase:	The	 list	of	key	factors	(Table 9)	was	emailed	to	RH	experts	and	presented	in	group	meetings	for	a	second	review.		In	order	to	determine	the	importance	of	each	factor,	the	experts	were	requested	to	review	each	one	and	assign	a	weighting.	The	right	column	of	Table
9	provides	average	normalized	weighting	factors	based	on	the	RH	experts’	opinions,	the	higher	the	number	the	greater	the	importance	in	the	tradeoff	analysis.	
Table 9. List of key factors for the RH concept tradeoff analysisS.No	 Key	factors	for	the	tradeoff	analysis		 Average	normalized	weighting	factor	1	 Reliability	 and	 availability	 of	 RH	 equipment	 within	 the	 Super-FRS	 envi-ronment	(redundancy	and	recoverability	of	the	system	in	the	event	of	RH	system	failure	during	RH	operations,	which	could	lead	to	contamination).	 16.95	2	 Maintenance	 issues	 with	 RH	 equipment	 (maintenance	 requirements	 and	procedures	 for	 RH	 equipment,	 including	 the	 ease	 of	 the	 RH	 system’s	maintenance,	the	cost	of	the	RH	system’s	maintenance	and	the	waste	gen-erated	during	the	RH	system’s	maintenance).	
6.4	
3	 Parking	and	working	positioning	of	 the	equipment	within	 the	Super-FRS	environment	 (exposure	 to	 radiation:	What	 type	of	environment	does	 the	RH	system	need	to	survive	during	maintenance	and	while	the	system	is	not	used?	What	dose	is	accumulated	due	to	radiation	exposure?).	
7.25	
4	 Complexity	of	the	RH	equipment’s	design	and	operation	(number	of	tasks	that	need	to	be	performed	by	the	RH	equipment).	 7.85	5	 Response	time	 for	maintenance	tasks	(how	 fast	the	RH	equipment	can	be	mobilized).	 3.55	6	 Capability	 for	 load	 handling	 (according	 to	 the	 Super-FRS	 main	 tunnel	needs).	 6	7	 Control	choice	for	RH	equipment	(automated	or	telemanipulated).	 5.9	8	 Negation	or	reduction	of	the	radiation	doses	suffered	by	personnel	during	maintenance.	 14.35	9	 Compatibility	 with	 the	 changing	 Super-FRS	 environment	 (adaptability	 of	the	RH	system	in	the	face	of	changing	needs	within	the	Super-FRS	mainte-nance	spectrum	(e.g.,	maintenance	of	the	FPF2	vacuum	chambers)	and	the	usage	of	 the	RH	 system	 for	 tasks	other	 than	FAIR	 tasks	 (e.g.,	anti-proton	targets	also	 require	 remote	maintenance;	 is	 it	possible	 to	use	Super	FRS	equipment	in	such	cases?).	
6.5	
	
10	 Ease	of	use	(what	are	the	operational	requirements?	 is	an	expert	needed,	or	can	anyone	perform	the	task?).	 5.15	11	 Cost	of	the	RH	equipment	(cost	of	the	RH	system	itself).	 8.1	
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12	 Cost	of	changes	to	the	Super-FRS	 facility	(beamline,	tunnel,	magnets,	con-struction	plans,	etc.)	that	require	RH	maintenance	due	to	the	selection	of	a	RH	system:	the	 impact	of	the	RH	system	on	the	system	requiring	mainte-nance	(e.g.,	an	increase	in	the	cost	of	the	Super	FRS	beamline	due	to	design	changes	resulting	from	the	selection	of	a	specific	RH	maintenance	design).	
8.15	
13	 The	use	 of	 RH	 equipment	 in	 activated	 environments	 (if	 there	 are	 pre-existing	data	that	the	equipment	is	already	used	for	RH).	 3.85	
	 Total	 100	
A	detailed	and	comprehensive	tradeoff	analysis	was	then	carried	out	based	on	the	key	factors	listed	in	
Table 9.Following	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	available	data	and	a	consultation	with	a	GSI	engineering	team,	it	was	decided	that	four	different	tradeoff	analyses	would	be	conducted	to	select	a	suitable	con-cept	design	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system.	These	were:	
· Requirement	and	functional	analysis	
· Radiation	dose	assessment	and	task	sequence	optimization	
· Reliability	analysis:	FMEA	analysis	
· Cost	estimation	analysis	
A	comprehensive	tradeoff	analysis	at	the	conceptual	design	stage	provides	a	solid	ground	for	selecting	
a	RH	concept	solution	which	 is	suitable	 for	 the	RH	needs	of	 the	Super-FRS	main	 tunnel.	During	 this	phase,	various	auxiliary	tradeoff	analyses	were	also	conducted,	including	analyses	of	task-based	tele-manipulator,	manipulator	space	and	task	sequence	planning	using	specific	tools,	which	are	described	in	the	next	section.	However,	due	to	their	specific	nature,	these	analyses	are	not	included	in	this	thesis.	These	tradeoff	analyses	will	be	more	mature	once	the	architectural	design	of	the	Super-FRS	facility	is	complete.			
3.5.2 Tool and strategies to conduct a tradeoff analysisTo	conduct	 a	 reliable	 tradeoff	analysis,	 it	 is	critical	 to	select	 the	 right	 tools	and	strategies	 to	obtain	credible	results,	which	can	then	be	used	to	select	the	right	concept	design.	In	the	case	of	the	RH	of	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system,	the	different	strategies	and	tools	used	are	listed	in	Table 10,	alongside	their	respective	tradeoff	analyses.	The	details	concerning	each	tool	are	given	in	the	respective	tradeoff	anal-ysis	section.	
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Table 10. Tools and their respective tradeoffs for the Super-FRS MTRH system.
S.No	 Tradeoff	Analysis	 Tools	1.	 Cost	analysis	 Cost	estimation	(detailed	cost	analysis	based	on	market	price	is	 carried	out	 to	 find	 the	best	price	 available	 for	 a	 concept	solution)	2.	 Requirements	analysis	 Requirements	 traceability	 matrix	 (requirements	 are	 com-pared	against	design	features	to	ensure	requirements	trace-ability)	3.	 Functional	analysis	 Function	vs.	components	matrix	(to	identify	key	components	that	will	perform	system	functions)	4.	 Radiation	dose	analysis	 FLUKA,	FLAIR,	 Ivplanner	 (tools	developed	used	 to	estimate	beamline	doses)	5.	 Task	sequence	optimiza-tion	 MatPlanner	(DSM	based	software	to	optimize	task	sequence	with	constraints)	6.	 Reliability	analysis	 FMEA	analysis	(Relia	software)	
3.5.3 System requirements and functional analysis
3.5.3.1 Requirements analysis tradeoffThe	purpose	of	 a	 traceability	matrix	 is	 to	maintain	 a	 linkage	 from	 the	 source	of	 each	 requirement,	through	 its	 decomposition	 and	 right	 up	 to	 implementation	 and	 verification.	This	 traceability	 is	 re-quired	to	ensure	that	all	requirements	are	addressed,	and	that	only	what	 is	required	 is	developed.	A	traceability	matrix	 is	 also	 useful	when	 conducting	 impact	 assessments	 of	 requirements,	 designs	 or	other	changes	of	configured	items.	This	matrix	should	ensure	 traceability	 for	each	 level	of	decomposition	performed	on	 the	project.	 In	particular,	it	should:	
· Ensure	that	every	lower-level	requirement	can	be	traced	to	a	higher-level	requirement	or	orig-inal	source	
· Ensure	 that	every	design,	 implementation	and	 test	element	can	be	 traced	back	 to	 a	 require-ment	
· Ensure	that	every	requirement	is	represented	in	both	design	and	implementation	
· Ensure	that	every	requirement	is	represented	in	testing	and	verification	Traceability	matrices	have	been	created	for	all	three	of	the	MTRH	system	concepts.		Each	matrix	com-pares	a	set	of	requirements	derived	from	the	System	Requirements	Documents	(SRD)	against	a	group	of	 features	of	 the	MTRH	concept	design.	The	comparison	shows	whether	and	how	well	 the	concept	meets	the	requirements.	The	traceability	matrix	cannot	be	included	in	this	document	due	to	the	sheer	size	of	the	analysis;	however,	the	features	of	the	MTRH	concept	design	and	the	results	of	the	require-ments	tradeoff	analysis	are	presented	in	Appendix	IV.		Briefly	summarized	results	for	the	requirements	analysis	are	presented	below	 in	Table 11.	These	re-sults	indicate	that	no	design	fulfills	100%	of	requirements.	This	can	be	attributed	to	the	following	rea-sons:	
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· Some	 of	 the	 requirements	 (e.g.	 testing	 and	 inspection	 requirements,	 decommissioning	 re-quirements,	 computer	 hardware	 and	 software	 requirements	 and	 RH	 control	 room	 require-ments)	will	be	satisfied	once	an	architectural	design	is	selected	for	further	development.	
· Fulfillment	of	some	of	the	requirements	(e.g.	RAMI	requirements,	applicable	codes	and	stand-ards	requirements,	structural	requirements	and	safety	design	criteria	requirements)	requires	collaboration	with	other	development	departments	or	approval	from	relevant	authorities.	The	requirements	analysis	indicates	that	MTRH	concepts	one	and	three	fulfill	more	requirements	than	MTRH	concept	 two.	 	However,	 the	differences	among	all	 three	concepts,	and	MTRH	concept	 two	 in	particular,	stem	from	the	presence	of	a	human-in-the-loop.		
Table 11. Comparison of MTRH system concept design requirements and their tradeoff anal-
yses.
S.No	 MTRH	concept	description	 Percentage	of	
requirements	
fulfilled	1	 Fully	automated	system	with	a	six-axis	manipulator	mounted	on	a	mobile	platform	 60.8	2	 Teleoperated	system	with	a	remote-controlled	crane	for	heavy	lifting	 59.1	3	 Automated	system	with	an	overhead	gantry	robot	and	a	mobile	shielding	container.	 60.8	The	percentages	and	numbers	of	the	requirements	met	in	the	requirements	analysis	(see	Appendix	IV	
Table	24-Table	26)	can	be	used	 to	 track	 the	progress	of	 the	design	process	and	 to	determine	how	well	 the	 design	 meets	 the	 customer’s	 requirements	 at	 any	 stage.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 requirements	tradeoff	analysis	can	be	used	as	benchmark	to	select	the	design	with	the	greatest	degree	of	require-ments	fulfillment.	This	research	work	uses	a	traceability	matrix	to	ensure	the	traceability	of	require-ments;	however,	for	more	effective	requirements	traceability,	IBM	DOORS	requirements	management	software	is	recommended.	IBM	Doors	is	requirements	management	tool	that	is	used	to	write	and	track	the	requirement	as	the	project	is	developed.	
3.5.3.2 Functional analysisThe	development	of	any	new	system	or	product	requires	a	functional	analysis.	The	functional	analysis	applies	to	every	phase	of	system	development	[128];	however,	it	is	most	useful	during	the	conceptual	design	phase,	during	which	various	potential	feasible	solutions	exist	for	the	future	system.	The	func-tional	analysis	has	three	major	benefits:	
· The	 identification	of	key	system	 functions.	This	can	 then	contribute	 to	 the	refinement	of	 the	functional	 requirements.	 In	 the	development	process	of	 the	MTRH	system,	 a	 functional	 tree	was	developed,	and	 a	systems	 requirements	document	was	established	 to	 identify	key	 func-tions.		
· The	 identification	 of	 key	 interfaces.	The	 functional	 analysis	 performed	 at	 the	 requirements	stage	identified	the	key	interfaces	within	the	MTRH	system.	
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· The	 identification	 of	 key	 system	 components	 during	 the	 concept	 development	 phase.	 This	functional	analysis	assists	 in	 the	development	of	concept	designs	and	detailed	product	 trees	for	 the	system.	 In	 the	MTRH	system,	 the	product	 tree	 for	 the	concept	design	was	developed	during	the	concept	development	phase.	It	was	based	on	the	functional	tree	and	 interface	dia-gram	 developed	 in	 the	 earlier	 functional	 analyses.	The	 fictional	 analysis	 (involving	 product	tree	development)	at	this	stage	enables	system	design	engineers	to	evaluate	multiple	options,	without	forgetting	any	potential	solutions	that	could	offer	significant	advantages.	At	 this	conceptual	stage,	 the	 functional	 tradeoff	analysis	 for	 the	MTRH	system	concept	designs	(see	Appendix	IV)	is	conducted	in	order	to:	
· Ensure	that	the	developed	concept	designs	are	adequate	and	fulfill	the	functional	requirements.	
· Ensure	that	the	concept	design	architectures	of	the	MTRH	systems	(and	subsystems)	are	clear-ly	understood.	This	analysis	clarifies	the	system	subsystems	and	their	functional	relationships.	
· Identify	a	detailed	product	tree	for	each	concept	design.	This	involves	developing:		
o Internal	interface	connections	for	each	concept.	
o The	detailed	product	tree	which	can	later	be	used	to	carry	out	a	fault	tree	analysis	(FTA)	to	 identify	key	 failure	points.	FTA	analyses	 for	 the	MTRH	system	concept	designs	are	outside	the	scope	of	this	stage;	however,	once	detailed	architectural	designs	are	estab-lished,	they	can	be	used	to	identify	key	fault	points.	
o Cost	analyses	(see	Section	3.5.4).		
o Modified,	 refined	and	optimized	 task	sequences	 for	architectural	design	 (see	Section	3.5.5).	
o Updated	and	improved	the	task	sequences,	which	designers	can	create	during	the	con-cept	design	phase.		The	functional	tradeoff	analysis	results	show	that	concept	one	requires	fewer	components	to	carry	out	the	same	task	than	either	of	concepts	two	and	three.		
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Table 12. Function (Table 5, Figure 80) vs. subsystem matrix: Number of subsystems required to
fulfill each high-level function at once.
Function	vs.	subsystem	analysis	
Number	of	subsystems	required	to	fulfil	each	high-
level	function		Functional	S.No.	 Concept	No.	 One	 Two	 Three	
1	 12 13 141,1	 9 10 121,1,1	 8 6 101,1,2	 6 5 61,1,3	 2 3 31,2	 4 6 61,2,1	 3 4 71,2,2	 3 2 61,2,3	 2 2 31,2,4	 3 3 31,3	 8 9 91,3,1	 2 4 31,3,2	 4 5 61,3,3	 3 6 81,4	 2 2 21,4,1	 1 1 11,4,2	 1 1 1
	The	functional	vs.	subsystem	analysis	(Table 12	and	Appendix	IV)	highlights	the	key	subsystems	and	components	required	for	each	concept	design	to	carry	out	the	RH	task	sequence.	This	information,	in	turn,	provides	grounds	for	building	a	more	detailed	system	interface	map.	The	analysis	also	provides	a	basic	list	of	subsystems	and	components	that	serve	as	building	blocks	for	the	concept	designs	(Table
13).	These	critical	building	blocks	can	be	regrouped	to	modify	concept	designs	or	even	generate	new	ones	(if	there	is	a	change	in	system	requirements	or	needs).		Table 13	lists	the	various	subsystems	and	components	identified	during	the	functional	analysis	which	was	conducted	for	the	MTRH	system	con-cept	designs.	These	are	higher-level	components	within	the	product	tree	that	will	expand	as	the	design	of	MTRH	system	progresses.	The	functional	analysis	approach	can	also	be	used	to	further	expand	the	product	tree	detail	(during	the	system	architecture	design	stage)	in	order	to	monitor	the	connections	within	the	MTRH	system,	subsystems	and	components	(see	Appendix	IV	Figure	97).	
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Table 13. Break down of the building blocks of the MTRH system concept designs, with system
level one being the MTRH system (one unit) and system level five being the basic component
level.
MTRH	system	concept	design	One	 Two	 Three	
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One	 1	 1	 1	
Two	 4	 4	 4	
Three	 7	 8	 7	
Four	 21	 26	 21	
Five	 61 68 63
The	functional	tradeoff	analysis	is,	without	a	doubt,	one	of	the	most	important	and	fundamental	tools	within	 the	SE	design	process,	since	 it	contributes	 to	 the	development	of	system	 requirements,	pro-vides	detailed	 listings	 and	 comparisons	of	 solutions	 and	ultimately	 enables	 the	designer	 to	 list	 the	components	required	by	each	system	to	fulfill	the	necessary	system	functions.	It	also	enables	the	de-signer	to	identify	key	interfaces	within	the	system	and	with	its	surroundings.	Its	output	can	be	used	in	developing	and	refining	both	 the	FTA	(carried	out	at	 the	architectural	design	 level)	and	system	task	sequences.The	design	of	MTRH	system	concept	one	requires	fewer	components	than	concepts	two	and	three	to	carry	out	the	same	tasks.	However,	concept	one	can	only	carry	out	the	specified	tasks	of	inspections,	removal	of	the	connector	plate	and	replacement	of	the	beamline	 insert.	It	has	very	 little	flexibility	 in	the	event	of	modifications	 to	 the	Super-FRS	beamline	during	 the	 facility’s	 lifespan	(e.g.	 in	 the	event	that	the	vacuum	chamber	requires	RH).	The	automated	task	sequence	for	concept	one	also	requires	a	high	 level	of	positioning	accuracy	and	a	proper	 load	distribution	across	all	handling	positions	of	 the	manipulator.		Also,	the	onboard	electronics	require	radiation	protection	in	order	to	avoid	failure	dur-ing	remote	maintenance	tasks.	The	analysis	also	reveals	that	the	subsystems	of	concept	two	require	high	levels	of	customization	and	higher	dependency	on	the	judgment	of	a	human	operator	than	those	of	concepts	one	and	three,	which	are	automated.	However,	the	manipulator	and	remote	maintenance	approach	used	in	concept	two	are	the	most	widely	used	across	the	nuclear	industry.	The	major	advantage	of	using	a	Master	Slave	Manip-ulator	within	the	tunnel	 involves	the	possibility	for	onsite	remote	maintenance	and	 inspection	of	the	beamline	equipment.	However,	the	Master	Slave	Manipulator,	mobile	platform,	mobile	crane,	shielding	
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would	 require	considerable	modification	 to	 facilitate	use	of	 this	concept	 in	 the	Super-FRS	 tunnel.	 It	would	also	require	more	operator	training.		The	third	concept	design	involves	fewer	subsystems	and	components	than	concept	two	and	a	couple	more	subsystems	than	concept	one.	It	has	the	advantage	that	the	gantry	overhead	robot	can	be	used	as	
a	power	manipulator	 (i.e.	an	overhead	crane	with	specialized	 tools)	 to	 retrieve	 the	beamline	 insert	directly	 from	 the	vacuum	 chamber.	Due	 to	 its	higher	 load	 capacity,	 this	 approach	 is	 flexible	 to	 the	adoption	of	future	beamline	changes.	It	also	has	the	flexibility	to	adapt	to	Super-FRS	beamline	equip-ment	changes	(e.g.	 the	setup	 for	 the	experiments	at	 the	FPF2	vacuum	chamber).	Special	 tooling	and	beamline	equipment	make	the	handling	of	such	equipment	possible.	The	overhead	gantry	robot	can	be	equipped	with	a	six-axis	teleoperated	robot	that	can	carry	out	remote	inspection	and	handling	on	ei-ther	side	of	 the	Super-FRS	beamline,	and	can	cover	 a	 larger	workspace	 than	either	of	 the	other	RH	concepts.	The	six-axis	manipulator	can	also	be	used	to	inspect	and	handle	part	of	the	Super-FRS	cryo-genic	 system.	 However,	 the	 implementation	 of	 this	 design	 is	 more	 challenging,	 due	 to	 unforeseen	changes	to	the	design	of	the	Super-FRS	beamline	and	main	tunnel.	In	other	words,	major	engineering	changes	to	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel	and	beamline	would	be	required	to	accommodate	the	overhead	gantry	robot.	These	include	changes	to	the	vacuum	chamber,	the	beamline	insert	handling	points,	the	connector	plates,	the	facility	cabling	and	the	overhead	rail	structure.		Given	the	results	of	the	functional	tradeoff	analysis,	we	can	conclude	that	MTRH	system	concept	one	requires	 fewer	components	 to	carry	out	current	RH	 tasks	within	 the	Super-FRS	 tunnel;	however,	 it	offers	very	limited	flexibility	for	future	changes.	In	contrast,	concept	two	offers	both	onsite	and	offsite	maintenance	 options	 due	 to	 its	 human-in-the-loop	 approach,	while	 requiring	 fewer	 changes	 to	 the	Super-FRS	tunnel	environment;	however,	this	concept	 involves	a	higher	degree	of	customization	and	the	 involvement	of	 radiation	workers	during	operations.	Concept	 three	offers	 greater	 flexibility,	 as	well	as	a	wider	workspace	envelope;	however,	it	requires	major	modifications	to	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel.	
3.5.4 System cost analysisCost	analysis	is	one	of	the	important	deciding	factors	in	the	selection	of	concept	designs.	The	develop-ment	of	new	 technical	systems	 is	normally	 focused	on	 technical	and	performance	aspects,	with	cost	analyses	often	deferred	until	the	end	of	the	project.	The	cost	analysis	of	systems	at	later	stages	can	be	critical	to	project	success	because	improper	cost	estimations	can	create	hurdles	in	system	design	and	development.	In	other	words,	in	order	to	justify	the	financial	parameters	of	a	project	and	consider	the	full	system	spectrum,	cost	analysis	must	be	a	key	part	of	concept	development	itself.	Lifecycle	costing	is	a	comprehensive	practice	that	includes	costs	associated	with	design,	construction,	production,	distribution,	operation,	maintenance,	support	and	disposal.	For	the	MTRH	concept	selec-tion,	we	will	 focus	mostly	on	 the	RH	system	costs	associated	with	 technical	components,	human	re-sources,	and	environmental	design	changes.	The	remaining	life-cycle	costs,	such	as	operation,	mainte-nance	and	disposal	costs,	must	be	calculated	once	a	concept	design	has	been	selected	for	the	architec-tural	design	stage.		The	cost	analyses	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	concepts	were	conducted	using	the	estimated	cost	analysis	from	the	IEEE	Project	Management	Body	of	Knowledge	(PMBOK)[129].	The	concept	designs	are	based	mostly	on	the	use	of	COTS	equipment;	hence,	 in	order	to	determine	the	estimates,	various	factors	were	used	as	inputs.	These	included:	
· The	scope	baseline,	which	 is	used	as	an	 input	for	cost	estimation	to	determine	a	product	de-scription,	acceptance	criteria,	key	deliverables,	project	boundaries,	assumptions,	and	system	
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constraints	(requirements	analysis).		It	also	provides	a	system	WBS	(work	break-down	struc-ture),	which	outlines	the	relationships	among	all	the	system	components	and	functions	(func-tional	analysis).	
· The	project	schedule,	which	 is	used	to	determine	the	time	and	resources	needed	to	complete	the	design	work.	
· Human	resources,	which	are	used	as	an	 input	to	determine	the	workforce	needed	to	develop	and	operate	the	RH	equipment.	The	cost	analysis	of	the	MTRH	system	concepts	(Appendix	V)	was	carried	out	within	input	from	a	de-tailed	market	survey	and	expert	 judgment.	The	expert	 judgment,	which	was	guided	by	historical	 in-formation,	provided	valuable	 insights	 into	 the	environment.	 Information	 from	similar	previous	pro-jects	(FRS,	ISOLDE	and	J-PARC)	was	leveraged	in	order	to	correctly	estimate	the	system	costs.	The	cost	analysis	of	the	MTRH	system	(Table 14)	indicates	that	concept	three	is	the	most	costly	option,	costing	up	to	3	million	euros,	while	concept	one	is	the	least	costly.	The	cost	analyses	included	market	costs	for	feasibility	studies,	equipment,	engineering	changes	and	personnel	training.	Since	the	cost	analysis	for	the	MTRH	system	is	an	initial	estimate,	it	does	not	include	operation	or	maintenance	costs,	testing	or	support	costs,	or	costs	for	disposal.	These	remaining	costs	must	be	calculated	once	the	concept	is	final-ized	for	architectural	design.	
Table 14. Total cost of the MTRH system concept designs (does not include the costs of opera-
tion, maintenance, testing, support, or disposal).
Total	value	(in	Kilo	€)	MTRH	system	concept	one	 2020	MTRH	system	concept	two	 2130	MTRH	system	concept	three	 2795	
3.5.5 System task sequence optimization and radiation dose assessmentIt	has	already	been	discussed	that	the	main	tunnel	area	under	focus	presents	high	dose	rates	due	to	activated	equipment.	Radiation	studies	have	been	conducted,	and	the	dimension	necessary	 to	shield	the	Super-FRS	 (calculated	using	 the	FLUKA	Monte	Carlo	algorithm	 to	estimate	ambient	prompt	and	residual	dose	rates)	have	been	published	[125][126].		FLUKA	is	used	for	analysis	due	the	fact	it	is	pro-vides	one	of	the	most	accurate	beam	losses	analysis	and	is	comprehensive	software	for	radiation	simu-lations.	To	ensure	radiation	protection	within	the	Super-FRS	tunnel,	it	is	important	to	carry	out	further	radia-tion	dose	estimations	for	the	Super-FRS	using	the	FLUKA	Monte	Carlo	algorithm	for	different	scenarios.	
Table	15	lists	all	of	the	various	scenarios	for	which	the	radiation	analysis	was	conducted.	For	the	pur-poses	of	this	thesis,	we	will	consider	the	 long-term	worst-case	scenario	as	consisting	of	two	years	of	operation	and	four	weeks	of	cool	down	before	the	RH	intervention.	The	operation	phase	includes	three	months	of	operation	and	one	month	of	cool	down	rotated	through	three	cycles	per	year	and	totaling	six	cycles	overall.	The	radiation	evaluation	scenarios	and	FLUKA	simulation	analyses	were	carried	out	with	the	assistance	of	experts	from	the	radiation	team	in	order	to	ensure	accurate	results.		For	 the	Super-FRS	 intervention	scenario,	(see	Figure 79),	FPF2	and	 its	beamline	 insert	maintenance	are	under	focus	because	the	beam	intensity	is	very	high	at	the	point	of	interaction.	Hence,	for	radiation	analysis	focal	plane	at	FPF2	is	considered	to	be	the	primary	location.	For	the	radiation	dose	calculation	
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for	the	intervention	scenario,	the	study	will	focus	on	the	replacement	of	the	beamline	insert	at	FPF2.	It	is	 important	 to	note	 that	 calculated	doses	 are	 reported	 in	µSv	 and	 that	dose	 rates	 are	 reported	 in	µSv/h.	These	units	are	used	 to	achieve	accurate	estimates	of	 the	doses	received	by	human	workers,	instead	of	the	RH	equipment.	This	analysis	is	important	because	it	signifies	the	radiation	doses	saved	due	to	the	fact	that	operations	are	carried	out	using	remote	maintenance.		The	 estimated	dose	simulation	 for	 the	FPF2	maintenance	 is	conducted	using	 the	FLUKA	simulation	package.	The	Super-FRS	tunnel	is	divided	into	two	parts:	Teil	A	and	Teil	B	(part	A	and	part	B	in	Ger-man).	This	simulation	is	shown	in	Figure 83.	The	radiation	pattern	used	in	this	simulation	involved	two	years	of	beam	operations	with	intervals	of	three	months	of	operation	and	one	month	of	cool	down.	At	the	end	of	two	years,	it	involved	four	weeks	of	cool	down	before	the	remote	maintenance	intervention	at	FPF2.	The	doses	received	along	the	access	paths	and	 the	punctual	dose	 rates	were	estimated	using	 a	2D	planner	named	 IVPlanner,	which	was	developed	by	Chris	Theis	(CERN,	DGS-RP).	The	3D	planner	RADIJS,	designed	by	Thomas	Fabry,	was	also	used	to	confirm	these	values;	however,	 its	development	was	still	on-going	at	the	time	of	this	re-search.	Hence,	the	IVPlanner	was	preferred	due	to	its	operational	capabilities	and	functionalities.		The	use	of	the	IVPlanner	enabled	the	visualization	of	FLUKA	data	on	top	of	the	Super-FRS	geometry.	The	received	doses	could	then	be	estimated	for	personnel	working	in	the	area	and	conducting	remote	maintenance.	The	doses	were	 estimated	 for	 two	operators:	 the	 teleoperator	 and	mobile	 crane.This	approach	enabled	accurate	dose	estimation	for	each	MTRH	concept	at	the	points	and	path	of	interest.	For	a	detailed	radiation	analysis,	see	Appendix	VI.	Previous	to	the	radiation	analysis,	the	RH	task	sequence	for	each	concept	was	planned	and	optimized	using	Matricial	Planner	(MatPlan).	MatPlan	is	an	integrated	software	application	for	planning,	schedul-ing	and	optimizing	interventions	in	ionizing	environments.	This	optimization	is	twofold:	it	involves	a	temporal	optimization	and	also	an	ALARA	optimization,	related	 to	 the	estimated	radiation	doses	re-ceived	by	workers.	MatPlan	is	developed	using	the	Collaborative	DSM	framework	based	on	the	Design	Structure	Matrix	(DSM)	[130].		The	Super-FRS	RH	scenario	(Figure 79)	task	sequence	was	entered	into	the	MatPlan	 software	 (Figure 84).	After	 applying	 constraints,	 calculations	were	 then	 performed	 to	determine	the	optimized	 intervention	scenario	for	remote	maintenance.	The	software	provides	a	re-port,	as	shown	in	Figure 85,	and	a	Gantt	chart	for	each	solution.	Figure 86	shows	these	results	for	the	teleoperated	concept	option.	
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Table 15. Super-FRS main tunnel FLUKA simulation scenarios for intervention patterns (both
planned and unplanned).
Scenario	 Operation	 Cool	down	time	Short-term	 Two	weeks	 Two	days	Mid-term	 Four	months	 Four	weeks	Long-term	 Two	years	of	operation,	with	three	months	of	operation	and	one	month	of	cool	down	rotated	through	three	cy-cles/year	(total:	six	cycles/two	years)	
Four	weeks	
Short-term	(Unplanned)	 Two	weeks	 One	day	Mid-term	(Unplanned)	 Four	months	of	operation	 One	day	of	cool	down	(for	inspection)	One	week	of	cool	down	(for	intervention)	Long-term	(Unplanned)	 One	year	of	operation	with	three	months	of	operation	and	one	month	cool	down/year,	with	a	sudden	failure	after	the	one	week	of	cool	down	
One	day	of	cool	down	(for	inspection)	One	week	of	cool	down	(for	intervention)	
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Figure 83. IV planner screen shot of the FLUKA simulations for the Super-FRS tunnel, showing
Teil A and Teil B (Part A and Part B in German).
Part  B
Teil A
Part  A
Teil A
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Figure 84. Screenshot of the main application screen of MatPlan, displaying interventions and
tasks.
Figure 85. Screenshot of the report tab in MatPlan.
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Figure 86. Screenshot of the Gantt tab in MatPlan, illustrating the two extreme solutions of the
teleoperated case study.
3.5.5.1 Analysis resultsThe	results	obtained	for	the	Super-FRS	RH	scenario	are	the	very	first	dose	estimates	and	duration	pre-dictions	which	have	been	 calculated	 for	 any	maintenance	 interventions	within	 the	 Super-FRS.	This	technique	will	be	used	in	the	future	to	conduct	further	analyses	of	the	RH	scenario	for	later	stages	of	the	MTRH	design.	However,	although	not	conducted	for	the	final	system	design,	the	current	extensive	analysis	still	contains	very	useful	information	about	the	doses	received	and	the	planning	and	schedul-ing	of	the	task	sequence.	
128
The	analysis	of	the	MTRH	system	concept	design,	using	MatPlan,	revealed	that:	
· Concept	two,	the	teleoperated	task	sequence,	had	96	individual	solutions	according	to	the	set	of	constraints	given	 in	the	matrix;	however,	the	software	optimization	reduced	this	set	to	16	possible	solutions,	by	improving	the	constraints	definition	and	by	implementing	new	software	updates.	The	solutions	involve	simulated	duration	ranges	between	9h8min	and	10h20min	for	the	intervention,	without	additional	maintenance	steps	(e.g.	on-site	repairs	of	the	beamline	in-sert	itself).	The	Gantt	charts	of	the	two	most	extreme	cases	are	displayed	in	Figure 86.	
· By	comparison,	the	simulations	of	the	automated	concepts	(concepts	one	and	three)	result	 in	longer	 interventions	 (8h50min	 to	10h45min	 for	concept	one	and	8h30min	 to	10h25min	 for	concept	three).	This	is	essentially	due	to	the	very	slow	speed	of	the	automatic	devices	during	the	travel	tasks	and	the	lengths	of	the	automated	sequences	(e.g.	changing	the	end	effector	in-volves	a	wider	range	of	subtasks	than	in	the	teleoperated	case).	Therefore,	when	no	additional	maintenance	is	performed,	the	teleoperated	scenario	was	found	to	be	quicker.		
· The	major	downside	of	the	teleoperated	case	is	its	high	level	of	radiation	dosages	to	workers.	In	the	case	of	automated	task	sequences,	no	human	involvement	is	needed	to	carry	out	the	re-mote	maintenance	tasks.	The	beamline	insert	is	eventually	maintained	once	in	the	hotcell.	The	estimated	radiation	doses	for	the	Super-FRS	RH	task	sequence	(see	Appendix	VI)	are	summarized	in	Table	16,	which	shows	the	dose	estimates	for	both	equipment	and	personnel.	The	equipment	speed	was	0.1	to	0.3	Km/h	and	the	personnel	speed	was	1	to	3	Km/h.		
Table 16. Summary of the Super-FRS MTRH concept design results (see Appendix VI).
Total	cumulative	doses	(in	µSv)	for	a	single	beamline	insert	
Concept	one	 Concept	two	 Concept	three	Equip-ment	Speed	 Person-nel	Speed	 Equipment	 Personnel	 Equip-ment	 Person-nel	 Equipment	 Person-nel	0,3	Km/h	 3	Km/h	 2926,80267	 N/A	 2783,086	 106,8937	 3212,16533	 N/A	0,2	Km/h	 2	Km/h	 2975,79667	 N/A	 2843,38	 107,6103	 3371,07533	 N/A	0,1	Km/h	 1	Km/h	 3123,07667	 N/A	 3024,66	 109,7537	 3655,50533	 N/A	The	radiation	analysis	revealed	that:	
· The	human	operators	 in	concept	two	(i.e.	the	telemanipulator	operator	and	the	mobile	crane	operator)	are	subjected	to	doses	of	107	µSv	during	the	RH	task	sequence.	The	station	for	the	operator	is	located	at	the	end	of	Super-FRS	service	tunnel,	which	also	provides	protection	from	direct	radiation.	 In	this	scenario,	3	km/h	 is	considered	 to	be	 the	natural	human	velocity	and	traveling	representing	only	about	5%	of	the	 intervention	dosage	with	the	remaining	95%	re-ceived	during	static	 tasks.	Considering	 that	 there	are	up	 to	27	beamline	 inserts,	of	which	15	may	require	replacement	once	a	year,	this	amount	could	be	up	to	1.5	mSv	per	year	received	by	personnel.	The	equipment	would	receive	a	total	dose	of	41.74629	mSv	per	year.		
· Concepts	one	and	three	are	fully	automated	and	do	not	require	on-site	operators	to	operate	the	equipment.	Concept	one	involves	a	dose	to	equipment	of	2.93	mSv	to	handle	one	beamline	in-sert	and	a	total	annual	dose	of	43.9	mSv	to	handle	15	beamline	inserts.	Similarly,	Concept	three	
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involves	a	dose	of	3.2	mSv	for	one	beamline	insert	and	a	total	annual	dose	of	48.2	mSv	to	han-dle	15	beamline	inserts.			The	 radiation	 analysis	 of	 the	MTRH	 system	 provides	 an	 early-stage	 estimate	 of	 doses	 received	 by	equipment	and	personnel.	However,	the	estimated	dose	rate	calculation	at	this	stage	does	not	take	into	account	that:	
· Beamline	inserts	could	fail	and	require	corrective	maintenance.	
· Beamline	 inserts	can	be	switched	 to	modify	 the	 installation	configuration	 for	physics	experi-ments.	
3.5.6 System reliability analysis: FMEA AnalysisReliability	is	a	key	element	of	the	SE	development	process.	Various	tools	are	used	to	measure	the	reli-ability	of	systems	at	different	 life	cycle	stages,	such	as	 reliability	hazard	analyses,	 failure	mode	and	effects	analyses	(FMEAs),	fault	tree	analyses	(FTAs),	and	Reliability-Centered	Maintenance.	In	the	case	of	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system,	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	concept	design	evaluation	was	conducted	to	select	the	right	tool	for	reliability	analysis.	FMEA	was	selected	to	evaluate	all	three	con-cept	designs,	due	to	the	fact	that	it	is	a	well-established,	systematic	method	for	evaluating	a	product	or	process.	It	 identifies	where	and	how	the	product	might	fail	 in	order	to	assess	the	relative	 impacts	of	different	 failures.	FMEA	 is	often	 the	 first	 step	of	 a	 system	 reliability	 study.	The	FMEA	 tool	 reviews	many	components,	assemblies	and	subsystems	in	order	to	identify	the	critical	elements	prone	to	fail-ure	within	a	system.	The	reasons	for	selecting	an	FMEA	for	this	study	were	as	follows:	
· Single-point	failures	are	identified	at	design	stage.	
· FMEA	provides	a	detailed	ranking	of	failures	based	on	Risk	Priority	Number	(RPN)	numbers.	
· It	provides	a	list	of	possible	causes	and	effects	of	failure	on	the	system.	
· It	is	a	uniform	method	for	assessing	potential	failures,	failure	modes	and	effects	on	the	system.	
· The	criteria	for	detection	can	also	be	determined	at	design	stage.	In	the	case	of	the	Super-FRS	logistics,	the	equipment	selected	to	perform	the	RH		must	be	evaluated	for	reliability.	In	case	of	the	Super-FRS,	an	FMEA	is	performed	because:	
· Identify	potential	failure	modes	for	a	Super-FRS	concept	designs.	
· To	assess	the	risk	and	causes	associated	with	those	failures.	
· To	rank	the	issues	in	terms	of	importance.	
· Identify	and	carry	out	corrective	actions	to	address	the	most	serious	concerns.	The	FMEA	 for	 the	Super-FRS	was	conducted	 in	collaboration	with	RAMS	specialists	 from	within	 the	PURESAFE	network,	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 results	were	 accurate	 and	 credible.	To	 conduct	 an	 effective	FMEA,	 a	 cross-disciplinary	 team	was	 selected	 to	 evaluate	 the	 concept	designs.	During	 this	process,	detailed	information	concerning	the	equipment	and	task	sequences	was	explained	to	the	FMEA	analy-sis	team.	In	the	next	step,	a	periodic	identification	was	performed	of	the	Super-FRS	RH	task	functions,	failures,	 effects,	 causes,	 controls	 and	 possible	 recommended	 actions.	Values	were	 assigned	 to	 each	item	to	calculate	the	RPN	number	for	the	FMEA	analysis.	These	values	were:	FMEA	Severity	(Se),	Oc-currence	(Oi)	and	Detection	(Di).	Each	value	was	ranked	between	1-10,	with	1	representing	lesser	and	10	representing	greater	risk.	Table	17	presents	a	short	summary	of	the	FMEA	analysis.		
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Table	17.	Potential	failure	causes	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	obtained	from	the	FMEA,	in-
cluding	high-risk	 failure	causes	 (Si=9-10	and	Oi=10),	medium-risk	 failure	causes	 (Si=4-8	and	
Oi=7-9),	and	low-risk	failure	causes	(Si=1-5	and	Oi=1-7)	
Concept	1	 2	 3	
Causes	(severity	level)	High	level	(Critical/system	down)	 32	 35	 33	Medium	level		(Significant	impact)	 31	 43	 30	Low	level		(Normal/minor	impact)	 50	 42	 50	Total	 113	 120	 113	The	FMEA	is	based	on	six	high-level	tasks	which	were	common	to	all	three	concepts	(Table 18).	
Table 18. MTRH system high-level task sequence breakdown for the FMEA tradeoff analysis.
Function	
ID	 Function	1	 Removal	and	installation	of	a	beamline	insert	at	the	focal	plane	of	the	pre-separator	in	the	main	tunnel	
2	 Remote	inspection	of	the	Super	FRS	pre-separator	area.	3	 Transportation	of	the	activated	beamline	inserts	from	the	focal	plane	to	the	hotcell.	4	 Remote	maintenance	(minor,	major	or	disposal)	of	beamline	inserts	within	the	hotcell	(minor	includes	cleaning	and	inspection,	major	includes	replacement	of	damaged	com-ponents,	and	disposal	includes	removal	of	damaged	or	radioactive	components	to	long-term	storage).	5	 Ensuring	a	safe	operating	environment	in	the	main	tunnel.	6	 Ensuring	a	safe	operating	environment	in	the	hotcell.	
3.5.6.1 Discussion of FMEA results for each MTRH conceptEach	MTRH	concept	consists	of	six	main	functions	of	the	RH	equipment.	The	results	of	the	FMEA	anal-ysis	for	each	concept	are	summarized	in	Table	17	and	discussed	in	this	section.	Analysis	of	concept	one	revealed	24	failure	types	with	113	causes,	totaling	33	different	effects	of	fail-ure.	Table	17	shows	the	severity	 levels	of	the	causes	of	failure.	 ,	with	32	high-risk,	31	medium-risk,	and	50	 low-risk	causes	 that	could	 jeopardize	 the	RH	 task	sequences	and	equipment.	To	 reduce	 the	risks	associated	with	concept	one,	the	FMEA	analysis	also	lists	207	actions	and	274	controls.	Analysis	of	concept	two	revealed	24	failure	types	with	120	causes,	totaling	33	different	effects	of	fail-ure.	Table	17	shows	the	severity	levels	of	the	causes	of	failure,	with	35	high-risk,	43	medium-risk,	and	42	 low-risk	causes	 that	could	 jeopardize	 the	RH	 task	sequences	and	equipment	 for	concept	 two.	To	
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reduce	 the	risks	associated	with	concept	 two,	 the	FMEA	analysis	also	 lists	233	actions	and	290	con-trols.	Analysis	of	concept	three	revealed	23	failure	types	with	113	causes,	totaling	32	different	effects	of	fail-ure.	Table	17	shows	the	severity	levels	of	the	causes	of	failure,	with	33	high-risk,	30	medium-risk,	and	50	 low-risk	causes	 that	could	 jeopardize	 the	RH	 task	sequences	and	equipment	 for	concept	 two.	To	reduce	the	risks	associated	with	concept	three,	the	FMEA	analysis	also	lists	214	actions	and	278	con-trols.	Based	on	the	FMEA	tradeoff	analysis,	concept	two	has	the	most	failure	causes	at	the	highest	severity	level,	while	 concept	one	has	 fewest	 failure	 causes	 at	 the	highest severity	 level.	Based	on	 the	FMEA	analysis	at	this	stage,	we	can	conclude	that	concept	one	will	have	better	reliability	than	the	other	two	concepts;	however,	the	critical	causes	serving	as	bases	for	failure	must	be	eliminated	through	proper	action	and	control	to	improve	system	availability.	
3.6 MTRH system tradeoff analysis results
The	MTRH	tradeoff	analysis	was	carried	out	in	order	to	determine	the	effects	of	the	key	factors	(listed	in	Table	9)	on	the	concept	designs	and,	thus,	to	select	the	design	which	best	fulfills	the	RH	needs	of	the	Super-FRS.	Based	on	expert	opinions	(Table	9),	the	tradeoff	analysis	(Table	10)	is	assigned	relevant	weighting	factors	(Table	19).	The	weighting	factor	for	each	tradeoff	analysis	was	based	on	the	values	assigned	to	various	factors	from	the	results	of	a	survey	of	RH	experts.	The	value	of	each	weighting	fac-tor	 has	 creditability	 because	 the	 experts	were	 consulted	 before	 the	 tradeoff	 analysis	was	 devised;	hence,	prejudice	was	reduced.	
Table 19. Super-FRS tradeoff analysis, weighted and scored based on an expert criteria evalua-
tion review (see Section 3.4.1).
S.No	 Analysis	 Weighting	factor	
1	 Cost	analysis	 16.25	
2	 Requirements	analysis	and	func-tional	analysis	 29.95	
3	 Radiation	dose	analysis	and	task	sequence	optimization	 42.7	
4	 Reliability	analysis	 35.05	The	tradeoff	analyses	carried	out	for	the	MTRH	system	concepts	were	ranked	and	listed	according	to	the	findings	in	Table	20.		
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Table 20. MTRH system concepts tradeoff analysis results: The results indicate that concept one
scores maximum points based on our analysis and after including the weighing factors. Thus,
concept analysis indicates that concept one is a favorable option.Un-weighted	score	from	the	tradeoff	analysis	 Weighted	score	from	the	tradeoff	analysis	S.No.	 Analysis	 Weighting	factor	 Con-cept	one	 Con-cept	two	 Con-cept	three	 Con-cept	one	 Con-cept	two	 Con-cept	three	
1	 Cost	analysis	 16.25	 3	 2	 1	 48.75	 32.5	 16.25	
2	
Requirements	analysis	 and	functional	analysis	 29.95	 5	 2	 4	 149.75	 59.9	 119.8	
3	
Radiation	dose	analysis	and	task	sequence	optimization	 42.7	 5	 2	 5	 213.5	 85.4	 213.5	
4	
Reliability	analysis	 35.05	 3	 1	 3	 105.15	 35.05	 105.15	Total	score	 16	 7	 13	 517.15	 212.85	 454.7	
Table	20	shows	both	the	weighted	and	un-weighted	scores,	which	both	 indicate	that	concept	one	 is	the	most	suitable	choice	 for	 the	MTRH	system.	The	results	suggest	 that	concept	one	 is	collectively	a	better	design,	capable	of	fulfilling	the	RH	needs	of	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel.	Concept	one	is	also	the	most	 cost-effective	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 two	 designs	 and	 performs	 similar	 functions	with	 fewer	components.		However,	it	still	does	not	fulfill	100%	of	the	needs	and,	hence,	certain	design	modifica-tions	are	required.	
3.6.1 Discussion and analysisThis	section	presents	detailed	discussion	concerning	the	results	of	this	research	that	address	the	de-velopment	and	tradeoff	analysis	of	the	concept	design	requirements	for	the	MTRH	system	using	the SE	approach	for	RH	systems	at	HEP	facilities,.	In	contrast	to	earlier	HEP	facility	designs,	these	new	facili-ties	need	to	be	designed	and	built	with	RH	capabilities.	The	Super-FRS	requirements	clearly	 indicate	various	 hotspots	 (activate	 components	 along	 beamline)	 that	 will	 require	 remote	 maintenance	 and	analysis	of	the	main	tunnel	indicates	that	RH	activities	will	consist	of	two	primary	actions:	
· Transportation	manipulation.	
· Dexterity	manipulation.	The	beamline	 inserts	 in	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel	will	require	separate	transportation,	storage	and	dexterity	manipulations.	Once	removed	from	the	vacuum	chamber,	each	beamline	insert	will	need	to	be	transported	to	the	hotcell	for	storage,	repair	or	disposal.	Replacing	the	beamline	insert	will	require	dexterous	manipulation	 prior	 to	 transport	manipulation.	 It	will	 also	 require	 a	 separate	 hotcell	 for	complex	dexterity	manipulation	using	Master	Slave	Manipulators	and	power	manipulators.		
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Based	on	the	system	requirements	analysis	and	State	of	the	Art	studies,	the	remote	maintenance	for	activated	 parts	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	 categories:	 scheduled	 and	 unscheduled.	Each	 of	 the	 afore-mentioned	categories	can	be	further	subdivided	into	two	sections:	long-term	maintenance	(LTM)	and	short-term	maintenance	(STM),	depending	on	time	and	resource	constraints.	Based	on	the	State	of	the	Art	survey	and	analysis	of	the	effects	of	radiation	on	the	Super-FRS	equip-ment,	the	radiation	sensitivities	of	electronic	components	were	found	to	depend	on	multiple	factors,	including	dose	rates,	 time	of	exposure,	biasing	conditions	(during	and	after	radiation)	and	tempera-ture[47].	RH	tasks	are	carried	out	once	the	beam	is	shut	down	and	after	a	cool-down	period.	The	re-sidual	dose	at	this	stage	is	only	caused	by	the	activated	parts;	hence,	it	is	much	lower	than	that	when	the	beam	is	operational.	In	the	case	of	the	Super-FRS,	the	ratio	between	the	prompt	dose	and	the	dose	by	activation	after	years	of	full	usage	 lies	between	the	factors	of	105	and	106,	depending	on	the	cool-down	time.		Dose	rates	can	be	predicted;	however,	it	is	hard	to	predict	the	exact	lifetimes	of	electronic	devices	in	different	radiation	environments	due	to	the	complexity	of	the	devices	and,	to	some	extent,	the	differ-ences	among	operating	scenarios.	In	later	stages	of	development,	radiation	hardness	assurance	accel-erated	testing	would	performed	on	electronics	in	a	simulated	environment,	using	the	test	procedures	documented	 in	MIL-STD-883	C,	Method	1019.4	 in	the	USA	[131]	and	ESA/SCC	basic	specification	no.	22900,	Draft	C	in	Europe	[132].	Radiation	hardness	assurance	testing	is	conducted	to	carry	out	failure	detection	and	to	improve	reliability,	while	enable	designers	for	redundancy	with	in	the	design	in	case	of	failure.	The	RH	system	profoundly	depends	on	electronic	circuitry	and	visual	monitoring	that	will	be	exposed	to	radiation	caused	by	activated	parts.		In	order	to	prevent	the	RH	equipment	electronics	from	failing,	it	is	important	to:	(1)	use	radiation-hardened	electronics,	(2)	minimize	the	number	of	electron-ics	directly	exposed	 to	 radiation	and	(3)	protect	electronics	 from	 radiation	 if	 they	are	on-board	 the	equipment	during	the	maintenance	process.		In	 the	existing	FRS	 target	area,	 the	permanently	 installed	cameras	are	not	 radiation-hardened.	As	 a	result	of	being	exposed	to	a	strong	neutron	flux	when	the	beam	was	operational,	the	camera	system	(both	CCD	and	control	unit)	was	completely	damaged	within	a	period	of	about	six	months.	This	system	then	required	replacement.	The	controller	box	for	the	existing	KUKA	robot	in	the	same	target	area	is	not	installed	on	the	robot,	but	behind	concrete	shielding.	Even	so,	the	actuators	on	the	joints	may	be	affected	by	particularly	high	doses	of	 radiation.	Most	 industrial	 robot	manufacturers,	such	 as	KUKA	and	FANUC,	do	not	provide	warranties	for	robotic	equipment	or	electronics	used	in	ionizing	radiation	environments.	As	a	safe	limit,	even	for	very	sensitive	semiconductor	parts,	the	data	indicate	that	doses	of	up	to	1Gy	can	be	received	without	failure	[132].	Due	to	the	complex	nature	of	the	Super-FRS	equipment	and	the	needs	mentioned	above,	it	is	important	to	adopt	a	SE	approach	that	can	provide	a	concept	design	capable	of	resolving	the	RH	issues	inherent	to	the	Super-FRS	tunnel.	In	order	to	accomplish	this,	a	SE	approach	was	formulated	following	a	study	of	State	of	 the	Art	SE	practices	 for	 the	development	of	RH	equipment	 in	HEP	 facilities	and	research	facilities.	To	make	 the	 SE	 approach	 reliable,	 it	was	 important	 to	 include	 feedback	 from	RH	 experts	across	the	globe.	These	RH	experts	were	contacted	directly	and	surveyed	as	part	of	a	tradeoff	analysis	to	decide	between	the	various	concept	solutions.	Based	on	this	SE	approach	requirements	and	needs	were	first	identified	and	documented	in	the	form	of	system	requirements	documents.	This	provided	a	firm	technical	grounding	to	explore	various	solu-tions	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system.	The	critical	role	of	requirements	development	is	to	identify	the	interfaces	between	the	MTRH	system	and	the	Super-FRS	environment.	It	also	 identifies	the	tasks	re-quired	 to	be	performed,	 the	RAMS	 requirements	and	other	non-functional	 requirements	critical	 for	development.	Requirements	development	is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	cornerstones	of	SE.	In	the	case	
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of	the	Super-FRS,	a	simple	MS	Office	template	was	used	to	document	the	requirements;	however	more	sophisticated	 software,	 such	 as	 IBM	DOORS	or	polarion,	 can	be	used	 to	 effectively	 collect,	 edit	 and	track	 requirements.	Once	 the	 requirements—both	 functional	and	non-functional—were	established,	the	next	step	was	to	develop	concept	designs	to	fulfill	the	Super-FRS’s	MTRH	system	needs.	The	three	concept	designs	developed	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	were	based	on	the	TPMs	established	for	the	Super-FRS	during	the	requirements	phase,	as	well	as	on	the	knowledge	drawn	from	the	equipment	classification	in	the	RH	survey	(see	chapter	0,	section	2.3).	The	three	concepts	developed	were	based	on	COTS	equipment	already	used	in	the	industry	and	in	various	other	facilities,	with	the	goal	of	mini-mizing	 development	 costs.	 The	 developed	 concepts	 identified	 and	 addressed	 key	 issues	 that	 were	missing	from	the	existing	RH	planning	in	the	Super-FRS.	These	issues	were:	
· RH	equipment	must	be	mobile,	so	that	it	is	able	to	move	through	the	tunnel	during	the	mainte-nance	period.	This	 is	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 there	are	multiple	 focal	points	and	hotspots	which	each	have	beamline	inserts	that	will	require	RH.	In	the	RH	solutions	suggested	before	this	re-search	began,	the	RH	stations	had	been	either	fixed	or	installed	on	rails	that	would	have	creat-ed	obstructions	within	the	main	tunnel	region	during	the	retrieval	of	beamline	 inserts.	In	the	event	of	magnet	failure,	the	whole	RH	setup	of	the	rails	and	the	robots	would	have	needed	to	be	dismantled	in	order	to	conduct	repair	or	replacement.	
· The	equipment	parked	within	tunnel	during	beam	operation	is	subjected	to	higher	doses	of	ra-diation	that	may	cause	damage	to	the	RH	equipment.	
· Interfaces:	The	beamline	 insert	and	vacuum	chamber	will	be	designed	by	multiple	organiza-tions	from	among	the	FAIR	partner	countries.	Hence,	there	 is	a	need	for	a	common	 interface	for	RH.	The	beamline	designs	require	remote	maintenance;	thus,	it	is	important	to	design	the	equipment	 to	 include	RH	and	 interface	points	 in	order	 to	optimize	 the	RH	and	maintenance	task	sequences.	
· The	 reduction,	 replacement,	 relocation	 and	protection	of	onboard	 electronics	 are	 a	priority.	They	reduce	the	risk	of	failure	of	the	RH	equipment	due	to	failures	of	the	electronics	systems	caused	by	radiation.	The	RH	equipment	must	also	be	provided	with	contamination	protection.	Modification	 of	 the	 COTS	 equipment	 for	 the	 MTRH	 system	 is	 needed	 in	 order	 to	 use	 this	equipment	in	the	Super-FRS	environment.	
· The	infrastructure	lacks	a	facility	to	store	activated	beamline	inserts.	
· Failures	regarding	the	installation	of	an	overhead	crane	across	the	Super-FRS	in	the	initial	fa-cility	design	represent	a	major	drawback	for	the	RH	system	infrastructure,	since:	
o It	is	very	costly	to	add	a	crane	system	at	this	stage.	
o This	severely	hinders	the	recoverability	of	major	RH	systems	during	failures.	
o This	hinders	the	deployment	of	redundant	systems	to	tackle	RH	system	failures.	
o This	reduces	the	load	capacity	for	RH	task	sequences.		
· The	choice	to	use	an	industrial	six-axis	manipulator	is	limited	to	the	KUKA	Titan	at	this	stage	because	the	required	payload	is	above	500	Kg	and	the	dimensions	of	the	tunnel	are	very	lim-ited	and	narrow.	
· Transferring	the	activated	beamline	 inserts	across	the	tunnel	and	to	the	hotcell	was	not	con-sidered	 in	earlier	designs.	A	transfer	shielding	box	on	a	mobile	platform	 is,	 thus,	required	 in	order	to	successfully	carry	out	RH	task	sequences.	
· Master	slave	manipulation	was	not	considered	during	the	initial	system	designs.	
· Task	sequences	for	on-site	remote	maintenance	were	not	defined.	The	post-processing	and	re-trieval	of	beamline	inserts	were	also	not	developed.	In	the	case	of	on-site	maintenance,	the	Su-per-FRS	would	require	RH	solutions	 involving	temporary	storage	and	repair	 locations	(other	than	the	main	hotcell	facility)	that	also	provide	master	slave	manipulation	and	storage.	
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The	three	suggested	concept	designs	were	all	more	detailed	than	earlier	considered	designs.	However,	the	aim	 is	to	 identify	the	most	suitable	design	for	the	Super-FRS.	This	was	achieved	by	conducting	a	tradeoff	 analysis	 of	 the	 three	 concepts	 in	 order	 to	 select	 one	 design	 for	 further	 development.	The	tradeoff	analysis	for	the	MTRH	concept	designs	was	divided	into	four	major	parts	based	on	RH	expert	input	and	design	needs	and	practices	(see	section	3.4.5	 for	detailed	 individual	analyses).	These	 four	parts	were:	
· Cost	analysis	
· Requirements	analysis	and	functional	analysis	
· Radiation	dose	analysis	and	task	sequence	optimization	
· Reliability	analysis	
The	overall	results	of	the	tradeoff	analysis	indicated	that	concept	one	was	the	best	solution	of	
the	three.	This	is	due	the	fact	that	this	solution	performs	the	current	RH	tasks	with:	
· Fewer	required	subsystems	to	carry	out	the	RH	task	sequences	within	the	Super-FRS	tunnel.	
· Lower	equipment	costs	and	infrastructure	change	costs	than	the	other	concept	designs,	which	also	require	higher	degrees	of	customization.	
· Experienced	and	skilled	GSI	RH	experts	capable	of	using	the	KUKA	robots	for	remote	mainte-nance.	These	means	that	no	further	trainings	are	needed	to	develop	the	workforce,	as	existing	workforce	has	these	skills.	
· A	higher	RAMS	rating,	due	the	fact	that	the	KUKA	titan	is	an	industrial	robot	with	a	higher	de-gree	of	reliability,	known	maintainability	procedures	and	practices	to	ensure	the	availability	of	the	system	for	remote	maintenance	task	sequences.	
· Fewer	modifications	to	the	COTS	equipment	and	the	Super-FRS	infrastructure	to	ensure	opera-tional	status	in	the	FAIR	Super-FRS	environment.		Despite	being	 the	most	suitable	option,	concept	one	still	has	some	major	drawbacks,	which	must	be	addressed	during	 the	 architecture	 design	 phase,	 the	 procurement	 phase	 and	 the	 prototype	 testing	phase:	
· There	is	very	little	room	for	onsite	maintenance	in	this	concept	and	the	scope	of	remote	opera-tions	is	limited.	Concept	one	can	only	be	used	for	pick-and-place	maintenance	in	the	tunnel	(i.e.	the	removal	and	installation	of	the	beamline	insert).	
· The	system	is	not	flexible	to	future	changes.	For	example,	the	RH	system	will	not	be	able	to	ac-commodate	changes	to	the	experimental	setup	of	the	Super-FRS,	such	as	changes	to	the	design	of	the	vacuum	chamber.	
· The	system	does	not	fulfil	100%	of	the	requirements	and	system	redundancy	requires	major	modifications.	
· Maintenance	of	the	 industrial	robotics	after	30	years	 is	not	supported	by	equipment	supplier	(i.e.	KUKA)	according	to	law.	
· The	system	has	no	master	slave	control	during	the	remote	manipulation	of	the	beamline	insert	i.e.	lack	of	man	in	the	loop	or	manual	manipulation.	The	use	of	the	proposed	SE	approach	enabled	engineers	to	identify	key	problems	with	initial	concept	designs,	which	had	only	been	designed	based	on	previous	experience	from	engineers	in	GSI.	Although	this	research	only	demonstrated	part	of	the	application	of	the	SE	approach,	the	implementation	of	the	entire	SE	approach	may	enable	the	Super-FRS	team	to	develop	MTRH	maintenance	systems	and	logis-tics	concepts	which	satisfy	the	complete	set	of	requirements,	TPMs,	and	technical	backgrounds	sam-pled	in	the	equipment	classifications	during	the	State	of	the	Art	survey.	The	three	concept	designs	and	
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the	selection	of	the	optimum	solution	take	 into	consideration	the	functional	needs,	RAMS	 issues	and	cost	concerns	by	utilizing	existing	and	conceptual	State	of	the	Art	engineering	designs	for	the	MTRH	system.	With	the	help	of	a	tradeoff	analysis,	the	SE	approach	ultimately	selected	a	concept	design	that	can	be	further	developed	into	a	system	that	will	be	used	at	the	Super-FRS	facility.	
3.7 Summary
This	chapter	has	presented	SE	approach	for	developing	RH	solutions	for	HEP	facilities.	It	has	focused	mainly	on	 the	development	of	 the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	 for	 the	FAIR	 facility,	which	served	as	 a	case-study	for	the	proposed	SE	approach.	It	presented	the	Super-FRS	RH	environment	within	the	tun-nel,	evaluated	the	beam	losses	across	the	Super-FRS	and	identified	the	critical	locations	requiring	re-mote	maintenance.	Following	the	steps	put	forward	by	the	SE	approach,	this	chapter	presented	a	brief	overview	of	the	requirements	development	process,	which	was	carried	out	 in	a	detailed	manner	and	used	to	identify	the	key	system	functions,	the	TPMs	(environmental	and	technical	parameters)	and	the	non-functional	requirements.	An	analysis	of	the	existing	concept	solutions	at	GSI	was	also	presented	and	the	technological	classification	of	the	RH	equipment,	presented	in	the	previous	chapter,	was	used	to	 develop	RH	 design	 concepts	 for	 the	MTRH	 system	 based	 on	 COTS	 equipment.	The	 possible	 ad-vantages	and	disadvantages	of	each	concept	design	for	the	MTRH	system	were	presented,	followed	by	
a	detailed	 tradeoff	 analysis.	This	 analysis	 included	 a	 requirements	 analysis,	 a	 functional	 analysis,	 a	radiation	dose	calculation	analysis,	an	FMEA,	a	cost	estimation	analysis	and	a	task	sequence	optimiza-tion	analysis.	The	result	of	this	process	was	the	 identification	of	an	optimal	design	for	an	RH	system	which	suits	the	needs	of	the	Super-FRS.		
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4 Conclusion and Future Work
4.1 Conclusion
This	thesis	has	presented	a	detailed	SE	approach	for	the	development	and	evaluation	of	RH	systems	for	maintenance	of	HEP	 facilities.	Specifically,	 it	has	 focused	on	particle	accelerator	 facilities	such	as	Super-FRS	at	FAIR	 in	Germany.	This	approach	has	been	generalized	and	can	be	applied	 to	develop-ment	of	other	RH	systems	in	different	facilities.		This	work	has	made	three	key	contributions	to	the	knowledge.	These	three	contributions	are	interde-pendent	and	related.	Its	first	contribution	was	a	detailed	and	comprehensive	survey	of	State	of	the	Art	equipment,	technologies	and	techniques	used	for	RH	at	HEP	and	nuclear	facilities	across	the	globe.	The	first	contribution,	the	survey	of	existing	RH	systems,	was	essential	to	fully	comprehend	the	State	of	the	Art	RH	equipment	and	diverse	environments	 in	both	HEP	 facilities	and	nuclear	reprocessing	plants.	The	goal	of	this	survey	was	to	classify	the	equipment	used	for	remote	maintenance,	categorize	the	var-ious	intervention	scenarios,	and	determine	the	generalized	needs	for	remote	maintenance	within	HEP	facilities.	RH	 equipment	 and	 tools	were	 listed	 and	divided	 into	 categories,	 as	were	 the	 existing	 ap-proaches	and	techniques	that	are	used	to	develop	and	evaluate	concept	designs	for	RH	systems.	Tasks	such	as	this	are	not	often	covered	or	explained	 in	a	systematic	way	 in	the	existing	 literature	for	HEP	facilities.	The	first	contribution	provided	additional	 information	concerning	HEP	facilities	RH	system	design	practices	and	toll	used	during	the	design	processes.	The	categorization	and	classification	of	HEP	facilities	in	details	enables	design	engineers	to	select	right	equipment	for	RH	system	designs	to	fulfill	the	RH	requirements.	The	second	contribution	of	the	work	was	the	proposal	of	a	SE	approach	for	the	development	of	RH	system	concepts	in	HEP	facilities.	This	contribution	directly	addresses	the	pressing	issue	of	nonexistent	SE	approaches	in	these	facilities	and	a	lack	of	adoption	of	SE	practices	which	exist	for	the	development	of	complex	equipment	in	other	fields	(e.g.	those	used	by	NASA,	ESA	and	INCOSE).		The	knowledge	gained	 from	 the	 first	contribution	was	 then	used	as	a	basis	 for	 the	proposed	SE	ap-proach,	which	was	 the	second	contribution.	The	proposed	SE	approach	 is	divided	 into	seven	major	processes	however	 the	scope	of	 thesis	was	 limited	 to	 first	 four	process	 implementation.	The	SE	ap-proach	was	 to	deliver	 a	 simplified	 SE	 approach	 that	was	 compatible	 to	HEP	 facilities	designing	 re-sources.	The	SE	approach	attempted	to	 integrate	SE	knowledge	with	RH	expert’s	opinion	to	 improve	the	RH	system	integration	into	the	facility	life	cycle	designing	process.	The	final	contribution,	the	de-velopment	and	evaluation	of	Super-FRS	MTRH	concept	designs,	was	a	practical	demonstration	of	the	proposed	SE	approach.	Finally,	several	concept	designs	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	were	devel-oped	and	evaluated	as	a	case	study	for	the	proposed	SE	approach.	As	such,	 it	validates	the	theory	of	
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the	approach,	while	also	acting	as	a	worked	example	for	any	engineers	wishing	to	apply	 it	 in	future.	The	problems	pointed	out	during	the	State	of	the	Art	studies	such	as	the	storage	of	activated	parts	and	transportation	and	compatibility	of	HEP	 facilities	equipment	 for	 remote	handling	were	some	of	key	major	issues	resolved	during	the	Super-FRS	case	study	by	applying	SE	approach.	Various	facilities	are	currently	 facing	unplanned	upgrades	with	 critical	 shortfalls	 in	 remote	maintenance.	However,	with	application	of	SE	approach	on	the	Super-FRS		case	study	a	detailed	overview	of	RH	environment	was	provided	by	calculating	beam	losses	across	the	fragment	separator	to	identify	critical	remote	mainte-nance	locations,	and	delivered	a	RH	system	designs	that	fulfills	the	RH	needs	(Section	3.6.1	provides	a	detailed	results	and	analysis	of	SE	approach	implementation	on	Super-FRS	remote	maintenance).	
		Chapter	two	presented	the	results	of	an	in-depth	survey.	This	was	necessary	to	gain	a	realistic	insight	into	how	RH	systems	are	used,	in	what	environments	they	are	used,	and	with	which	technologies.	The	survey	was	divided	into	three	main	parts:	i)	State	of	the	Art	RH	survey	of	HEP	facilities;	ii)	State	of	the	Art	RH	robotic	equipment	survey;	and	iii)	Classification	of	the	RH	equipment	for	remote	maintenance	tasks.		The	first	part	of	the	survey	specifically	focused	on	HEP	facilities.	It	was	found	that	each	and	eve-ry	existing	facility	had	evolved	over	the	course	of	past	60	years.	Correspondingly,	the	RH	systems	 in	these	 facilities	have	also	developed	over	 the	course	of	 this	 time	period	and,	 therefore,	development	has	been	carried	out	without	using	any	sort	of	standardized	process.	Despite	this,	the	survey	revealed	some	very	 interesting	similarities	 in	the	conditions,	systems	and	practices	used	for	RH	maintenance.	The	information	gathered	in	the	survey	was	formulated	into	a	classification	of	HEP	facilities	based	on	the	different	RH	environments.	The	four	types	of	classification	lay	down	a	generalized	basis	for	any	RH	environment	and	show	what	type	of	RH	systems	have	been	used	for	remote	maintenance	in	those	en-vironments.		A	classification	of	RH	equipment	was	also	performed,	with	the	aim	of	assisting	RH	design	engineers	 to	select	which	equipment	can	be	used	 to	 fulfill	 the	RH	needs	and	requirements	 for	 their	specific	environment.	As	well	as	design	engineers,	this	contribution	can	also	be	used	by	the	planners	of	HEP	facilities	as	a	guideline	to	allow	them	to	make	provisions	for	RH	systems	even	if	it	will	not	be	de-signed	along	with	 the	 facility,	but	rather	will	be	gradually	 introduced	 into	 the	project	as	 the	 facility	develops.		Chapter	three	presented	two	contributions:	the	proposed	SE	approach	and	a	worked	example.	Contri-bution	two	of	this	thesis	focused	on	providing	a	simplified	SE	approach	for	developing	the	RH	systems	and	logistics	concepts	for	HEP	facilities.	This	was	necessary	as	the	survey	found	that	SE	approaches	in	these	facilities	were	nonexistent	for	the	development	of	RH	systems.	The	proposed	approach	is	based	on	State	of	the	Art	SE	knowledge	but	 tailored	to	 the	specific	needs	of	HEP	 facilities.	 It	stipulates	 the	milestones	and	target	documentation	required	to	record	the	knowledge	which	is	developed	during	the	process	of	RH	concept	design.	The	proposed	SE	approach	is	focused	on	three	aspects:		i)	Utilizing	the	knowledge	available	regarding	the	RH	solutions	at	various	facilities;		ii)	Optimizing	the	resources	and	time	allocation	during	concept	development;	and		iii)	Documenting	the	knowledge	at	every	stage	of	the	process	to	ensure	a	concept	design	that	is	usea-ble	and	fulfills	the	RH	needs.		Chapter	three	also	presented	the	third	contribution	of	this	thesis,	which	was	the	application	of	the	SE	approach	to	the	development	of	concept	designs	of	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system.	Certain	parts	of	the	SE	approach	were	elaborated	on	 in	 further	detail,	using	knowledge	 from	 the	 fields	of	 requirements	management,	 interface	management,	functional	analysis,	radiation	protection,	radiation	analysis,	and	concept	design	engineering.	Through	this	process,	the	MTRH	system	concept	designs	were	developed	
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and	evaluated	for	the	Super-FRS	facility.	This	part	of	the	research	work	also	focused	on	developing	a	tradeoff	analysis	for	three	concept	designs,	in	order	to	attain	a	single	design	that	was	reliable,	accepta-ble	(based	on	expert	criteria),	and	 fulfilled	 the	basic	needs	and	requirements.	The	SE	approach	was	shown	to	be	successful	as	the	development	and	tradeoff	analysis	enabled	the	designers	to	explore	new	avenues	and	evaluate	a	variety	of	solutions	to	carry	out	maintenance.	This	included	modular	thinking	into	 the	MTRH	designs	and	which	beamline	equipment	required	remote	handling.	The	development	addressed	the	 issues	of	activated	beamline	storage	 transportation,	onsite	storage,	onsite	and	hotcell	maintenance	 issues,	RAMS,	 initial	 cost	 estimation,	 automated	 and	 teleoperated	 equipment,	 and	 the	flexibility	of	the	MTRH	system	over	the	course	of	facility	lifecycle.	This	contribution	also	demonstrated	the	use	of	various	State	of	the	Art	tools	that	had	previously	either	only	been	used	individually	or	had	never	been	used	collectively	in	concept	development,	planning	and	evaluation	of	RH	systems	for	HEP	facilities.		The	research	work	presented	in	this	thesis	paves	the	way	for	the	future	development	of	generalizable	practices	 to	develop	 concept	designs	of	RH	systems	 for	HEP	 facilities.	This	 research	 lays	down	 the	groundwork	for	developing	RH	systems	 in	a	systematic	manner,	utilizing	SE	knowledge	and	State	of	the	Art	advances	in	RH	system	technology	from	across	the	globe.	It	also	provides	a	guideline	example	of	how	 to	document	 the	knowledge	created	during	 the	concept	development	process	and	uses	 tools	that	can	provide	better	results	to	estimate	possible	doses.	It	shows	the	value	of	including	expert	opin-ion	in	designing	the	tradeoff	analysis	to	ensure	the	selection	of	an	optimal	design.	
4.1 Future work
This	research	project	pushes	for	the	adoption	of	systematic	approaches	to	the	development	of	RH	sys-tems	for	hazardous	environments,	such	as	those	created	due	the	 increase	 in	beam	 intensities	at	HEP	facilities.	The	research	has	provided	a	comprehensive	outlook	regarding	the	technologies	and	equip-ment	currently	 in	use	within	HEP	facilities	and	has	fused	this	with	system	engineering	knowledge	to	streamline	the	development	of	RH	system	concepts.	The	continuing	growth	in	the	construction	of	HEP	facilities	and	the	increase	of	beam	intensities	will	result	in	a	growing	need	to	adopt	generalizable	ap-proaches,	such	as	the	one	presented	in	this	thesis.	It	ensures	that	the	developed	solutions	fulfill	the	RH	needs	of	the	facility,	while	maximizing	the	use	of	the	available	State	of	the	Art	technology.	During	the	development	of	this	thesis,	close	collaborations	were	carried	out	with	RH	engineers	and	researchers,	and	future	prospects	for	the	research	have	been	identified.	Some	of	the	key	fields	for	future	research	are	listed	below.	Extension	of	the	SE	approach	for	developing	RH	architectures	for	HEP	facilities.	For	example,	 in	par-ticular,	 further	 improving	 the	SE	approach	 to	allow	optimization	of	the	development	resources,	cost	and	time.	Also,	further	integration	of	project	management,	SE,	and	design	engineering	practices	is	re-quired	to	develop	a	comprehensive,	unified	framework	for	RH	development	within	HEP	facilities.	Further	 integration	of	 radiological	protection	 scenarios	 into	 the	design	process	of	RH	 systems	 and	facility	concepts.	For	example,	currently,	various	software	tools	(FLUKA,	IV	planner,	MatPlanner)	are	used	 individually	 to	assess	 the	situation	 for	 the	 radiation	protection	and	 intervention.	The	develop-ment	of	software	with	integrated	features	to	analyze	the	pre	and	post	interventions,	besides	the	radia-tion	protection,	is	one	promising	direction	for	research.	
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Some	of	 the	key	 technical	 issues	of	 the	RH	 equipment	 itself	 require	 further	 research.	For	 example,	these	include	aspects	such	as:	master	slave	control	across	longer	distances,	accuracy	and	repeatability	of	RH	tasks	and	optimization	of	energy	consumption	across	long	distance.	Also,	further	efforts	and	studies	should	be	made	to	implement	the	proposed	SE	approach	in	the	devel-opment	of	concept	designs	for	RH	systems	in	future	facilities.	Examples	of	such	facilities	include	ESS,	SPIRAL	2	and	International	Linear	Collider	projects	(ILC).	In	this	way,	the	proposed	approach	can	be	improved	as	well	as	becoming	a	standard	approach	for	the	development	of	RH	concept	designs	within	HEP	facilities.	
141
References
[1]	 J.-L.	Basdevant,	J.	Rich,	and	M.	Spiro,	Fundamentals	in	Nuclear	Physics:	From	Nuclear	Structure	to	
Cosmology.	Springer	Science	&	Business	Media,	2005.	[2]	 H.	H.	Gutbrod,	I.	Augustin,	H.	Eickhoff,	K.	D.	Gross,	W.	F.	Henning,	D.	Kraemer,	and	G.	Walter,	“FAIR	
-	Baseline	technical	report.	Executive	summary,”	2006.	[3]	 K.-H.	Behr,	B.	Achenbach,	A.	Brünle,	H.	Geissel,	M.	Gleim,	W.	Hüller,	C.	Karagiannis,	G.	Münzenberg,	C.	Scheidenberger,	K.	Sümmerer,	H.	Weick,	and	M.	Winkler,	“Remote-handling	systems	at	the	high-radiation	areas	of	the	GSI	fragment	separator	FRS,”	Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	B	Beam	
Interact.	Mater.	At.,	vol.	266,	no.	19–20,	pp.	4280–4283,	Oct.	2008.	[4]	 T.	L.	G.	Stan	O.	Schriber,	“ Rare	Isotope	Heavy	Ion	Accelerators,” Proceedings	of	the	11th	Work-shop	on	RF	Superconductivity,	Lübeck/Travemünder,	Germany,	2003.		
	[5]	 I.	Augustin,	H.Gutbord,	D.Krämer,	K.H.	Langanke,	and	H.	Stöcker,	"New	physics	at	the	international	Facility	for	Antiproton	and	Ion	Research	(FAIR)	next	to	GSI," Fourth	International	Conference	on	
Fission	and	Properties	of	Neutron-Rich	nuclei,	Sanibel	Island,	Florida,	Nov.	2007.		[Online]	Available:	http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0804/0804.0177.pdf	[6]	 “OECD	Global	Science	Forum	report	2008,”	Working	group	of	nuclear	physics,	Dec.	2012.	[Online].	Available:	http://www.oecd.org/science/scienceandtechnologypolicy/40638321.pdf.	[7]	 NuPECC,	“About	NuPECC.”	[Online].	Available:		http://www.nupecc.org/	[8]	 U.	Amaldi,	“The	importance	of	particle	accelerators,”	Europhys.	News,	vol.	31,	no.	6,	pp.	5–9,	2000.	[9]	 “How	Particle	Accelerators	Work,”	Energy.gov.	[Online].	Available:	http://energy.gov/articles/how-particle-accelerators-work.	[Accessed:	May.	2015].	[10]	“PURESAFE	–	‘Preventing	hUman	intervention	for	incrREased	SAfety	in	inFrastructures	Emitting	ionizing	radiation’	Initial	Training	Network	(ITN),”	Jan.	2011.	[Online].	Available:	http://webhotel2.tut.fi/iha/puresafe/.	[11]	K.	Wille,	"The	Physics	of	Particle	Accelerators:	An	Introduction".	Oxford	University	Press,	2000.	[12]	S.	Myers,	“The	engineering	needed	for	particle	physics,”	Philos.	Trans.	R.	Soc.	Lond.	Math.	Phys.	Eng.	
Sci.,	vol.	370,	no.	1973,	pp.	3887–3923,	Aug.	2012.	[13]	H.	Geissel,	H.	Weick,	M.	Winkler,	G.	Münzenberg,	V.	Chichkine,	M.	Yavor,	T.	Aumann,	K.	H.	Behr,	M.	Böhmer,	A.	Brünle,	K.	Burkard,	J.	Benlliure,	D.	Cortina-Gil,	L.	Chulkov,	A.	Dael,	J.-E.	Ducret,	H.	Em-ling,	B.	Franczak,	J.	Friese,	B.	Gastineau,	J.	Gerl,	R.	Gernhäuser,	M.	Hellström,	B.	Jonson,	J.	Kojouha-rova,	R.	Kulessa,	B.	Kindler,	N.	Kurz,	B.	Lommel,	W.	Mittig,	G.	Moritz,	C.	Mühle,	J.	A.	Nolen,	G.	Nyman,	P.	Roussell-Chomaz,	C.	Scheidenberger,	K.-H.	Schmidt,	G.	Schrieder,	B.	M.	Sherrill,	H.	Simon,	K.	Sümmerer,	N.	A.	Tahir,	V.	Vysotsky,	H.	Wollnik,	and	A.	F.	Zeller,	“The	Super-FRS	project	at	GSI,”	
142
Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	B	Beam	Interact.	Mater.	At.,	vol.	204,	pp.	71–85,	May	2003.	
	[14]	M.	Winkler,	H.	Geissel,	H.	Weick,	B.	Achenbach,	K.-H.	Behr,	D.	Boutin,	A.	Brünle,	M.	Gleim,	W.	Hüller,	C.	Karagiannis,	A.	Kelic,	B.	Kindler,	E.	Kozlova,	H.	Leibrock,	B.	Lommel,	G.	Moritz,	C.	Mühle,	G.	Mün-zenberg,	C.	Nociforo,	W.	Plass,	C.	Scheidenberger,	H.	Simon,	K.	Sümmerer,	N.	A.	Tahir,	A.	Tausch-witz,	M.	Tomut,	J.	S.	Winfield,	and	M.	Yavor,	“The	status	of	the	Super-FRS	in-flight	facility	at	FAIR,”	
Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	B	Beam	Interact.	Mater.	At.,	vol.	266,	no.	19–20,	pp.	4183–4187,	Oct.	2008.	[15]	R.	C.	Fernow	and	R.	C.	Fernow,	Introduction	to	Experimental	Particle	Physics.	Cambridge	University	Press,	1989.	[16]	B.	R.	Martin,	Nuclear	and	Particle	Physics:	An	Introduction.	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	2011.	[17]	A.	A.	A.	Jr,	L.	M.	A.	Filho,	A.	F.	Barbosa,	M.	Martemiyanov,	M.-L.	Mercier,	S.	Monteil,	V.	Niess,	P.	Per-ret,	G.	Reinmuth,	A.	Robert,	S.	Suchorski,	K.	Arnaud,	E.	Aslanides,	J.	Babel,	C.	Benchouk,	J.-P.	Cachemiche,	J.	Cogan,	F.	Derue,	B.	Dinkespiler,	P.-Y.	Duval,	V.	Garonne,	S.	Favard,	R.	L.	Gac,	F.	Leon,	O.	Leroy,	P.-L.	Liotard,	F.	Marin,	M.	Menouni,	et.	al.,	“The	LHCb	Detector	at	the	LHC,”	J.	Instrum.,	vol.	3,	no.	08,	p.	S08005,	Aug.	2008.	[18]	A.	H.	Sullivan,	A	guide	to	radiation	and	radioactivity	levels	near	high	energy	particle	accelerators.	Nuclear	Technology	Publishing,	1992.	[19]“About	CERN-CERN,”	16-Oct-2008.	[Online].	Available:	http://home.web.cern.ch/.		[20]	“CONVENTION	FOR	THE	ESTABLISHMENT	OF	A		EUROPEAN	ORGANIZATION	FOR	NUCLEAR	RE-SEARCH.”	[Online].	Available:	http://council.web.cern.ch/council/en/EuropeanStrategy/ESConvention.html.	[21]	T.	Junquera,	“Status	of	the	construction	of	the	SPIRAL	2	accelerator	at	GANIL,”	Proc.	LINAC08	Vic.	
BC	Can.,	2008.	[22]	“About	Facility	for	Rare	Isotope	Beams	(FRIB).”	[Online].	Available:	http://www.frib.msu.edu/.	[23]J.	Moffat,	Cracking	the	Quantum	Code	of	the	Universe.	Oxford	University	Press,	2014.	[24]“About	GSI	Helmholtz	Centre	for	Heavy	Ion	Research-	GSI.”	[Online].	Available:	www.gsi.de.	[25]M.	Buss,	K.-K.	Lee,	N.	Nitzsche,	A.	Peer,	B.	Stanczyk,	and	U.	Unterhinninghofen,	“Advanced	Telero-botics:	Dual-Handed	and	Mobile	Remote	Manipulation,”	in	Advances	in	Telerobotics,	M.	Ferre,	M.	Buss,	R.	Aracil,	C.	Melchiorri,	and	C.	Balaguer,	Eds.	Springer	Berlin	Heidelberg,	2007,	pp.	471–497.	[26]	K.	Goldberg,	D.	Song,	Y.	Khor,	D.	Pescovitz,	A.	Levandowski,	J.	Himmelstein,	J.	Shih,	A.	Ho,	E.	Paulos,	and	J.	Donath,	“Collaborative	online	teleoperation	with	spatial	dynamic	voting	and	a	human‘	Tele-Actor,’”	in	Robotics	and	Automation,	2002.	Proceedings.	ICRA’02.	IEEE	International	Conference	on,	2002,	vol.	2,	pp.	1179–1184.	[27]	Keiji	Nagatani,	S.	Kiribayashi,	Y.	Okada,	S.	Tadokoro,	T.	Nishimura,	T.	Yoshida,	E.	Koyanagi,	and	Y.	Hada,	“Redesign	of	rescue	mobile	robot	Quince,”	in	2011	IEEE	International	Symposium	on	Safety,	
Security,	and	Rescue	Robotics	(SSRR),	2011,	pp.	13–18.	
143
[28]	R.	R.	Murphy,	J.	Kravitz,	S.	Stover,	and	R.	Shoureshi,	“Mobile	robots	in	mine	rescue	and	recovery,”	
IEEE	Robot.	Autom.	Mag.,	vol.	16,	no.	2,	pp.	91–103,	Jun.	2009.	[29]J.	Vertut	and	P.	Coiffet,	Teleoperation	and	Robotics:	Evolution	and	development.	Springer	Nether-lands,	1985.	[30]	S.	Kim,	S.	H.	Jung,	and	C.	H.	Kim,	“Preventive	maintenance	and	remote	inspection	of	nuclear	power	plants	using	telerobotics,”	in	1999	IEEE/RSJ	International	Conference	on	Intelligent	Robots	and	Sys-
tems.	IROS	’99.	Proceedings,	vol.	1,	pp.	603–608,	1999.	[31]	B.	N.	E.	Society,	Remote	Techniques	for	Nuclear	Plant:	Proceedings	of	the	Conference	Organized	by	
the	British	Nuclear	Energy	Society,	Held	at	Stratford-upon-Avon	on	10-13	May	1993.	Thomas	Telford,	1993.	[32]S.	Y.	Nof,	Handbook	of	Industrial	Robotics.	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	1999.	[33]K.	Kim,	J.	Lee,	B.	Park,	and	I.	Cho,	“PRIDE	RH	systems,”	in	2012	12th	International	Conference	on	
Control,	Automation	and	Systems	(ICCAS),	pp.	2203–2206,	2012.	[34]P.	Putz,	“Space	robotics	in	Europe:	A	survey,”	Robot.	Auton.	Syst.,	vol.	23,	no.	1–2,	pp.	3–16,	Mar.	1998.	[35]V.	Oghenekevwe,	S.	Redmond,	M.	Hiltz,	and	R.	Rembala,	“Human	and	robotic	repair	of	a	solar	array	wing	during	ISS	assembly	mission	10A,”	Acta	Astronaut.,	vol.	65,	no.	11–12,	pp.	1717–1722,	Dec.	2009.	[36]E.	Coleshill,	L.	Oshinowo,	R.	Rembala,	B.	Bina,	D.	Rey,	and	S.	Sindelar,	“Dextre:	Improving	mainte-nance	operations	on	the	International	Space	Station,”	Acta	Astronaut.,	vol.	64,	no.	9–10,	pp.	869–874,	May	2009.	[37]R.	Rembala	and	C.	Ower,	“Robotic	assembly	and	maintenance	of	future	space	stations	based	on	the	ISS	mission	operations	experience,”	Acta	Astronaut.,	vol.	65,	no.	7–8,	pp.	912–920,	Oct.	2009.	[38]S.	McMillan,	D.	E.	Orin,	and	R.	B.	McGhee,	“Efficient	dynamic	simulation	of	an	underwater	vehicle	with	a	robotic	manipulator,”	IEEE	Trans.	Syst.	Man	Cybern.,	vol.	25,	no.	8,	pp.	1194–1206,	Aug.	1995.	[39]“Subsea	remotely	operated	vehicles	to	subsea	robots.”	[Online].	Available:	https://www.academia.edu/672916/Subsea_remotely_operated_vehicles_to_subsea_robots.	[Ac-cessed:	27-Apr-2015].	[40]A.	Shukla	and	H.	Karki,	“A	review	of	robotics	in	onshore	oil-gas	industry,”	in	2013	IEEE	Interna-
tional	Conference	on	Mechatronics	and	Automation	(ICMA),	2013,	pp.	1153–1160.	[41]A.	C.	Rolfe,	“A	perspective	on	fusion	relevant	RH	techniques,”	Fusion	Eng.	Des.,	vol.	82,	no.	15–24,	pp.	1917–1923,	Oct.	2007.	[42]A.	Holmes-Siedle	and	L.	Adams,	Handbook	of	Radiation	Effects,	2	edition.	Oxford ;	New	York:	Ox-ford	University	Press,	2002.	[43]Y.	Miyake,	K.	Shimomura,	N.	Kawamura,	P.	Strasser,	S.	Makimura,	A.	Koda,	H.	Fujimori,	K.	Nakahara,	S.	Takeshita,	Y.	Kobayashi,	K.	Nishiyama,	W.	Higemoto,	T.	U.	Ito,	K.	Ninomiya,	M.	Kato,	R.	Kadono,	N.	
144
Sato,	and	K.	Nagamine,	“J-PARC	muon	facility,	MUSE,”	J.	Phys.	Conf.	Ser.,	vol.	225,	no.	1,	p.	012036,	Apr.	2010.	[44]“About	ORNL-Oak	Ridge	National	Laboratory	|	ORNL.”	[Online].	Available:	https://www.ornl.gov/.	[45]	J.	Vollaire,	“Calculation	of	the	residual	dose	rate	from	targets	used	in	the	ISOLDE	facility.,”	4th	
High	Power	Targetry	Workshop,	2011.	[Online].	Available:	http://www.hep.princeton.edu/mumu/target/Vollaire/vollaire_050411.pdf.	[46]P.	C.	Bennett	and	L.	D.	Posey,	“RHOBOT:	Radiation	Hardened	Robotics.”	Sandia		National	Laborato-ries,	Oct-1997.	[47]	D.	Bräunig,	F.	Wulf,	“Chapter	10	Radiation	effects	in	electronic	components.”	Elsevier	book	series:	Instabilities	in	Silicon	Devices,	Vol	3,		Pages	639-722,	1999.	[Online].	Available:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874590399800172	[48]“Nuclear	and	space	radiation	effects	on	materials.”	NASA,	Jun-1970. [Online].	Available:http://www.barringer1.com/mil_files/NASA-SP-8053.pdf		[49]J.	D.	Cossairt,	“Radiation	physics	for	personnel	and	environmental	protoection,”	Fermilad	Report	TM1834,	Revision	9B,	May	20017.	[Online].	Available:	https://www-esh.fnal.gov/TM1834_PDF_Files/TM_1834_Revision_9B.pdf	[50]J.	Shapiro,	Radiation	Protection:	A	Guide	for	Scientists,	Regulators,	and	Physicians.	La	Editorial,	UPR,	American	Association	of	Physicists	in	Medicine,	2003.	[51]“About	International	Commission	on	Radiological	Protection-	ICRP,”	05-May-2015.	[Online].	Available:	http://www.icrp.org/.	[52]L.	E.	Moritz,	“Radiation	Protection	Considerations	in	the	Design	of	Accelerated	Radioactive	Beam	Facilities,”	Proceedings	of	the	15th	International	Conference	on	Cyclotrons	and	their	Applications,	Caen,	France,	Sep.	1999.	[Online].	Available:	https://accelconf.web.cern.ch/accelconf/c98/papers/d-01.pdf	[53]European	Atomic	Energy	Community,	“Directive	96/29/Euratom	-	ionizing	radiation.”	13-May-1996.	[54]“1990	Recommendations	of	the	International	Commission	on	Radiological	Protection,”	Ann.	ICRP,	vol.	21,	no.	1–3,	pp.	1–201,	1991.	[55]“The	2007	Recommendations	of	the	International	Commission	on	Radiological	Protection.	ICRP	publication	103,”	Ann.	ICRP,	vol.	37,	no.	2–4,	pp.	1–332,	2007.	[56]German	Federal	Office	for	Radiation	Protection,	“German	dose	limits	in	occupational	radiation	protection,.”	[Online].	Available:	http://www.bfs.de/en/ion/beruf_schutz/grenzwerte.html.	[57]C.	William,	J.	C.	Inkret,	and	C.	B.	Taschner,	“A	Brief	History	of	Radiation:	Protection	Standards,”	1995.	[58]W.	F.	Morgan	and	W.	J.	Bair,	“Issues	in	Low	Dose	Radiation	Biology:	The	Controversy	Continues.	A	Perspective,”	Radiat.	Res.,	vol.	179,	no.	5,	pp.	501–510,	Apr.	2013.	
145
[59]C.	Grupen,	Introduction	to	Radiation	Protection:	Practical	Knowledge	for	Handling	Radioactive	
Sources,	2010	edition.	Berlin ;	New	York:	Springer,	2010.	[60]German	Federal	Office	for	Radiation	Protection,	“Ordinance	on	the	Protection	against	Damage	and	Injuries	Caused	by	Ionizing	Radiation	(Radiation	Protection	Ordinance).”	2001.	[61]International	Conference	on	Occupational	Radiation	Protection:	Protecting	Workers	against	Expo-sure	to	Ionizing	Radiation	and	International	Atomic	Energy	Agency,	Eds.,	Occupational	radiation	
protection:	protecting	workers	against	exposure	to	ionizing	radiation ;	[International	Conference	on	
Radiation	Protection:	Protecting	Workers	against	Exposure	to	Ionizing	Radiation	organized	by	the	
International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	...	and	held	in	Geneva,	26	-	30	August	2002].	Vienna:	Internat.	Atomic	Energy	Agency,	2003.	[62]R.	Sharp	and	M.	Decréton,	“Radiation	tolerance	of	components	and	materials	in	nuclear	robot	ap-plications,”	Reliab.	Eng.	Syst.	Saf.,	vol.	53,	no.	3,	pp.	291–299,	Sep.	1996.	[63]“About	PSI	-	Paul	Scherrer	Institute.”	[Online].	Available:	http://www.psi.ch/.	[64]E.	Wagner,	“RH	and	Shielding	at	PSI,”	in	AIP	Conference	Proceedings,	2002,	vol.	642,	pp.	265–268.	[65]M.	J.	Rennich	and	T.	W.	Burgess,	“RH	in	the	spallation	neutron	source	target	facility,”	Nucl.	News,	vol.	49,	no.	2,	pp.	32–36,	2006.	[66]F.	C.	K.	Kershaw,	“Remote	inspection,	measurement	and	handling	for	LHC,”	pp.	332	–	334,	2007.	[67]“CERN	releases	analysis	of	LHC	incident,”	16-Oct-2008.	[Online].	Available:	http://press.web.cern.ch/press-releases/2008/10/cern-releases-analysis-lhc-incident.	[68]D.	Milosevic	and	P.	Patanakul,	“Standardized	project	management	may	increase	development	pro-jects	success,”	Int.	J.	Proj.	Manag.,	vol.	23,	no.	3,	pp.	181–192,	2005.	[69]“Critical	Success	Factors	for	Different	Project	Objectives,”	J.	Constr.	Eng.	Manag.,	vol.	125,	no.	3,	pp.	142–150,	1999.	[70]S.	J.	Kapurch,	NASA	Systems	Engineering	Handbook.	DIANE	Publishing,	2010.	[71]R.	Stevens,	Systems	Engineering:	Coping	with	Complexity.	Pearson	Education,	1998.	[72]R.	I.	Faulconbridge	and	M.	J.	Ryan,	Managing	Complex	Technical	Projects:	A	Systems	Engineering	
Approach.	Artech	House,	2003.	[73]D.	Dvir,	T.	Raz,	and	A.	J.	Shenhar,	“An	empirical	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	project	plan-ning	and	project	success,”	Int.	J.	Proj.	Manag.,	vol.	21,	no.	2,	pp.	89–95,	Feb.	2003.	[74]J.	F.	Nunamaker	Jr.,	M.	Chen,	and	T.	D.	M.	Purdin,	“Systems	Development	in	Information	Systems	Research,”	J	Manage	Inf	Syst,	vol.	7,	no.	3,	pp.	89–106,	Oct.	1990.	[75]G.	Heidenreich,	“Carbon	and	Beryllium	Targets	at	PSI,”	in	AIP	Conference	Proceedings,	2002,	vol.	642,	pp.	122–124.	[76]P.	A.	Schmelzbach	and	R.	Dolling,	“Experience	with	high-power	operation	of	the	PSI	proton	accel-erator	facility,” Proceedings	of	HB2006,	pp.	274–278,	Tsukuba,	Japan,	2006.	
146
[77]H.	Heyck,	“Infrastructure	of	a	high	Power	Neutron	Spallation	Source	at	PSI.”	Second	High-Power	
Targetry	Workshop	,	Oak	Ridge,	TN,	Oct.	2005.	[78]S.	Makimura,	N.	Kawamura,	and	M.	Kato,	“Remotely	controlled	replacement	of	highly	radioactive	components	in	J-PARC/MUSE,” Proceedings	of	the	7th	Annual	Meeting	of	Particle	Accelerator	Socie-
ty	of	Japan,	,	Himeji,	Japan,	Aug.	2010.	[79]K.	Anderson	and	B.	Bernstein,	“The	NuMI	Facility	Technical	Design	Report.”	Oct-1998.	[Online].	Available:	http://lss.fnal.gov/archive/design/fermilab-design-1998-01.pdf	[80]C.	J.	Densham,	M.	D.	Fitton,	M.	Baldwin,	and	M.	Woodward,	“T2K	Target	RH.”	4th	High	Power	Tar-
getry	Workshop,	Malmö,	Sweden,	May.	2011.	[81]T2K	Collaboration,	N.	Abgrall,	H.	Aihara,	Y.	Ajima,	J.	B.	Albert,	D.	Allan,	P.-A.	Amaudruz,	C.	Andreo-poulos,	B.	Andrieu,	M.	D.	Anerella,	C.	Angelsen,	S.	Aoki,	O.	Araoka,	J.	Argyriades,	A.	Ariga,	T.	Ariga,	S.	Assylbekov,	J.	P.	A.	M.	de	André,	D.	Autiero,	A.	Badertscher,	O.	Ballester,	M.	Barbi,	G.	J.	Barker,	P.	Baron,	G.	Barr,	L.	Bartoszek,	M.	Batkiewicz,	F.	Bay,	S.	Bentham,	V.	Berardi,	B.	E.	Berger,	H.	Berns,	I.	Bertram,	M.	Besnier,	J.	Beucher,	et.	al.,	“The	T2K	Experiment,”	Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	
Accel.	Spectrometers	Detect.	Assoc.	Equip.,	vol.	659,	no.	1,	pp.	106–135,	Dec.	2011.	
	[82]P.	E.	F.	Gérard	Bachy,	“Design	process	and	control,	design	standards	for	the	Large	Hadron	Collider	project.” LHC-Project-Report-2	;	CERN-LHC-Project-Report-2,	Accelerators	and	Storage	Rings,	Ge-neva,	Switzerland,	Feb.	1996.	[83]K.	Kershaw,	“Collimation	RH.” LHC	Collimation	Review	meeting,		Jun.	2011.	[84]R.	Folch,	“Remote	Inspection	Vehicle	at	CERN.” Workshop	on	remote	manipulations	in	radioactive	areas,	CERN,	Geneva,		switzerland,	May.	2013.	[85]D.	Autiero,	“ Target	station	infrastructure	the	cngs	experience.” Workshop	on	Applications	of	High	
Intensity	Proton	Accelerators,	Dresden,	Germany	Oct.	2008.		[86]K.	Kershaw,	“ remote	overhead	travelling	crane	operation	&	xtax	table	repair	repair:	A	large	scale	
&	remote	controlled	excercise	@	CERN”,	Remote	manipulations	/	diagnostics	in	radioactive	areas	
and	handling	of	radioactive	material	Workshop,	Geneva,	Switzerland,	May.	2013.	[87]T.	Wakui,	M.	Futakawa,	H.	Kogawa,	and	S.	Ishikura,	“Failure	probability	estimation	of	multi-walled	vessels	for	mercury	target,”	J.	Nucl.	Sci.	Technol.,	vol.	44,	no.	4,	pp.	530–536,	2007.	[88]T.	Wakui,	T.	Naoe,	H.	Kogawa,	and	M.	Futakawa,	“Effects	of	pitting	damage	and	repeated	stresses	on	lifetime	of	mercury	target,”	Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	Accel.	Spectrometers	Detect.	
Assoc.	Equip.,	vol.	600,	no.	1,	pp.	150–153,	Feb.	2009.	[89]S.	Sakamoto,	“Technical	design	report	of	spallation	neutron	source	facility	in	J-PARC,”	Japan	Atom-ic	Energy	Agency,	Tokai,	Ibaraki	(Japan),	2012.	[90]P.	V.	Duppen,	“Isotope	Separation	On	Line	and	Post	Acceleration,”	The	Euroschool	Lectures	on	Phys-
ics	with	Exotic	Beams,	Vol.	II,		Volume	700	of	the	series	Lecture	Notes	in	Physics,	pp	37-77,	2006.	[91]A.	C.	Mueller,	“AN	OVERVIEW	OF	RADIOACTIVE	BEAM	FACILITIES,”	Proceedings	of	European	Par-
ticle	Accelerator	Conference,	pp	73-77,	Vienna,	Austria,	2000.	
147
[92]H.	Geissel,	P.	Armbruster,	K.	H.	Behr,	A.	Brünle,	K.	Burkard,	M.	Chen,	H.	Folger,	B.	Franczak,	H.	Kel-ler,	O.	Klepper,	B.	Langenbeck,	F.	Nickel,	E.	Pfeng,	M.	Pfützner,	E.	Roeckl,	K.	Rykaczewski,	I.	Schall,	D.	Schardt,	C.	Scheidenberger,	K.-H.	Schmidt,	A.	Schröter,	T.	Schwab,	K.	Sümmerer,	M.	Weber,	G.	Mün-zenberg,	T.	Brohm,	H.-G.	Clerc,	M.	Fauerbach,	J.-J.	Gaimard,	A.	Grewe,	E.	Hanelt,	B.	Knödler,	M.	Stei-ner,	B.	Voss,	J.	Weckenmann,	C.	Ziegler,	A.	Magel,	H.	Wollnik,	J.	P.	Dufour,	Y.	Fujita,	D.	J.	Vieira,	and	B.	Sherrill,	“The	GSI	projectile	fragment	separator	(FRS):	a	versatile	magnetic	system	for	relativistic	heavy	ions,”	Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	B	Beam	Interact.	Mater.	At.,	vol.	70,	no.	1–4,	pp.	286–297,	Aug.	1992.	[93]J.	L.	GRENARD,	“The	ISOLDE	robots	upgrade.” ISOLDE	Workshop	and	Users	meeting,		Dec.	2014.	[94]B.	Jonson	and	K.	Riisager,	“The	ISOLDE	facility,”	Scholarpedia,	vol.	5,	no.	7,	p.	9742,	2010.	[95]A.	Yoshida,	T.	Suda,	T.	Ohtsuki,	H.	Yuki,	and	T.	Kubo,	“Status	and	overview	of	production	target	for	BigRIPS	separator	at	RIKEN,”	Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	Accel.	Spectrometers	Detect.	
Assoc.	Equip.,	vol.	590,	no.	1–3,	pp.	204–212,	Jun.	2008.	[96]A.	C.	Rolfe,	“RH	on	fusion	experiments,”	Fusion	Eng.	Des.,	vol.	36,	no.	1,	pp.	91–100,	Apr.	1997.	[97]P.	D.	F.	Jones,	D.	Maisonnier,	and	T.	Raimondi,	“Design	and	operation	of	the	JET	articulated	boom,”
IEEE	ymposium	on	engineering	problems	in	fusion	research,	Austin,	TX	(USA),	p.	144-147	1986.	
	[98]“JET	develops	improved	ICRH	for	ITER,”	EUROfusion.	[Online].	Available:	https://www.euro-fusion.org/newsletter/jet-develops-improved-icrh-for-iter/.	[Accessed:	17-Jun-2015].	[99]K.	J.	B.	Klaus	Heger,	“Lessons	Learned	With	The	Dismantling	Of	The	Karlsruhe	Reprocessing	Plant	Wak,” Waste	Management	Conference	Tucson,	AZ	(USA),	Feb.	2001.	[100]K.	K.	R.	Papp,	“ decommissioning	of	nuclear	facilities	in	germany	-	status	at	BMBF	sites.”,	Waste	Management	Conference	Tucson,	AZ	(USA)	Feb.	2002.	[101]J.	Dux,	D.	Friedrich,	W.	Lutz,	and	M.	Ripholz,	“Dismantling	of	Highly	Contaminated	Process	Instal-lations	of	the	German	Reprocessing	Facility	(wak)	-	Status	of	New	RH	Technology	-	13287,”	Waste	Management	Symposia,	Phoenix,	AZ	(USA),	INIS-US--13-WM-13287,	Jul.	2013.	[102] M.	W.	Noakes,	"Remote	dismantlement	tasks	for	the	CP5	reactor:	Implementation,	operation,	and	lessons	learned."	Oak	Ridge	National	Laboratory	Robotics	&	Process	Systems	Division	(contract	
number	DE-AC05-96OR22464)	,Oak	Ridge,	Tennessee	(USA),	Oct.	1998.		[103]The	Deactivation	&	Decommssioning	Knowledge	Management	Information	Tool,	“Chicago	Pile	5	DAWP	Robotics	for	Dismantling	and	Retrieval.”	[Online].	Available:	https://www.dndkm.org/Technology/TechnologyFactSheet.aspx?TechnologyID=893&name=Chicago%20Pile%205%20DAWP.	[104]X.	Petitet	and	A.	Garcia,	“AT1	Decommissionning	feedback	experience	fast	breeder	reprocessing	spent	fuel	facility.”	Ref.	CEA/DEN/DPA/JGN01-507	Jul.	2001.	[Online].	Available:.https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/documents/IDN_2007/Videos/AT1069D_eng.pdf	[105]P.	G.	Franck	Geffard,	“TAO2000	V2	computer-assisted	force	feedback	telemanipulators	used	as	maintenance	and	production	tools	at	the	AREVA	NC-La	Hague	fuel	recycling	plant,”	J	Field	Robot.,	vol.	29,	no.	1,	pp.	161–174,	2012.	
148
[106]G.	Piolain,	A.	Freudenreich,	P.	Monthel,	M.	Brudieu,	F.	Geffard,	and	P.	Garrec,	“Results	of	a	testing	campaign	of	the	telerobotic	system	MT200-TAO	in	AREVA	La	Hague’s	hot-cells,”	in	2012	2nd	Inter-
national	Conference	on	Applied	Robotics	for	the	Power	Industry	(CARPI),	2012,	pp.	157–162.	
	[107]“MT200	TAO,”	01-Jun-2015.	[Online].	Available:	http://www.getinge.com/nuclear/applications-products/telemanipulators/mt200-tao/.	[108]	F.	Heckendorn.	and	R.	Kress,	“Outline	for	Large-Scale	System	Operations	and	D	and	D	Report”,	Oak	Ridge	National	Laboratory	Contract	No.	DE-AC09-96SR18500	with	the	U.S.	Department	of	En-ergy	[Online].	Available:	http://sti.srs.gov/fulltext/tr2000364/tr2000364.html.	[Accessed:	23-Jun-2015].	[109] L.C.	Bares, L.S.	Conley	and	B.R.	Thompson	“Rosie	-	Mobile	Robot	Worksystem	for	Decommission-ing	and	Dismantling	Operations.	Final	Report,	April	1,	1996--January	31,	1997,”	Redzone	Robotics,	Inc.,	Pittsburgh,	PA	(United	States),	DOE/MC/33207--5634,	Dec.	1998.	[110]L.	C.	Bares,	L.	S.	Conley,	and	B.	R.	Thompson,	“Rosie:	Remote	Work	System	for	Decontamination	and	Dismantlement,”	Redzone	Robotics,	Inc.,	Pittsburgh,	PA	(United	States),	DOE/MC/33207--97/C0802;	CONF-9610231--27,	Dec.	1996.	[111]“ISO	17874-2:2004Remote-handling	devices	for	radioactive	materials	--	Part	2:	Mechanical	mas-ter-slave	manipulators.”	Dec.	2004.	[112]“ISO	17874-4:2006	RH	devices	for	radioactive	materials	--	Part	4:	Power	manipulators.”	Jan.	2006.	[113]About	TELBOT	system	“ROBOT	SYSTEM	TELBOT,”	01-Jun-2015.	[Online].	Available:	http://www.hwm.com/64-1-Robot+TELBOT.html.	
	[114]C.	Haskins,	K.	Forsberg,	M.	Krueger,	D.	Walden,	and	D.	Hamelin,	“Systems	engineering	handbook,”	in	INCOSE,	2006.	[115]European	Space	Agency,	“European	Cooperation	for	Space	Standardization.” [Online].	Available:http://www.ecss.nl/.		[116]S.	C.	Wheelwright	and	K.	B.	Clark,	Revolutionizing	Product	Development:	Quantum	Leaps	in	Speed,	
Efficiency,	and	Quality.	Simon	and	Schuster,	1992.	[117]N.	P.	Suh,	The	Principles	of	Design.	OUP	USA	|	Oxford	Series	on	Advanced	Manufacturing	6,	1990.	[118] A.	P.	Sage,	W.	B.	Rouse	Wiley:	Handbook	of	Systems	Engineering	and	Management,	2nd	Edition,Wiley-Blackwell	(Publisher),	2009.		[Online].	Available:	http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470083530.html.	[Accessed:	30-Jun-2015].	[119]B.	Boehm,	J.	A.	Lane,	S.	Koolmanojwong,	and	R.	Turner,	The	Incremental	Commitment	Spiral	Model:	
Principles	and	Practices	for	Successful	Systems	and	Software,	1	edition.	Upper	Saddle	River,	NJ:	Ad-dison-Wesley	Professional,	2014.	
149
[120]A.	Kossiakoff,	W.	N.	Sweet,	S.	Seymour,	and	S.	M.	Biemer,	Systems	engineering	principles	and	prac-
tice,	vol.	83.	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	2011.	[121]E.	Hull,	K.	Jackson,	and	J.	Dick,	Requirements	Engineering,	3rd	ed.	2011	edition.	London ;	New	York:	Springer,	2010.	[122]F.	Amjad,	H.	Weick,	J.	Mattila,	L.	Orona,	E.	Kozlova,	M.	Winkler,	K.-H.	Behr,	and	C.	Karagiannis,	“Survey	on	RH	Logistics	for	Super-FRS,”	Int.	J.	Adv.	Robot.	Syst.,	p.	1,	2013.	[123]N.	Iwasa,	H.	Weick,	and	H.	Geissel,	“New	features	of	the	Monte-Carlo	code	MOCADI,”	Nucl.	Instrum.	
Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	B	Beam	Interact.	Mater.	At.,	vol.	269,	no.	8,	pp.	752–758,	Apr.	2011.	[124]E.	Mustafin,	I.	Hofmann,	and	H.	Weick,	“Influence	of	electronic	stopping	power	on	the	total	neu-tron	yield	of	energetic	heavy	ions,”	Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	Accel.	Spectrometers	De-
tect.	Assoc.	Equip.,	vol.	501,	no.	2–3,	pp.	553–558,	Apr.	2003.	[125]E.	Kozlova,	H.	Weick,	B.	Achenbach,	K.-H.	Behr,	G.	Fehrenbacher,	H.	Geissel,	M.	Gleim,	C.	Karagian-nis,	A.	Kelic,	A.	Kratz,	T.	Radon,	K.	Sümmerer,	and	M.	Winkler,	“Layout	of	the	Super-FRS	target	hall,”	
Nucl.	Instrum.	Methods	Phys.	Res.	Sect.	B	Beam	Interact.	Mater.	At.,	vol.	266,	no.	19–20,	pp.	4275–4279,	Oct.	2008.	[126]T.	Radon,	E.	Kozlova,	G.	Fehrenbacher,	H.	Geissel,	K.	Sümmerer,	H.	Weick,	and	M.	Winkler,	“Shielding	of	the	target	area	of	the	fragment	separator	Super-FRS,”	Nucl.	Technol.,	vol.	168,	no.	2,	pp.	492–496,	2009.	[127]L.	Miguel,	H.	Weick,	J.	Mattila,	F.	Amjad,	E.	Kozlova,	C.	Karagiannis,	K.-H.	Behr,	and	M.	Winkler,	“Super-FRS	Target	Area	RH:	Scenario	and	Development,”	Int.	J.	Adv.	Robot.	Syst.,	p.	1,	2013.	[128]Aircraft	Design:	A	Conceptual	Approach,	3rd	edition.	Reston,	VA:	Amer	Inst	of	Aeronautics	&,	1999.	[129]“IEEE	Draft	Guide:	Adoption	of	the	Project	Management	Institute	(PMI)	Standard:	A	Guide	to	the	Project	Management	Body	of	Knowledge	(PMBOK	Guide)-2008	(4th	edition),”	IEEE	P1490D1	May	
2011,	pp.	1–505,	Jun.	2011.	[130]M.		Baudin,	P.	Bonal,	and	J.	D.	Jonghe,	“A	DSM-based	‘2.0’	system	for	human	intervention	planning	and	scheduling	in	facilities	emitting	ionizing	radiations,”	DSM	2012	Proc.	14th	Int.	DSM	Conf.	Kyoto	
Jpn.,	2012.	[131]USA	Department	of	Defense	“Steady	state	total	dose	irradiation	procedure,	MIL-STD-883C,	Meth-od	1019.9.”	pp	131-144	Jun.2013.	[Online].	Available:	http://www.dscc.dla.mil/downloads/milspec/docs/mil-std-883/std883.pdf	[132]Space	components	coordination	group	ESS,	“Total	dose	steady-state	irradiation	test	method.	ESA/SCC	basic	spec.	no.	22900.”	1987. [Online].	Available:		https://escies.org/download/webDocumentFile?id=760	[132]G.D.	Crnkovic,	"Constructive	Research	and	Info-computational	Knowledge	Generation,"	Model-Based	Reasoning	in	Science	and	Technology,	Vol	314	of	the	series	Studies	in	Computational	Intelli-gence,	pp.	359-380,	2010.		
150
[133]M.	Fletcher,	"CISIS	Facility:Facility	Design	Challenges,"	Proton	Accelerators	for	Science	and	Inno-vation	workshop, Fermilab,		12–14	January	2012.	[Online].	Available:http://www.hep.princeton.edu/mumu/target/pasiw12/fletcher_011312.pdf.	
151
Appendix I: Super-FRS Tunnel Layout
152
Figure 87. Distances along the Super-FRS main tunnel and regions of potential exposure during remote maintenance for equipment and
radiation workers.
153
Figure 88. Super-FRS main tunnel entrance for RH equipment and humans.
154
Figure 89. Cross section of the Super-FRS main tunnel, the working environment for the MTRH system.
155
Figure 90. RH equipment parking space analysis
156
Figure 91. Parking space analysis at FMF2.
157
Appendix II: MTRH System for RH in the Super-FRS Main
Tunnel: System Requirements Document (SRD)
158
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Appendix III: Super-FRS vacuum chambers
162
Figure 92. List of Super-FRS diagnostics vacuum chambers and beam line inserts
163
Figure 93. FPF2 vacuum chamber layout and beam inserts.
164
Figure 94. FPF3 vacuum chamber layout and beam inserts.
165
Figure 95. FPF4 vacuum chamber layout and beam inserts.
166
Figure 96. FMF2 vacuum chamber layout and beam inserts.
167
Appendix IV: Requirements and Functional Analysis
	This	appendix	includes	the	detailed	requirements	traceability	and	functional	tradeoff	analysis	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	concept	designs.	The	 requirements	analysis	carried	out	 for	 the	MTRH	de-signs	were	very	extensive	and	compared	the	system	requirements	against	the	concept	design	features.	In	 this	section,	 features	of	all	 three	concept	design	and	 results	 from	 requirements	analysis	are	pre-sented	from	Table	21	till	Table	26.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
168
Requirements analysis data
Feature list MTRH systems for Super-FRS main tunnel
I.D.	 Features	F1	 Modification	to	COTs	system	for	radiation	protection:		
· Replacement,	shielding,	or	radiation	hardening	of	MTRH	system	components.	
· Radiation	hardened	cable	onboard	the	MTRH	system	components.	
· Contamination	covers	for	the	MTRH	system	components.	
	F2	 Six	axis	(KUKA	Titan)	industrial	manipulator	(radiation	tolerant).	F3	 Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	or	AGV)	(radiation	tolerant).	
· For	the	six	axis	robot.	
· For	the	shielding	container.	F4	 Shielding	container	to	transfer	beamline	inserts.	F5	 Customized	design	for		Super-FRS	main	tunnel:	
· Remote	handling	tools	designed	based	on	task	specification.	
· Redesigned	connector	panel	for	Super-FRS	beamline	insert.	
· Beamline	insert	design	modification	for	remote	handling	needs.	
· The	codes	and	standard	concerning	the	designed	need	to	be	fulfilled.	F6	 Power	supply	system	(to	power	the	remote	handling	equipment	during	remote	handling	task	sequence	excluding	during	MTRH	system	transfer).	F7	 Battery	power	pack	(to	power	the	MTRH	system	during	transfer	across	the	tunnel	&	as	backup	power	in	case	of	power	failure).	F8	 Automatic	navigation	system	to	drive	the	MTRH	system	into	position.	F9	 Automatic	parking	system	to	securely	park	the	MTRH	system.	F10	 Communication	and	control	system	to	operated	and	drive	MTRH	system	(Automated	task	sequence	and	human	in	loop	if	required)	F11	 Visual	feedback	(CCTV	)	system	to	provide	overview	of	remote	handling	task	sequence.	F12	 Remotely	controlled	mobile	crane	used	as	a	redundant	system	in	case	of	MTRH	system	primary	remote	handling	equipment	failure.	F13	 Modular	and	reliable	design	approach	while	using	the	COTs	for	the:	
· MTRH	system	components.	
· Connector	plates.	
· Tooling	system.	
· Control	system.	F14	 Failure	Mode	Effect	Analysis	(FMEA)	of	the	remote	handling	task	sequence.	F15	 Establishing	the	detailed	remote	handling	task	sequence	for	remote	maintenance	within	the	tunnel.		
Table	21.	MTRH	system	concept	1	Features	list	(for	the	traceability	matrix).
169
I.D.	 Features	F1	 Modification	to	COTs	system	for	radiation	protection:		
· Replacement,	shielding,	or	radiation	hardening	of	MTRH	system	components.	
· Radiation	hardened	cable	onboard	the	MTRH	system	components.	
· Contamination	covers	for	the	MTRH	system	components.	
· Radiation	shielding	and	fixture	for	MSM	F2	 The	remotely	controlled	MSM	(e.g.	electrical	powered	MT200	TAO,	hydraulically	powered	Schilling	titan	robotics,	pneumatic	powered	Festo	Exohand,	or	industrial	robot	customized	for	MSM).	F3	 Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	or	AGV)	(radiation	tolerant):	F4	 Replacement	repair	and	holding	bay	for	activate	beamline	insert.	The	bay	is	also	used	for	holding	the	bay	in	place.	The	bay	also	where	the	beamline	insert	held	and	transferred	across	to	the	storage	location.	The	bay	area	is	also	equipped	with	shielding	flask	to	transfer	the	beamline	insert	to	hotcell.	F5	 Customized	design	for		Super-FRS	main	tunnel:	
· Remote	handling	tools	designed	based	on	task	specification.	
· Redesigned	connector	panel	for	Super-FRS	beamline	insert.	
· Beamline	insert	design	modification	for	remote	handling	needs.	
· The	codes	and	standard	concerning	the	designed	need	to	be	fulfilled.	F6	 Power	supply	system	(to	power	the	remote	handling	equipment	during	remote	handling	task	sequence	excluding	during	MTRH	system	transfer).	F7	 Battery	power	pack	(to	power	the	MTRH	system	during	transfer	across	the	tunnel	&	as	backup	power	in	case	of	power	failure).	F8	 Automatic	navigation	system	to	drive	the	MTRH	system	into	position.	F9	 Automatic	parking	system	to	securely	park	the	MTRH	system.	F10	 Communication	and	control	system	to	operated	and	drive	MTRH	system	F11	 Visual	feedback	(CCTV	)	system	to	provide	overview	of	remote	handling	task	sequence.	F12	 Remotely	controlled	mobile	crane	used	as	a	basic	system	to	handle	heavy	load	such	as	lifting	of	the	beamline	inserts.	F13	 Modular	and	reliable	design	approach	while	using	the	COTs	for	the:	
· MTRH	system	components.	
· Connector	plates.	
· Tooling	system.	
· Control	system.	F14	 Failure	Mode	Effect	Analysis	(FMEA)	of	the	remote	handling	task	sequence.	F15	 Establishing	the	detailed	remote	handling	task	sequence	for	remote	maintenance	within	the	tunnel	
Table	22.	MTRH	system	concept	2	Features	list	(for	the	traceability	matrix).
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I.D.	 Features	F1	 Modification	to	COTs	system	for	radiation	protection:		
· Replacement,	shielding,	or	radiation	hardening	of	MTRH	system	components.	
· Radiation	hardened	cable	onboard	the	MTRH	system	components.	
· Contamination	covers	for	the	MTRH	system	components.	
· Radiation	shielding	and	fixture	for	MSM	F2	 Overhead	gantry	coordinate	robot	(i.e.	Hager	Portal	stacker	PLF/Jumbo).	F3	 Mobility	of	MTRH	System:	
· Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	or	AGV)	(radiation	tolerant)	for	shielding	container.	
· Overhead	guide	rails	for	gantry	coordinate	robot	to	move	across	tunnel.	F4	 Shielding	container	to	transfer	beamline	inserts.	F5	 Customized	design	for		Super-FRS	main	tunnel:	
· Remote	handling	tools	designed	based	on	task	specification.	
· Redesigned	connector	panel	for	Super-FRS	beamline	insert.	
· Beamline	insert	design	modification	for	remote	handling	needs.	
· The	codes	and	standard	concerning	the	designed	need	to	be	fulfilled.	F6	 Power	supply	system	(to	power	the	remote	handling	equipment	during	remote	handling	task	sequence	excluding	during	MTRH	system	transfer).	F7	 Battery	power	pack	(to	power	the	MTRH	system	during	transfer	across	the	tunnel	&	as	backup	power	in	case	of	power	failure).	F8	 Automatic	navigation	system	to	drive	the	MTRH	system	into	position.	F9	 Automatic	parking	system	to	securely	park	the	MTRH	system.	F10	 Communication	and	control	system	to	operated	and	drive	MTRH	system	F11	 Visual	feedback	(CCTV)	system	to	provide	overview	of	remote	handling	task	sequence.	F12	 Remotely	controlled	mobile	crane	used	as	a	primary	component	of	MTRH	system	to	transfer	beamline	insert.	F13	 Modular	and	reliable	design	approach	while	using	the	COTs	for	the:	
· MTRH	system	components.	
· Connector	plates.	
· Tooling	system.	
· Control	system.	F14	 Failure	Mode	Effect	Analysis	(FMEA)	of	the	remote	handling	task	sequence.	F15	 Establishing	the	detailed	remote	handling	task	sequence	for	remote	maintenance	within	the	tunnel	
Table	23.	MTRH	system	concept	3	Features	list	(for	the	traceability	matrix).	
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MTRH systems for Super-FRS main tunnel requirements analysis resultsMTRH	concept	1	 	 	 	Percentage	of	requirements	met	 	 	 	S.No.	 Types	of	Requirements		 Fullfiled	 Total	 Percentage	1	 System	functions	requirements	 7	 7	 100	2	 Basic	configuration	requirements	 14	 14	 100	3	 Interface	requirements	 7	 7	 100	4	 General	requirements	 5	 5	 100	5	 Functional	requirements	 7	 7	 100	6	 Assembly	requirements	 2	 2	 100	7	 System	operational	requirements	 3 5 60	8	 System	maintenance		requirements	 6	 7	 85.71428571	9	 Structural		requirements	 0	 8	 0	10	 Position	accuracy	requirements	 2	 2	 100	11	 Seismic	requirements	 4	 5	 80	12	 Electrical	requirements	 0	 2	 0	13	 Grounding	and	Insulation	requirements	 0	 4	 0	14	 Instrumentation	and	control	requirements	 6	 11	 54.54545455	15	 Computer	hardware	and	software	requirements	 0	 8	 0	16	 RH	Control	Room	 0	 6	 0	17	 RH	Equipment	 0	 3	 0	18	 HVAC	 0	 1	 0	19	 Vacuum	requirements	 4	 4	 100	20	 Thermal	management	requirements	 3 3 100	21	 Electromagnetic	requirements	 2 2 100	22	 Material		requirements	 5 5 100	23	 Installation	requirements	 2 2 100	24	 Testing	and	inspection	requirements	 0 3 0	25	 Decommissioning	requirements	 0 2 0	26	 Safety	design	criteria	requirements	 13 16 81.25	27	 Environmental	Impact		requirements	 1 1 100	28	 RAMI		requirements	 20 35 57.14285714	29	 Applicable	codes	and	Standards	requirements	 0 9 0	
	 Total	 113	 186	 60.75268817	
Table	24.	MTRH	system	concept	one:	Percentage	of	requirements	met.	
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MTRH	concept	2	 	 	 	Percentage	of	requirements	met	 	 	 	S.No.	 Types	of	Requirements		 Fulfilled	 Total	 Percentage	1	 System	functions	requirements	 7	 7	 100	2	 Basic	configuration	requirements	 14	 14	 100	3	 Interface	requirements	 7	 7	 100	4	 General	requirements	 5	 5	 100	5	 Functional	requirements	 7	 7	 100	6	 Assembly	requirements	 2	 2	 100	7	 System	operational	requirements	 3	 5 60	8	 System	maintenance		requirements	 5	 7	 71.4	9	 Structural		requirements	 0	 8	 0	10	 Position	accuracy	requirements	 2	 2	 100	11	 Seismic	requirements	 4	 5	 80	12	 Electrical	requirements	 0	 2	 0	13	 Grounding	and	Insulation	requirements	 0	 4	 0	14	 Instrumentation	and	control	requirements	 7	 11	 63.6	15	 Computer	hardware	and	software	requirements	 0	 8	 0	16	 RH	Control	Room	 0	 6	 0	17	 RH	Equipment	 0	 3	 0	18	 HVAC	 0	 1	 0	19	 Vacuum	requirements	 4	 4	 100	20	 Thermal	management	requirements	 3	 3 100	21	 Electromagnetic	requirements	 2	 2 100	22	 Material		requirements	 5	 5 100	23	 Installation	requirements	 2	 2 100	24	 Testing	and	inspection	requirements	 0	 3 0	25	 Decommissioning	requirements	 0	 2 0	26	 Safety	design	criteria	requirements	 13	 16 81.3	27	 Environmental	Impact		requirements	 0	 1 0	28	 RAMI		requirements	 20	 35 57.1	29	 Applicable	codes	and	Standards	requirements	 0	 9 0	
	 Total	 112	 186	 60.2	
Table	25.	MTRH	system	concept	two:	Percentage	of	requirements	met.	
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MTRH	concept	3	 	 	 	Percentage	of	requirements	met	 	 	 	S.No.	 Types	of	Requirements		 Fulfilled	 Total	 Percentage	1	 System	functions	requirements	 7	 7	 100	2	 Basic	configuration	requirements	 14	 14	 100	3	 Interface	requirements	 7	 7	 100	4	 Genral	requirements	 5	 5	 100	5	 Functional	requirements	 7	 7	 100	6	 Assembly	requirements	 2	 2	 100	7	 System	operational	requirements	 3 5 60	8	 System	maintenance		requirements	 6	 7	 85.7	9	 Structural		requirements	 0	 8	 0	10	 Position	accuracy	requirements	 2	 2	 100	11	 Seismic	requirements	 4	 5	 80	12	 Electrical	requirements	 0	 2	 0	13	 Grounding	and	Insulation	requirements	 0	 4	 0	14	 Instrumentation	and	control	requirements	 6	 11	 54.5	15	 Computer	hardware	and	software	requirements	 0	 8	 0	16	 RH	Control	Room	 0	 6	 0	17	 RH	Equipment	 0	 3	 0	18	 HVAC	 0	 1	 0	19	 Vacuum	requirements	 4	 4	 100	20	 Thermal	management	requirements	 3 3 100	21	 Electromagnetic	requirements	 2 2 100	22	 Material		requirements	 5 5 100	23	 Installation	requirements	 2 2 100	24	 Testing	and	inspection	requirements	 0 3 0	25	 Decommissioning	requirements	 0 2 0	26	 Safety	design	criteria	requirements	 13 16 81.3	27	 Environmental	Impact		requirements	 1 1 100	28	 RAMI		requirements	 20 35 57.1	29	 Applicable	codes	and	Standards	requirements	 0 9 0	
	 Total	 113	 186	 60.8	
Table	26.	MTRH	system	concept	three:	Percentage	of	requirements	met.	
Functional tradeoff analysis for MTRH system concept designsIn	order	 to	carry	out	 the	 functional	 analysis	 the	MTRH	system	concept	designs,	 the	 following	steps	were	used:	
· Develop	subsystem	 list	for	each	MTRH	system	concept	using	bottom	up	approach	while	ana-lyzing	the	system	functions	(see	Table	27-Table	29)	
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· Evaluate	the	MTRH	system	concept	design	subsystems	using	a	functions	vs	subsystems	matrix.	This	identifies	key	subsystems	that	can	be	used	for	various	functions.	
· Based	on	the	analysis,	develop	detailed	product	tree	that	can	be	used	for	the	following	purpos-es	(this	analysis	is	out	of	scope	of	this	thesis):	
o Defining	detailed	list	for	the	MTRH	system	architecture	design	(up	to	component	level).	
o Fault	tree	analysis.		
o Develop	a	detailed	task	sequence	by	identifying	physical	and	control	interfaces.	
Subsystems list for the MTRH system concept designs
Table	27.	Subsystems	list	of	MTRH	system	concept	one.	
Table	28.	Subsystems	list	of	MTRH	system	concept	two.	
I.D.	 Component	S1	 The	 remotely	 controlled	 MSM	 (e.g.	 electrical	 powered	 MT200	 TAO,	 hydraulically	powered	 Schilling	 titan	 robotics,	 pneumatic	 powered	 Festo	Exohand,	 or	 industrial	robot	customized	for	MSM)	S2	 Task	specific	tooling	system	S3	 Shielding	wall,	and	fixture	for	MSM	
I.D.	 Component	S1	 Six	axis	(KUKA	Titan)	industrial	manipulator	S2	 Task	specific	tooling	system	S3	 Shielding	container	to	transfer	beamline	inserts	S4	 Power	supply	system	S5	 Battery	power	pack		&	backup	power	system	S6	 Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	or	AGV)	S7	 Automatic	navigation	system	S8	 Automatic	parking	system	S9	 Communication	and	control	system	S10	 Visual	feedback	(CCTV	)	system	S11	 Remotely	controlled	mobile	crane	S12	 Contamination	protection	cover	
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S4	 Replacement	repair	and	holding	bay	for	activate	beamline	insert.	The	bay	is	also	used	for	holding	the	bay	in	place.	S5	 Power	supply	system	S6	 Battery	power	pack		&	backup	power	system	S7	 Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	or	AGV)	S8	 Automatic	navigation	system	S9	 Automatic	parking	system	S10	 Communication	and	control	system	S11	 Visual	feedback	(CCTV	)	system	S12	 Remotely	controlled	mobile	crane	S13	 Contamination	protection	cover	
	
Table	29.	Subsystems		list	of	MTRH	system	concept	three.	
I.D.	 Component	S1	 Overhead	gantry	coordinate	robot	(i.e.	Hager	Portal	stacker	PLF/Jumbo)	S2	 Task	specific	 tooling	system.	The	overhead	gantry	crane	can	also	be	equipped	with	six	axis	manipulator	that	can	be	remotely	controlled	to	carry	out	remote	manipula-tion.	S3	 Shielding	container	to	transfer	beamline	inserts	S4	 Power	supply	system	S5	 Battery	power	pack		&	backup	power	system	S6	 Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	or	AGV)	to	transfer	the	shielding	container	S7	 Overhead	guide	rails	for	gantry	coordinate	robot	to	move	across	tunnel	S8	 Automatic	navigation	system	S9	 Automatic	parking	system	S10	 Communication	and	control	system	S11	 Visual	feedback	(CCTV	)	system	
176
S12	 Remotely	controlled	mobile	crane	S13	 Contamination	protection	cover	S14	 Automatic	disconnection	of	connector	panel	or	use	of	tooling	(F2)	
Function vs Subsystem matrix analysis for MTRH system concept designs
Table	30.	Function	vs	Subsystem	matrix	analysis	for	MTRH	system	concept	one.	
Functional	vs	Subsystem	analysis	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	MTRH	system	concept	one	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Functional	S.No.	 Feature	/	Subsystem	ID	 S1	 S2	 S3	 S4	 S5	 S6	 S7	 S8	 S9	 S10	 S11	 S12	
1	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	1,1	 X	 		 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	1,1,1	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		1,1,2	 		 		 		 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 		1,1,3	 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	1,2	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,2,1	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,2,2	 		 		 X	 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		1,2,3	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,2,4	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		1,3	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 		 		 X	 		1,3,1	 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,3,2	 X	 		 		 		 		 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		1,3,3	 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	 		1,4	 		 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,4,1	 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,4,2	 		 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
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Table	31.	Functions	vs	Subsystem	matrix	analysis	for	MTRH	system	concept	two.	
Functional	vs	Subsystem	analysis	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	MTRH	system	concept	two	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Functional	S.No.	 Feature	/	Subsystem	ID	 S1	 S2	 S3	 S4	 S5	 S6	 S7	 S8	 S9	 S10	 S11	 S12	 S13	
1	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	1,1	 X	 		 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	1,1,1	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		1,1,2	 		 		 		 		 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		1,1,3	 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	1,2	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 X	 		1,2,1	 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 X	 		1,2,2	 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,2,3	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,2,4	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		1,3	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 		 		 X	 		1,3,1	 X	 X	 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	 		1,3,2	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 X	 		 X	 		 		 X	 		1,3,3	 		 		 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 X	 X	 		 X	1,4	 		 		 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,4,1	 		 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,4,2	 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Table	32.	Functions	vs	Subsystem	matrix	analysis	for	MTRH	system	concept	three.	
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Functional	vs	Subsystem	analysis	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	MTRH	system	concept	three	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		Functional	S.No.	 Feature	/	Subsystem	ID	 S1	 S2	 S3	 S4	 S5	 S6	 S7	 S8	 S9	 S	10	 S	11	 S12	 S	13	 S	14	
1	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	1,1	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	1,1,1	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		1,1,2	 		 		 		 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		1,1,3	 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	 X	1,2	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		1,2,1	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 X	 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		1,2,2	 		 		 X	 		 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		1,2,3	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	1,2,4	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		 		1,3	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 X	 		 		1,3,1	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		1,3,2	 X	 X	 X	 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		1,3,3	 		 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 X	 X	 X	 X	 		 X	 X	1,4	 		 		 		 X	 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,4,1	 		 		 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		1,4,2	 		 		 		 X	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
 MTRH system concept designs product trees
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Figure	97.	MTRH	system	concept	designs	product	trees	(1	of	3)
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Figure	97.	MTRH	system	concept	designs	product	trees	(2	of	3)
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Figure	97.	MTRH	system	concept	designs	product	trees	(3	of	3)	
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Appendix V: Cost analysis for Super-FRS MTRH system
concept designs	
	This	appendix	addresses	the	cost	estimation	aspect	of	the	MTRH	system	concept	designs.	Cost	is	a	key	decision	factor	in	the	selection	and	planning	of	the	any	engineering	project.	Since	cost	engineering	is	full	separate	 field	of	 its	own,	here	we	mainly	concentrate	on	 the	cost	estimates	of	 the	 initial	system	development.	The	operating	cost	 is	not	considered	at	this	stage,	only	capital	 investment	will	be	con-sidered.	These	cost	estimates	are	based	on	the	market	enquires	and	discussion	with	RH	experts.	How-ever,	although	a	more	detailed	cost	analysis	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	such	cost	analysis	is	of	the	utmost	importance	and	more	detailed	cost	estimation	requires	to	be	integrated	into	the	final	pro-ject	analysis.	The	purpose	of	this	cost	analysis	is	to	be	used	to	compare	the	different	concepts	for	sake	of	selecting	the	MTRH	concept	design.		However,	this	analysis	can	also	be	used	as	baseline	for	estimat-ing	the	final	cost	of	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system.		
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Table	33.	Initial	cost	estimates	for	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	concept	one.	Preliminary	cost	estimates	
	MTRH	system	concept	one	
	S.No	 Cost	incurring	entities		 Value	(in	Kilo	€)	
1	 	Six	axis	(KUKA	Titan)	industrial	robot	cost	 650	
2	 Tools	for	RH	cost	 65	
3	 Shielding	container	cost	 25	
4	 Power	supply	system	Parking	system	communication	sys-tem	Control	system	cost	 80	
5	 Navigation	cost	 30	
6	 Visual	feedback	system	cost	 20	
7	 Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	/	AGV)	cost	 750	
8	 Remotely	controlled	crane	 300	
9	 Personal		training	cost	 100	10	 Operational	and	maintenance	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	11	 Testing	and	support	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	12	 Disposal	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	
		 Total	cost	 2020	
Table	34.	Initial	cost	estimates	for	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	concept	two.	Preliminary	cost	estimates	
	MTRH	system	concept	two	
	S.No	 Cost	incurring	entities		 Value	(in	Kilo	€)	
1	 Remotely	controlled	Master	slave	manipulator	(MSM)	 700	
2	 Tools	for	RH	 70	
3	 Shielding	wall	and	MSM	operational	fixture	 100	
4	
Power	supply	system,	Parking	system,	communication	sys-tem,	Control	system	cost	 80	
5	 Navigation		 30	
6	 Visual	feedback	system	 50	
7	 Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	/	AGV)	 400	
8	 Remotely	controlled	crane	 300	
9	 Modification	to	Super-FRS	beamline		system	 200	10	 Personal		training	 200	11	 Operational	and	maintenance	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	12	 Testing	and	support	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	13	 Disposal	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	
		 Total	cost	 2130	
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Table	35.	Initial	cost	estimates	for	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	concept	three.	Preliminary	cost	estimates	
	MTRH	system	concept	three	
	S.No	 Cost	incurring	entities		 Value	(in	Kilo	€)	1	 Overhead	gantry	coordinate	robot	 700	
2	 Tools	for	RH	 70	
3	 Shielding	container	 25	4	 Dual	arm	schilling	robotics	titan	4	for	remote	manipulation	 270	
5	
Power	supply	system,	parking	system,	communication	sys-tem,	control	system	 80	
6	 Navigation		 30	
7	 Visual	feedback	system	 20	8	 Mobile	platform	(KUKA	Omnimove	/	AGV)	 400	
9	 Remotely	controlled	crane	 300	10	 Modification	to	Super-FRS	facility	design	 200	11	 Modification	to	Super-FRS	beamline		system	 200	12	 Personal		training	 200	13	 Overhead	guide	rail	 300	14	 Operational	and	maintenance	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	15	 Testing	and	support	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	16	 Disposal	cost	 Not	calculated	at	this	stage	
		 Total	cost	 2795	
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Appendix	VI	:	Super-FRS	Radiation	Analysis	
This	appendix	details	the	radiation	analysis	carried	out	for	the	Super-FRS	MTRH	system	concept	de-signs.	The	radiation	analysis	was	carried	out	using	State	of	the	art	tools	and	 is	based	on	the	replace-ment	of	the	beamline	insert	at	FPF2	location.	The	results	in	this	section	provide	the	radiation	analysis	data,	 including	dose	 rates	across	 the	critical	points	and	dose	 received	by	equipment	and	personnel.	Due	to	the	fact	that	the	radiation	analysis	 is	carried	out	using	FLUKA	simulation	analysis,	the	Super-FRS	main	tunnel	was	divided	into	two	sections	Tiel	A	and	Tiel	B	(in	German	Section	A	and	B).	The	dos-es	are	shown	in	µSv	in	order	to	show	the	dose	impact	of	radiation	on	humans,	rather	than	on	the	RH	equipment.	
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Figure	 98.	 Screen	 shot	 of	 the	 MTRH	 concept	 one	 radiation	 analysis	 table.	 “Cumulative	 dose	
received"	 column	 shows	 the	 doses	 received	 by	 the	 MTRH	 concept	 one	 moving	 at	 different	
speeds.		
Speed Situation Dose	rates	(Average)	(µSv/h) Total	dose	(Average)(µSv	) Dose	rates	(Average)(µSv/h) Total	dose	(Average)(µSv	)
	Dose	Received	(Average)(µSv)
Comulative	dose	(Average)	(µSv) CommentsTravelling	across	tunnel	(equipment) 162,2 48,25 2,4 0,693 97,886 Equipmenttravelling doses1840,5 Robot operationdoses988,4167 Shielding box
operation dosesTravelling	across	tunnel	(equipment) 162,2 72,4 2,4 1,04 146,88 Equipmenttravelling doses1840,5 Robot operationdoses988,4167 Shielding box
operation dosesTravelling	across	tunnel	(equipment) 162,2 145 2,4 2,08 294,16 Equipmenttravelling doses1840,5 Robot operationdoses988,4167 Shielding boxoperation doses
Teil	A Teil	B
Performaing	task	(equipment)0.3Km/hr 409
0.1	Km/hr Performaing	task	(equipment)
Performaing	task	(equipment)0.2km/hr 409
409
2828,917
2828,917 2926,80267
2975,79667
3123,076672828,917
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Figure	 99.	 Screen	 shot	 of	 the	 MTRH	 concept	 two	 radiation	 analysis	 table.	 “Cumulative	 dose	
received”	column	shows	the	doses	received	by	MTRH	concept	two	moving	at	different	speeds.		
This	is	the	only	case	where	human	operators	are	exposed	to	dose	along	with	equipment.	
Speed Situation Dose	rates	(Average)	(µSv/h) total	dose	(µSv	) Dose	rates	(Average)(µSv/h) total	dose	(µSv) dose		collected	(µSv) Total	dose	(µSv) CommentsTravelling	across	tunnel	(equipment) 197 60 2,4 0,693 60,293 Multiplied withtwo the doses arefor two MRC and
MC1500 N/A N/A Mobile repaircenter dose1162,5 Mobile crane doseTravelling	across	tunnel	(personal) 24,2 0,699 0,548 0,0145 0,7135 Multiplied withtwo the doses arefor two MRC and
MC operators45,2 N/A N/A Mobile repair
center operator60,266652 Mobile crane dose
operator dose
Travelling	across	tunnel	(equipment) 197 89 2,4 1,04 90,44 Multiplied withtwo the doses arefor two MRC and
MC1500 N/A N/A Mobile repaircenter dose1162,5 Mobile crane doseTravelling	across	tunnel	(personal) 24,2 1,05 0,548 0,0218 1,0718 Multiplied withtwo the doses arefor two MRC and
MC operators45,2 N/A N/A Mobile repair
center operator60,266652 Mobile crane dose
operator dose
Travelling	across	tunnel	(equipment) 197 179 2,4 2,08 181,08 Multiplied withtwo the doses arefor two MRC and
MC1500 N/A N/A Mobile repaircenter dose1162,5 Mobile crane doseTravelling	across	tunnel	(personal) 24,2 2 0,548 0,0435 2,1435 Multiplied withtwo the doses arefor two MRC and
MC operators45,2 N/A N/A Mobile repair
center operator60,266652 Mobile crane dose
operator dose
3km/hr Performaing	task		(personal) 45,2
0.2km/hr Performaing	task	(equipment)
Teil	A Teil	B
0.3Km/hr Performaing	task	(equipment) 225
225
Performaing	task		(personal) 45,2
Performaing	task	(equipment) 225
45,2Performaing	task		(personal)
1km/hr
0.1Km/hr
2km/hr
105,4666516
2783,086
106,8936516
2843,38
107,6102516
3024,66
109,7536516
2662,5
2662,5
2662,5
105,4666516
105,4666516
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Figure	100.	Screen	shot	of	the	MTRH	concept	three	radiation	analysis	table.	“Cumulative	dose	
received”	column	shows	the	doses	recieved	by	MTRH	concept	three	moving	at	different	speeds.		
	
Figure	101.	Screen	 shot	 for	 the	MTRH	 concept	one	and	 three.	The	 table	 shows	 the	 radiation	
exposure	time	for	both	concepts.	The	time	calculaitons	are	based	on	an	initial	definition	of	the	
RH	task	sequence.	The	task	sequence	can	be	optimized	using	MatPlanner.				
Speed Situation Dose	rates	(Average)	(µSv/h) Total	dose	(Average)(µSv	) Dose	rates	(Average)(µSv/h) Total	dose	(Average)(µSv	)
	Dose	Received	(Average)(µSv)
Comulative	dose	(Average)	(µSv) CommentsTravelling	across	tunnel	(Shielding	box) 162,2 48,25 2,4 0,693 97,886 Shielding	box	transport	dosesTravelling	across	tunnel	(overhead	robot) 165 13,7 0,343 0,398 28,196 Overhead	robot	transport	dosePerforming	task	(overhead	robot)	Idle 447 968,5 overhead	robot	operation	dosesPerforming	task	(overhead	robot	)	handling	beam 542 1129,167Performaing	task	(Shielding	box) 409 988,4167 Shielding	box	operation	dosesTravelling	across	tunnel	(Shielding	box) 162,2 72,4 2,4 1,04 146,88 Shielding	box	transport	dosesTravelling	across	tunnel	(overhead	robot) 165 68,6 0,343 0,456 138,112 Overhead	robot	transport	dosePerforming	task	(overhead	robot)	Idle 447 968,5 overhead	robot	operation	dosesPerforming	task	(overhead	robot	)	handling	beam 542 1129,167Performing	task	(Shielding	box) 409 988,4167 Shielding	box	operation	dosesTravelling	across	tunnel	(Shielding	box) 162,2 145 2,4 2,08 294,16 Shielding	box	transport	dosesTravelling	across	tunnel	(overhead	robot) 165 137 0,343 0,631 275,262 Overhead	robot	transport	dosePerforming	task	(overhead	robot)	Idle 447 968,5 overhead	robot	operation	dosesPerforming	task	(overhead	robot	)	handling	beam 542 1129,167Performing	task	(Shielding	box) 409 988,4167 Shielding	box	operation	doses
Teil	A Teil	B
0.3Km/hr 3212,165333086,083
0.2km/hr 3371,075333086,083
0.1	Km/hr 3655,505333086,083
S.No. Time	for	various	situation (in	min) (in	hours)1 Exposure	time	for	mobile	robot		(concept	one) 275 4,5833333332 Exposure	time	for	shielding	box	(concept	one/three) 145 2,4166666673 Exposure	of	over	head	robot	to	higher	dose	(concept	three) 125 2,0833333334 Exposure	of	robot	to	lower	dose	when	idle	(concept	three) 130 2,166666667
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Figure	102.	 Screen	 shot	 for	 the	MTRH	 concept	 two.	The	 table	 shows	 the	 radiaiton	 exposure	
time	 for	the	MTRH	concept	two.	This	concept	has	more	components	and	human	 involvement,	
hence	the	time	calcuation	is	complicated	when	compared	to	concepts	one	and	three.	The	time	
calculaitons	are	based	on	initial	defined	RH	task	sequence.	The	task	sequence	can	be	optimized	
using	MatPlanner.				
	
	
S.No. Time	for	various	situation (in	min) (in	hours)1 Total	time	needed	for	remote	handling	task	in	the	tunnel 420 72 Total	time	needed	for	onsite	remote	mainteance	and	later	transfer	to	the	hotcell	for	the	waste.	Note	exposure	time	for	operator	increases	during	onsite	mainteance. 576 9,63 Total	time	needed	for	remote	mainteance	and	transfer	the	beamline	insert	to	hotcell	(no	onsite	mainteance) 481 8,0166666674 Exposure	time	for	MRC	operator	to	radiation	travelling 40 0,6666666675 Exposure	time	for	MC	operator	to	radiation 40 0,6666666676 Exposure	time	for	MRC	during	operation 60 17 Exposure	time	for	MC	during	operation 80 1,3333333338 Exposure	time	for	the	MRC	unit	during	operation 400 6,6666666679 Exposure	time	for	MC	unit	during	operation 310 5,16666666710 Exposure time of MRC unit during onsite mainteance 95 1,58333333311 Exposure time of MC unit during onsite mainteance 95 1,583333333
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